American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review 17 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev., No. 1, Spring, 2009. Boston College Law Review 50 B.C. L. Rev., No. 3, May, 2009. Boston University Public Interest Law Journal 18 B.U. Pub. Int. L.J., No. 2, Spring, 2009. Cardozo Journal of Conflict Resolution 10 Cardozo J. Conflict Resol., No. 2, Spring, 2009. Cardozo Public Law, Policy, & Ethics Journal 7 Cardozo Pub. L. Pol’y & Ethics J., No. 3, Summer, 2009. Chicago Journal of International Law 10 Chi. J. Int’l L., No. 1, Summer, 2009. Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy 20 Colo. J. Int’l Envtl. L. & Pol’y, No. 2, Winter, 2009. Columbia Journal of Law & the Arts 32 Colum. J.L. & Arts, No. 3, Spring, 2009. Connecticut Public Interest Law Journal 8 Conn. Pub. Int. L.J., No. 2, Spring-Summer, 2009. Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy 18 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y, No. 1, Fall, 2008. Cornell Law Review 94 Cornell L. Rev., No. 5, July, 2009. Creighton Law Review 42 Creighton L. Rev., No. 3, April, 2009. Criminal Law Forum 20 Crim. L. Forum, Nos. 2-3, Pp. 173-394, 2009. Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 34 Del. J. Corp. L., No. 2, Pp. 433-754, 2009. Environmental Law Reporter News & Analysis 39 Envtl. L. Rep. News & Analysis, No. 7, July, 2009. European Journal of International Law 20 Eur. J. Int’l L., No. 2, April, 2009. Family Law Quarterly 43 Fam. L.Q., No. 1, Spring, 2009. Georgetown Journal of International Law 40 Geo. J. Int’l L., No. 3, Spring, 2009. Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics 22 Geo. J. Legal Ethics, No. 2, Spring, 2009. Golden Gate University Law Review 39 Golden Gate U. L. Rev., No. 2, Winter, 2009. Harvard Environmental Law Review 33 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev., No. 2, Pp. 297-608, 2009. International Review of Law and Economics 29 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ., No. 1, March, 2009. Journal of Environmental Law and Litigation 24 J. Envtl. L. & Litig., No. 1, Pp. 1-201, 2009. Journal of Legislation 34 J. Legis., No. 1, Pp. 1-98, 2008. Journal of Technology Law & Policy 14 J. Tech. L. & Pol’y, No. 1, June, 2009. Labor Lawyer 24 Lab. Law., No. 3, Winter/Spring, 2009. Michigan Journal of International Law 30 Mich. J. Int’l L., No. 3, Spring, 2009. New Criminal Law Review 12 New Crim. L. Rev., No. 2, Spring, 2009. Northern Kentucky Law Review 36 N. Ky. L. Rev., No. 4, Pp. 445-654, 2009. Ohio Northern University Law Review 35 Ohio N.U. L. Rev., No. 2, Pp. 445-886, 2009. Pace Law Review 29 Pace L. Rev., No. 3, Spring, 2009. Quinnipiac Health Law Journal 12 Quinnipiac Health L.J., No. 2, Pp. 209-332, 2008-2009. Real Property, Trust and Estate Law Journal 44 Real Prop. Tr. & Est. L.J., No. 1, Spring, 2009. Rutgers Race and the Law Review 10 Rutgers Race & L. Rev., No. 2, Pp. 441-629, 2009. San Diego Law Review 46 San Diego L. Rev., No. 2, Spring, 2009. Seton Hall Law Review 39 Seton Hall L. Rev., No. 3, Pp. 725-1102, 2009. Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal 18 S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J., No. 3, Spring, 2009. Stanford Environmental Law Journal 28 Stan. Envtl. L.J., No. 3, July, 2009. Tulsa Law Review 44 Tulsa L. Rev., No. 2, Winter, 2008. UMKC Law Review 77 UMKC L. Rev., No. 4, Summer, 2009. Washburn Law Journal 48 Washburn L.J., No. 3, Spring, 2009. Washington University Global Studies Law Review 8 Wash. U. Global Stud. L. Rev., No. 3, Pp.451-617, 2009. Washington University Journal of Law & Policy 29 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol’y, Pp. 1-401, 2009. Washington University Law Review 86 Wash. U. L. Rev., No. 6, Pp. 1273-1521, 2009. William Mitchell Law Review 35 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev., No. 4, Pp. 1235-1609, 2009. Yale Journal of International Law 34 Yale J. Int’l L., No. 2, Summer, 2009. Yale Journal on Regulation 26 Yale J. on Reg., No. 2, Summer, 2009.

/pdf/current-index-to-legal-periodicals-8re353ze53.pdf

Current index to legal periodicals

https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2926&context=ndlr

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties

A sense of self-perceived collective victimhood emerges as a major theme in the ethos of conflict of societies involved in intractable conflict and is a fundamental part of the collective memory of the conflict. This sense is defined as a mindset shared by group members that results from a perceived intentional harm with severe consequences, inflicted on the collective by another group. This harm is viewed as undeserved, unjust and immoral, and one that the group could not prevent. The article analyses the nature of the self-perceived collective sense of victimhood in the conflict, its antecedents, the functions that it fulfils for the society and the consequences that result from this view.

/pdf/a-sense-of-self-perceived-collective-victimhood-in-spdk74qbw8.pdf

A sense of self-perceived collective victimhood in intractable conflicts

International humanitarian law does not contain precise enough criteria to determine which situations fall within its material field of application, as the reality of armed conflict is more complex than the categories anticipated by IHL. This article sets out to show how these categories can be interpreted in light of recent international legal developments, and examines various controversial cases of application.

Typology of armed conflicts in international humanitarian law: legal concepts and actual situations

The Law of Armed Conflict: LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT AND INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: BATTLEFIELD ISSUES

One of the most complex contemporary debates related to the regulation of armed conflict is the relationship between international humanitarian law (or the law of armed conflict) and international human rights law. Since human rights experts first began advocating for the complimentary application of these two bodies of law, there has been a steady march of human rights application into an area formerly subject to the exclusive law of armed conflict regulation. While the legal aspects of this debate are both complex and fascinating, like all areas of conflict regulation the outcome must ultimately produce guidelines that can be translated into an effective operational framework for war-fighters. In an era of an already complex and often confused battle space, there can be little tolerance for adding complexity and confusion to the rules that war-fighters must apply in the execution of their missions. Instead, clarity is essential to aid them in navigating this complexity. This article will explore this debate from a military operational perspective. It asserts the invalidity of extreme views in this complementarity debate, and that the inevitable invocation of human rights obligations in the context of armed conflict necessitates a careful assessment of where symmetry between these two sources of law is operationally logical and where that logic dissipates. While acknowledging a legitimate role for human rights norms in relation to the treatment of noncombatants and subdued opposition personnel, I argue that these norms cannot be permitted to influence the legal framework that regulates the application of combat power against operational opponents. Preventing this intrusion is essential to balance the interest of protecting human rights with the fundamental purpose of armed hostilities – securing the prompt and efficient submission of an opponent. Perhaps the most critical premise of this article is that failing to recognize the existence of this boundary will produce a distortion of this historic authority/restraint balance at the core of the law of armed conflict – a distortion that will inevitably be perceived as operationally illogical by armed forces thereby risking the credibility of both bodies of law.

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID1658463_code557106.pdf?abstractid=1511954&mirid=5&type=2

Mixing Apples and Hand Grenades: The Logical Limit of Applying Human Rights Norms to Armed Conflict

For more than fifty years following the 1949 revision of the Geneva Conventions, the articles that defined when the protections of these treaties came into force - Common Articles 2 and 3 - were understood as the exclusive standard for determining application of the laws of war. From these two articles emerged an "either/or" law-applicability paradigm: inter-state, or international, armed conflicts triggered the full corpus of the laws of war; intra-state, or internal, armed conflicts triggered the limited humanitarian protection reflected in the terms of Common Article 3. The military response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 threw this paradigm into disarray. These events exposed the gap in legal regulation of armed conflict. Although the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld rejected the Bush administration's reliance on this "either/or" law-triggering paradigm as a basis to deny the applicability of the humane treatment mandate to captured al Qaeda personnel, that decision did not address regulation of hostilities. It was, instead, the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah that exposed the unacceptable consequences of this gap in legal regulation. While numerous voices from the international community invoked law of war as a basis to condemn both parties, there was virtually no consideration of the reality that, like the global war on terror, the conflict defied traditional categorization under the Common Article 2/3 paradigm. This Article asserts that the changing nature of warfare necessitates recognition of a hybrid category of "transnational armed conflict." This category is based on the de facto existence of armed conflict, regardless of geographic scope. The such armed conflicts trigger for application of the foundational principles of the laws of war, and how such application is derived from the history of regulating warfare, the purposes of the Geneva Conventions, and the pragmatic logic that animated the adoption of national military policies mandating application of these principles to all military operations.

Hamdan, Lebanon, and the Regulation of Armed Hostilities: The Need to Recognize a Hybrid Category of Armed Conflict

The law of armed conflict provides the authority to use lethal force as a first resort against identified enemy belligerent operatives. There is virtually no disagreement with the rule that once an enemy belligerent becomes hors de combat — what a soldier would recognizes as “combat ineffective” — this authority to employ deadly force terminates. Recently, however, some have forcefully asserted that the LOAC includes an obligation to capture in lieu of employing deadly force whenever doing so presents no meaningful risk to attacking forces, even when the enemy belligerent is neither physically disabled or manifesting surrender. Proponents of this obligation to capture rather than kill, or use the least harmful means to incapacitate enemy belligerents, do not contest the general authority to employ deadly force derived from belligerent status determinations. Instead, they insist that the conditions that rebut this presumptive attack authority are broader than the traditional understanding of the meaning of hors de combat embraced by military experts, and include any situation where an enemy belligerent who has yet to be rendered physically incapable of engaging in hostilities may be subdued without subjecting friendly forces to significant risk of harm.This essay offers our collective and — we hope — comprehensive rebuttal of this least harmful means LOAC interpretation. First, Section I reviews the fundamental principles of the LOAC that permit status-based attacks against enemy belligerents with combat power highly likely to cause death unless and until the enemy is rendered physically incapable of participating in hostilities. Section II thoroughly analyzes the affirmative prohibitions on the use of force that the LOAC — and specifically Additional Protocol I — does require, and also highlights what Additional Protocol I does not require. In particular, the fact that Additional Protocol I — by any account the most humanitarian-oriented LOAC treaty ever developed — did not impose any affirmative least harmful means obligation vis a vis belligerents undermines any assertion that such an obligation may be derived from the positive LOAC. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Section III emphasizes how this least harmful means concept, especially when derived from an expanded interpretation of the meaning of the concept of hors de combat, is fundamentally inconsistent with the tactical, operational, and strategic objectives that dictate employment of military power.The LOAC must, as it has historically, remain rationally grounded in the realities of warfare. We are confident that anyone grappling with this issue understands that decisions related to the employment of combat power are not resolved in the quiet and safe confines of law libraries, academic conferences, or even courtrooms; they are resolved in the intensely demanding situations into which our nation thrusts our armed forces. The law must, as it always has, remain animated by the realities of warfare in the effort to strike a continuing credible balance between the authority to prevail on the battlefield and humanitarian objective of limiting unnecessary suffering. The clarity of the existing paradigm achieves that goal and does not include any legal obligation to use the least harmful means in targeting enemy belligerent personnel.

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID2289522_code1374175.pdf?abstractid=2271152&mirid=1

Belligerent Targeting and the Invalidity of a Least Harmful Means Rule

One of the most complex contemporary debates related to the regulation of armed conflict is the relationship between international humanitarian law (or the law of armed conflict) and international human rights law. Since human rights experts first began advocating for the complementary application of these two bodies of law, there has been a steady march of human rights application into an area formerly subject to the exclusive regulation of the law of armed conflict (LOAC). While the legal aspects of this debate are both complex and fascinating, like all areas of conflict regulation the outcome must ultimately produce guidelines that can be translated into an effective operational framework for war-fighters. In an era of an already complex and often confused battle space, there can be little tolerance for adding complexity and confusion to the rules that war-fighters must apply in the execution of their missions. Instead, clarity is essential to aid them in navigating this complexity. This article will explore this debate from a military operational perspective. It asserts the invalidity of extreme views in this complementarity debate, and that the inevitable invocation of human rights obligations in the context of armed conflict necessitates a careful assessment of where symmetry between these two sources of law is operationally logical and where that logic dissipates.

Mixing Apples and Hand Grenades The Logical Limit of Applying Human Rights Norms to Armed Conflict

FOREWORD, BY MAJOR GENERAL CHARLES J. DUNLAP INTRODUCTION, BY PROFESSOR GEOFFREY S. CORN WHAT LAW APPLIES TO THE WAR ON TERROR? BY GEOFFREY S. CORN, SOUTH TEXAS COLLEGE OF LAW TARGETING OF PERSONS AND PROPERTY BY ERIC T. JENSEN, US ARMY JAG CORPS DETENTION OF COMBATANTS AND THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR BY JAMES A. SCHOETTLER, JR., GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER INTERROGATION AND TREATMENT OF DETAINEES IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR BY DICK JACKSON, US ARMY JAG CORPS TRIAL AND PUNISHMENT FOR BATTLEFIELD MISCONDUCT BY GEOFFREY S. CORN (S. TEXAS COLLEGE OF LAW) AND ERIC T. JENSEN (JAG) COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY BY VICTOR M. HANSEN, NEW ENGLAND SCHOOL OF LAW BATTLEFIELD PERSPECTIVES ON THE LAWS OF WAR BY MICHAEL W. LEWIS, OHIO NORTHERN UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW

Geoffrey S. Corn

Papers

Mixing Apples and Hand Grenades: The Logical Limit of Applying Human Rights Norms to Armed Conflict

Hamdan, Lebanon, and the Regulation of Armed Hostilities: The Need to Recognize a Hybrid Category of Armed Conflict

Belligerent Targeting and the Invalidity of a Least Harmful Means Rule

Mixing Apples and Hand Grenades The Logical Limit of Applying Human Rights Norms to Armed Conflict

The War on Terror and the Laws of War: A Military Perspective