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George Hendrikse

Bio: George Hendrikse is an academic researcher. The author has contributed to research in topics: Variety (cybernetics) & Business. The author has an hindex of 1, co-authored 1 publications receiving 2887 citations.

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TL;DR: In this paper , an agent-based model is developed to address the relationship between the ownership structure of an enterprise and the evolution of its product portfolio, where the coherence and evolution of a product portfolio is operationalized by transition rules regarding the Moore environment.
Abstract: An agent-based model is developed to address the relationship between the ownership structure of an enterprise and the evolution of its product portfolio. The coherence and evolution of a product portfolio is operationalized by transition rules regarding the Moore environment. The distinguishing feature of a cooperative is the single origin constraint according to Cook (1997), which is modelled as a cooperative assigning an infinite lifetime to the first product in its product portfolio, while all other products have finite lifetime. All product of an investor-owned firm (IOF) are assumed to have finite lifetime. Our simulation results show that the single origin constraint pulls the activities of the cooperative in one cluster centered around the first activity, while the IOF’s product portfolio develops in a centrifugal way. The cooperative and the IOF are more diversified in a mixed duopoly.

1 citations

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TL;DR: In this paper , the authors investigated why agricultural cooperatives exhibit different principles for the allocation of decision rights between the Board of Directors and the Management in an investment proposal game and showed that, on the one hand, board structure variety is an equilibrium outcome, while on the other hand, the traditional model and the management model perform better than the Corporation model, where the management is in full control of the cooperative firm.
Abstract: . This paper investigates why agricultural cooperatives exhibit different principles for the allocation of decision rights between the Board of Directors and the Management. A mass-action interpretation of the Nash equilibrium in an investment proposal game shows that, on the one hand, board structure variety is an equilibrium outcome while, on the other, the Traditional model (the board has full control) and the Management model (the professional management makes up the Board of the cooperative society) perform better than the Corporation model (the Management is in full control of the cooperative firm).
Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper , the authors investigated the relationship between cognition and incentives in cooperatives versus investor-owned firms in a multi-tasking principal-agent model, where the principal chooses the incentive intensity as well as the precision of monitoring, while the agent chooses the activities.
Abstract: . We extend the results of Feng and Hendrikse (2012) by investigating the relationship between cognition and incentives in cooperatives versus investor-owned firms (IOFs) in a multi-tasking principal-agent model. The principal chooses the incentive intensity as well as the precision of monitoring, while the agent chooses the activities. We establish that a cooperative is uniquely efficient when either the synergy between the upstream and downstream activities or the knowledgeability of the members regarding the cooperative enterprise is sufficiently high.

Cited by
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TL;DR: The concept of sectoral system of innovation and production as mentioned in this paper provides a multidimensional, integrated and dynamic view of sectors, where agents carry out market and non-market interactions for the creation, production and sale of those products.

2,472 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Several limitations of revenue sharing are identified to (at least partially) explain why it is not prevalent in all industries, including cases in which revenue sharing provides only a small improvement over the administratively cheaper wholesale price contract.
Abstract: Under a revenue-sharing contract, a retailer pays a supplier a wholesale price for each unit purchased, plus a percentage of the revenue the retailer generates. Such contracts have become more prevalent in the videocassette rental industry relative to the more conventional wholesale price contract. This paper studies revenue-sharing contracts in a general supply chain model with revenues determined by each retailer's purchase quantity and price. Demand can be deterministic or stochastic and revenue is generated either from rentals or outright sales. Our model includes the case of a supplier selling to a classical fixed-price newsvendor or a price-setting newsvendor. We demonstrate that revenue sharing coordinates a supply chain with a single retailer (i.e., the retailer chooses optimal price and quantity) and arbitrarily allocates the supply chain's profit. We compare revenue sharing to a number of other supply chain contracts (e.g., buy-back contracts, price-discount contracts, quantity-flexibility contracts, sales-rebate contracts, franchise contracts, and quantity discounts). We find that revenue sharing is equivalent to buybacks in the newsvendor case and equivalent to price discounts in the price-setting newsvendor case. Revenue sharing also coordinates a supply chain with retailers competing in quantities, e.g., Cournot competitors or competing newsvendors with fixed prices. Despite its numerous merits, we identify several limitations of revenue sharing to (at least partially) explain why it is not prevalent in all industries. In particular, we characterize cases in which revenue sharing provides only a small improvement over the administratively cheaper wholesale price contract. Additionally, revenue sharing does not coordinate a supply chain with demand that depends on costly retail effort. We develop a variation on revenue sharing for this setting.

2,271 citations

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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors modeled international crises as a political "war of attrition" in which state leaders choose at each moment whether to attack, back down, or escalate, and found that the side with a stronger domestic audience is always less likely to back down than the side less able to generate audience costs.
Abstract: International crises are modeled as a political “war of attrition” in which state leaders choose at each moment whether to attack, back down, or escalate. A leader who backs down suffers audience costs that increase as the public confrontation proceeds. Equilibrium analysis shows how audience costs enable leaders to learn an adversary's true preferences concerning settlement versus war and thus whether and when attack is rational. The model also generates strong comparative statics results, mainly on the question of which side is most likely to back down. Publicly observable measures of relative military capabilities and relative interests prove to have no direct effect once a crisis begins. Instead, relative audience costs matter: the side with a stronger domestic audience (e.g., a democracy) is always less likely to back down than the side less able to generate audience costs (a nondemocracy). More broadly, the analysis suggests that democracies should be able to signal their intentions to other states more credibly and clearly than authoritarian states can, perhaps ameliorating the security dilemma between democratic states.

1,829 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, it is argued that the most complex, but also the most advantageous relationship between competitors, is "cooperative" where two competitors both compete and cooperate with each other.

1,738 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors focus on the ways a firm may signal the unobservable quality of its products through several marketing-mix variables, and develop a typology that classifies signals and discuss the available empirical evidence on the signaling properties of several marketing variables.
Abstract: Recent research in information economics has focused on signals as mechanisms to solve problems that arise under asymmetric information. A firm or individual credibly communicates the level of some unobservable element in a transaction by providing an observable signal. When applied to conveying product quality information, this issue is of particular interest to the discipline of marketing. In this article, the authors focus on the ways a firm may signal the unobservable quality of its products through several marketing-mix variables. The authors develop a typology that classifies signals and discuss the available empirical evidence on the signaling properties of several marketing variables. They consider managerial implications of signaling and outline an agenda for future empirical research.

1,714 citations