Author
Geoff A. Parker
Other affiliations: Imperial College London, University of Cambridge
Bio: Geoff A. Parker is an academic researcher from University of Liverpool. The author has contributed to research in topics: Sperm competition & Sperm. The author has an hindex of 66, co-authored 151 publications receiving 24164 citations. Previous affiliations of Geoff A. Parker include Imperial College London & University of Cambridge.
Topics: Sperm competition, Sperm, Population, Sexual selection, Sexual conflict
Papers published on a yearly basis
Papers
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TL;DR: In this article, Simpson et al. describe a method to solve the problem of homonymity in Bee W l d 34, 14) and show that it works well in beekeeping.
Abstract: by M. Simpson in Bee W l d 34, 14).
3,892 citations
TL;DR: Predictions compatible with the observations are given, indicating that RHP loss alone can be adequate to explain withdrawal: escalation behaviour.
1,914 citations
TL;DR: In this article, a theoretical analysis is made of the evolution of behavioral strategies in contest situations, and it is concluded that in asymmetric contests the ESS is likely to be a "mixed" strategy; that is, either the population will be genetically polymorphic or individuals will be behaviourally variable.
1,750 citations
TL;DR: Punishing strategies are used to establish and maintain dominance relationships, to discourage parasites and cheats, to discipline offspring or prospective sexual partners and to maintain cooperative behaviour.
Abstract: Although positive reciprocity (reciprocal altruism) has been a focus of interest in evolutionary biology, negative reciprocity (retaliatory infliction of fitness reduction) has been largely ignored. In social animals, retaliatory aggression is common, individuals often punish other group members that infringe their interests, and punishment can cause subordinates to desist from behaviour likely to reduce the fitness of dominant animals. Punishing strategies are used to establish and maintain dominance relationships, to discourage parasites and cheats, to discipline offspring or prospective sexual partners and to maintain cooperative behaviour.
901 citations
TL;DR: Optimization models help to test the insight into the biological constraints that influence the outcome of evolution by improving the understanding about adaptations and demonstrating that natural selection produces optimal solutions.
Abstract: Optimization models help us to test our insight into the biological constraints that influence the outcome of evolution. They serve to improve our understanding about adaptations, rather than to demonstrate that natural selection produces optimal solutions.
850 citations
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Book•
01 Apr 1984TL;DR: In this paper, a model based on the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy in the context of the Prisoner's Dilemma game was developed for cooperation in organisms, and the results of a computer tournament showed how cooperation based on reciprocity can get started in an asocial world, can thrive while interacting with a wide range of other strategies, and can resist invasion once fully established.
Abstract: Cooperation in organisms, whether bacteria or primates, has been a difficulty for evolutionary theory since Darwin. On the assumption that interactions between pairs of individuals occur on a probabilistic basis, a model is developed based on the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy in the context of the Prisoner's Dilemma game. Deductions from the model, and the results of a computer tournament show how cooperation based on reciprocity can get started in an asocial world, can thrive while interacting with a wide range of other strategies, and can resist invasion once fully established. Potential applications include specific aspects of territoriality, mating, and disease.
17,720 citations
TL;DR: A model is developed based on the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy in the context of the Prisoner's Dilemma game to show how cooperation based on reciprocity can get started in an asocial world, can thrive while interacting with a wide range of other strategies, and can resist invasion once fully established.
Abstract: Cooperation in organisms, whether bacteria or primates, has been a difficulty for evolutionary theory since Darwin. On the assumption that interactions between pairs of individuals occur on a probabilistic basis, a model is developed based on the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy in the context of the Prisoner's Dilemma game. Deductions from the model, and the results of a computer tournament show how cooperation based on reciprocity can get started in an asocial world, can thrive while interacting with a wide range of other strategies, and can resist invasion once fully established. Potential applications include specific aspects of territoriality, mating, and disease.
10,675 citations
TL;DR: Five mechanisms for the evolution of cooperation are discussed: kin selection, direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocities, network reciprocation, group selection, and group selection.
Abstract: Cooperation is needed for evolution to construct new levels of organization. Genomes, cells, multicellular organisms, social insects, and human society are all based on cooperation. Cooperation means that selfish replicators forgo some of their reproductive potential to help one another. But natural selection implies competition and therefore opposes cooperation unless a specific mechanism is at work. Here I discuss five mechanisms for the evolution of cooperation: kin selection, direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, network reciprocity, and group selection. For each mechanism, a simple rule is derived that specifies whether natural selection can lead to cooperation.
4,899 citations
TL;DR: This paper will develop a model for the use of a “patchy habitat” by an optimal predator and depresses the availability of food to itself so that the amount of food gained for time spent in a patch of type i is hi(T), where the function rises to an asymptote.
4,772 citations
Book•
01 Jan 1998TL;DR: In this book the authors investigate the nonlinear dynamics of the self-regulation of social and economic behavior, and of the closely related interactions among species in ecological communities.
Abstract: Every form of behavior is shaped by trial and error. Such stepwise adaptation can occur through individual learning or through natural selection, the basis of evolution. Since the work of Maynard Smith and others, it has been realized how game theory can model this process. Evolutionary game theory replaces the static solutions of classical game theory by a dynamical approach centered not on the concept of rational players but on the population dynamics of behavioral programs. In this book the authors investigate the nonlinear dynamics of the self-regulation of social and economic behavior, and of the closely related interactions among species in ecological communities. Replicator equations describe how successful strategies spread and thereby create new conditions that can alter the basis of their success, i.e., to enable us to understand the strategic and genetic foundations of the endless chronicle of invasions and extinctions that punctuate evolution. In short, evolutionary game theory describes when to escalate a conflict, how to elicit cooperation, why to expect a balance of the sexes, and how to understand natural selection in mathematical terms.
Comprehensive treatment of ecological and game theoretic dynamics
Invasion dynamics and permanence as key concepts
Explanation in terms of games of things like competition between species
4,480 citations