George J. Posner

Bio: George J. Posner is an academic researcher from Cornell University. The author has contributed to research in topics: Conceptual change & Science education. The author has an hindex of 5, co-authored 5 publications receiving 6166 citations. Previous affiliations of George J. Posner include Ithaca College.

Accommodation of a scientific conception: Toward a theory of conceptual change

Abstract: It has become a commonplace belief that learning is the result of the interaction between what the student is taught and his current ideas or concepts.’ This is by no means a new view of learning. Its roots can be traced back to early Gestalt psychologists. However, Piaget’s (1929, 1930) early studies of children’s explanations of natural phenomena and his more recent studies of causality (Piaget, 1974) have perhaps had the greatest impact on the study of the interpretive frameworks students bring to learning situations. This research has led to the widespread study of students’ scientific misconceptions.2 From these studies and, particularly, from recent work by researchers such as Viennot ( 1979) and Driver (1 973), we have developed a more detailed understanding of some of these misconceptions and, more importantly, why they are so “highly robust” and typically outlive teaching which contradicts them (Viennot, 1979, p. 205). But identifying misconceptions or, more broadly speaking, “alternative frameworks” (Driver & Easley, 1978), and understanding some reasons for their persistence, falls short of developing a reasonable view of how a student’s current ideas interact with new, incompatible ideas. Although Piaget (1974) developed one such theory, there appears to be a need for work which focuses “more on the actual content of the pupil’s ideas and less on the supposed underlying logical structures” (Driver & Easley, 1978, p. 76). Several research studies have been performed (Nussbaum, 1979; Nussbaum & Novak, 1976; Driver, 1973; Erickson, 1979) which have investigated “the substance of the actual beliefs and concepts held by children” (Erickson, 1979, p. 221). However, there has been no well-articulated theory explaining or describing the substantive dimensions of the process by which people’s central, organizing concepts change from one set of concepts to another set, incompatible with the first. We believe that a major source of hypotheses concerning this issue is contemporary philosophy of science, since a central question of recent philosophy of science is how concepts change under the impact of new ideas or new information. In this article we first sketch a general model of conceptual change which is largely derived from current philosophy of science, but which we believe can illuminate * This article is partly based on a paper entitled “Learning Special Relativity: A Study of Intellectual Problems Faced by College Students,” presented at the International Conference Celebrating the 100th Anniversary of Albert Einstein, November 8-10, 1979 at Hofstra University.

Conceptual change and science teaching

Abstract: Summaries English In this article, the authors address themselves to the important question of how learning in science education relates to the growth of scientific knowledge. After discussing how changes in scientific concepts come about, they offer suggestions for modifying the objectives and content of science curricula and teaching approaches in science education in the light of knowledge and understanding of the history and philosophy of science.

Teachers’ Beliefs and Educational Research: Cleaning Up a Messy Construct:

Abstract: Attention to the beliefs of teachers and teacher candidates should be a focus of educational research and can inform educational practice in ways that prevailing research agendas have not and cannot. The difficulty in studying teachers’ beliefs has been caused by definitional problems, poor conceptualizations, and differing understandings of beliefs and belief structures. This article examines the meaning prominent researchers give to beliefs and how this meaning differs from that of knowledge, provides a definition of belief consistent with the best work in this area, explores the nature of belief structures as outlined by key researchers, and offers a synthesis of findings about the nature of beliefs. The article argues that teachers’ beliefs can and should become an important focus of educational inquiry but that this will require clear conceptualizations, careful examination of key assumptions, consistent understandings and adherence to precise meanings, and proper assessment and investigation of spec...

Accommodation of a scientific conception: Toward a theory of conceptual change

Abstract: It has become a commonplace belief that learning is the result of the interaction between what the student is taught and his current ideas or concepts.’ This is by no means a new view of learning. Its roots can be traced back to early Gestalt psychologists. However, Piaget’s (1929, 1930) early studies of children’s explanations of natural phenomena and his more recent studies of causality (Piaget, 1974) have perhaps had the greatest impact on the study of the interpretive frameworks students bring to learning situations. This research has led to the widespread study of students’ scientific misconceptions.2 From these studies and, particularly, from recent work by researchers such as Viennot ( 1979) and Driver (1 973), we have developed a more detailed understanding of some of these misconceptions and, more importantly, why they are so “highly robust” and typically outlive teaching which contradicts them (Viennot, 1979, p. 205). But identifying misconceptions or, more broadly speaking, “alternative frameworks” (Driver & Easley, 1978), and understanding some reasons for their persistence, falls short of developing a reasonable view of how a student’s current ideas interact with new, incompatible ideas. Although Piaget (1974) developed one such theory, there appears to be a need for work which focuses “more on the actual content of the pupil’s ideas and less on the supposed underlying logical structures” (Driver & Easley, 1978, p. 76). Several research studies have been performed (Nussbaum, 1979; Nussbaum & Novak, 1976; Driver, 1973; Erickson, 1979) which have investigated “the substance of the actual beliefs and concepts held by children” (Erickson, 1979, p. 221). However, there has been no well-articulated theory explaining or describing the substantive dimensions of the process by which people’s central, organizing concepts change from one set of concepts to another set, incompatible with the first. We believe that a major source of hypotheses concerning this issue is contemporary philosophy of science, since a central question of recent philosophy of science is how concepts change under the impact of new ideas or new information. In this article we first sketch a general model of conceptual change which is largely derived from current philosophy of science, but which we believe can illuminate * This article is partly based on a paper entitled “Learning Special Relativity: A Study of Intellectual Problems Faced by College Students,” presented at the International Conference Celebrating the 100th Anniversary of Albert Einstein, November 8-10, 1979 at Hofstra University.

Self-Efficacy Beliefs in Academic Settings

Abstract: The purpose of this article is to examine the contribution made by the self-efficacy component of Bandura’s (1986) social cognitive theory to the study of self-regulation and motivation in academic settings. The difference between self-efficacy beliefs and other expectancy constructs is first explained, followed by a brief overview of problems in self-efficacy research. Findings on the relationship between self-efficacy, motivation constructs, and academic performances are then summarized. These findings demonstrate that particularized measures of self-efficacy that correspond to the criterial tasks with which they are compared surpass global measures in the explanation and prediction of related outcomes. The conceptual difference between the definition and use of expectancy beliefs in social cognitive theory and in expectancy value and self-concept theory is then clarified. Last, strategies to guide future research are offered.

Teacher Pedagogical Beliefs: The Final Frontier in Our Quest for Technology Integration?.

Abstract: Although the conditions for successful technology integration finally appear to be in place, including ready access to technology, increased training for teachers, and a favorable policy environment, high-level technology use is still surprisingly low. This suggests that additional barriers, specifically related to teachers’ pedagogical beliefs, may be at work. Previous researchers have noted the influence of teachers’ beliefs on classroom instruction specifically in math, reading, and science, yet little research has been done to establish a similar link to teachers’ classroom uses of technology. In this article, I argue for the importance of such research and present a conceptual overview of teacher pedagogical beliefs as a vital first step. After defining and describing the nature of teacher beliefs, including how they are likely to impact teachers’ classroom practice, I describe important implications for teacher professional development and offer suggestions for future research.

Constructing Scientific Knowledge in the Classroom

Abstract: The view that knowledge cannot be transmitted but must be constructed by the mental activity of learners underpins contemporary perspectives on science education. This article, which presents a theoretical perspective on teaching and learning science in the social setting of classrooms, is informed by a view of scientific knowledge as socially constructed and by a perspective on the learning of science as knowledge construction involving both individual and social processes. First, we present an overview of the nature of scientific knowledge. We then describe two major traditions in explaining the process of learning science: personal and social constructivism. Finally, we illustrate how both personal and social perspectives on learning, as well as perspectives on the nature of the scientific knowledge to be learned, are necessary in interpreting science learning in formal settings.