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Author

George L. Cook

Bio: George L. Cook is an academic researcher from University of British Columbia. The author has contributed to research in topics: Total war & Dominion. The author has an hindex of 1, co-authored 1 publications receiving 4 citations.
Topics: Total war, Dominion, Victory, Proclamation

Papers
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Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Borden as discussed by the authors stated that Canada was "fighting not for a truce but victory" in the First World War, similar to Lloyd George's own declaration that the fight must be to a finish, to a knockout.
Abstract: ‘Let the past bury its dead, but for God's sake let us get down to earnest endeavour and hold this line until … the end.’ No other words can more adequately express, after four years of war, the sheer agony of the Canadian Prime Minister, Sir Robert L. Borden. These words also suggest both his attitude to the war in general and his intense frustration with die supreme direction. Like Lloyd George, Borden was an exponent of total war and of victory. His proclamation that Canada was ‘fighting not for a truce but victory’, was strikingly similar to Lloyd George's own declaration that ‘the fight must be to a finish—to a knockout’. The objective, proclaimed at die conclusion of the Somme battles, seemed no less remote in the middle of 1918. Over the last two, and most critical, years of the First World War there was constant contention within Britain over how the objective was to be secured. One aspect of the contention was the direct involvement of Dominion leaders, especially Sir Robert Borden.

4 citations


Cited by
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01 Jan 2016
TL;DR: This article argued that Canadian veterans did not suffer postwar disillusionment, rather, they embraced the war alongside a renewed Canadian nationalism and this collective identification more than shaped a sense of self; it influenced understanding of the conflict's meaning.
Abstract: The Great War was a formative event for men who came of age between 1914 and 1918. They believed the experience forged them into a distinct generation. This collective identification more than shaped a sense of self; it influenced understanding of the conflict’s meaning. Canadian historians, however, have overlooked the war’s generational impact, partly because they reject notions of a disillusioned Lost Generation. Unlike European or American youths, it is argued that Canadian veterans did not suffer postwar disillusionment. Rather, they embraced the war alongside a renewed Canadian nationalism. This generation was proud of their nation’s wartime achievements, notably those of the Canadian Corps, but the conflict’s meaning was rooted in more than battlefield history. Its validity was inseparable from the postwar life for which veterans believed they had fought for. Yet, despite hopes to return home to a ‘square deal’, economic and international instability marred life in interwar Canada, dashing the generation’s confidence in the future. This discontent is obscured by histories heavily focused on memory and a corresponding reliance on cultural sources, such as war books, to explain the conflict’s social history. While an important part of the war’s legacy, retrospective focus on commemoration is a poor guide to the lived realities of the postwar present. In the war’s aftermath many young veterans struggled to find work. Combined with the prospect of renewed war in Europe, their unemployment added to a growing list of postwar grievances, including failure to secure adequate assistance for wounded and traumatized veterans. These unresolved complaints about the pension system, the soldier settlement schemes, and the mishandling of postwar canteen funds (particularly in Ontario) more than undermined the war generation’s belief in the war, it left them deeply disillusioned with its meaning.

46 citations

14 May 2014
TL;DR: The transformation of the largely amateur and inexperienced Canadian Expeditionary Force (CEF) into one of the most effective fighting formations in the British Expeditionary Task Force (BEF) was described in this article.
Abstract: : Canada's participation in World War I enabled transformation of the nation from a satellite state into an independent nation and ally. It also saw the transformation of the largely amateur and inexperienced Canadian Expeditionary Force (CEF) into one of the most effective fighting formations in the British Expeditionary Force (BEF). Seen through the lens of operational art, these transformations are the result of arrangements of actions, linked in purpose, to achieve strategic objectives. The first of the strategic objectives was Canadian autonomy from Britain. The actions along the line of effort to achieve independence include the military and governance efforts to support the war, an information campaign to build a sense of nationalism, and Canadianization of the CEF (essentially establishing a de facto national army). The second strategic objective was the creation of an effective fighting force within the CEF. The actions along this line of effort were based upon transformation of the organizational culture of the Canadian Corps: the development of a command philosophy that engendered professionalism and pragmatism, and the value placed upon learning and innovation.

3 citations

Reference EntryDOI
13 Nov 2011
TL;DR: Lloyd George as discussed by the authors proposed a special war conference of the empire composed of representatives of the Dominions as well as India to meet jointly with his new war cabinet, a small inner-governmental body that effectively supplanted the cabinet and exercised oversight of the war effort.
Abstract: Shortly after becoming prime minister, David Lloyd George told the House of Commons (December 19, 1916) that “the time has come when the Dominions ought to be more formally consulted as to the progress and course of the War” India and the Dominions had become essential partners in the war against the Central Powers, furnishing British armies in France, Gallipoli, Palestine, and Mesopotamia with approximately one million men But the British government now sought even more imperial reinforcements, especially from India In 1911 Lloyd George had been impressed with the involvement of the Imperial Conference (composed of Dominion representatives) after its members had participated in secret discussions in the Committee of Imperial Defence But the Imperial Conference had no provision for secret sessions and excluded India, which was not a self-governing Dominion To get around this difficulty Lloyd George wanted a “special war conference of the empire” composed of representatives of the Dominions as well as India to meet jointly with his new war cabinet, a small inner-governmental body that effectively supplanted the cabinet and exercised oversight of the war effort Keywords: twentieth century; Diplomacy and International Relations; First World War; Colonial and Postcolonial History