Gerard Caprio

Bio: Gerard Caprio is an academic researcher from Williams College. The author has contributed to research in topics: Bank regulation & Financial regulation. The author has an hindex of 46, co-authored 115 publications receiving 13152 citations. Previous affiliations of Gerard Caprio include World Bank.

Rethinking Bank Regulation: Till Angels Govern

Abstract: 1. Introduction: 1.A Motivation 1.B Objectives and contributions 1.C Key findings: a brief synopsis 1.D Guide to the book 2. Contrasting approaches to bank regulation: 2.A Two approaches to bank regulation: 2.A.1 Public interest approach 2.A.2 Private interest view of regulation 2.B Bank regulation: how 2.C The Basel Committee and regulatory convergence 2.D Conclusion 3. How are banks regulated and supervised around the world?: 3.A Overview 3.B Structure, scope and independence of regulation and supervision 3.C What is a 'bank'? 3.D Entry into banking, capital requirements and supervisory powers 3.E Explicit deposit insurance schemes 3.F Private monitoring and external governance 3.G Does bank ownership type affect the choice of regulations and supervisory practices? 3.H Forces for greater harmonization of regulation and supervision among countries 4. What works best: 4.A Goals and boundaries 4.B Bank regulation and supervision and bank development 4.C Bank supervision, regulation, and stability 4.D Bank supervision, regulation, and bank efficiency 4.E Bank supervision, regulation, and bank lending 4.F Supervision, regulation, and bank governance 4.G Summary of results 5. Choosing bank regulations 5.A Recap and motivation 5.B Motivating example: Mexico and the United States 5.C Conceptual framework 5.D Empirical framework and data 5.E Summary remarks 6. Rethinking bank regulation: 6.A Approach and context 6.B Lessons and implications.

Bank Regulation and Supervision: What Works Best?

Abstract: The authors draw on their new database on bank regulation and supervision in 107 countries to assess different governmental approaches to bank regulation and supervision and evaluate the efficacy of different regulatory and supervisory policies. First, the authors assess two broad and competing theories of government regulation: the helping-hand approach, according to which governments regulate to correct market failures, and the grabbing-hand approach, according to which governments regulate to support political constituencies. Second, they assess the effect of an extensive array of regulatory and supervisory policies on the development and fragility of the banking sector. These policies include the following: Regulations on bank activities and the mixing of banking and commerce. Regulations on entry by domestic and foreign banks. Regulations on capital adequacy. Design features of deposit insurance systems. Supervisory power, independence, and resources; stringency of loan classification; provisioning standards; diversification guidelines; and powers to take prompt corrective action. Regulations governing information disclosure and fostering private sector monitoring of banks. Government ownership of banks. The results raise a cautionary flag with regard to reform strategies that place excessive reliance on a country's adherence to an extensive checklist of regulatory and supervisory practices that involve direct government oversight of and restrictions on banks. The findings, which are much more consistent with the grabbing-hand view of regulation than with the helping-hand view, suggest that the regulatory and supervisory practices most effective in promoting good performance and stability in the banking sector are those that force accurate information disclosure, empower private sector monitoring of banks, and foster incentives for private agents to exert corporate control.

Episodes of systemic and borderline financial crises

Abstract: The following table presents information on 113 systemic banking crises (defined as much or all of bank capital being exhausted) that have occurred in 93 countries since the late 1970s. The table also provides information on 50 borderline and smaller (nonsystemic) banking crises in 44 countries during that period. Some judgment has gone into the compilation of this list, not only for countries lacking data on the size of the losses but also for countries where official estimates understate the problem. For instance, at some point in the 1990s nearly every transition economy experienced a banking crisis, but not all of these were excluded to limit the number of countries with missing information.

The Regulation and Supervision of Banks Around the World: A New Database

Abstract: This new and comprehensive database on the regulation and supervision of banks in 107 countries should better inform advice about bank regulation and supervision and lower the marginal cost of empirical research.International consultants on bank regulation and supervision for developing countries often base their advice on how their home country does things, for lack of information on practice in other countries. Recommendations for reform have tended to be shaped by bias rather than facts.To better inform advice about bank regulation and supervision and to lower the marginal cost of empirical research, Barth, Caprio, and Levine present and discuss a new and comprehensive database on the regulation and supervision of banks in 107 countries. The data, based on surveys sent to national bank regulatory and supervisory authorities, are now available to researchers and policymakers around the world.The data cover such aspects of banking as entry requirements, ownership restrictions, capital requirements, activity restrictions, external auditing requirements, characteristics of deposit insurance schemes, loan classification and provisioning requirements, accounting and disclosure requirements, troubled bank resolution actions, and (uniquely) the quality of supervisory personnel and their actions.The database permits users to learn how banks are currently regulated and supervised, and about bank structures and deposit insurance schemes, for a broad cross-section of countries.In addition to describing the data, Barth, Caprio, and Levine show how variables may be grouped and aggregated. They also show some simple correlations among selected variables.In a companion paper ("Bank Regulation and Supervision: What Works Best") studying the relationship between differences in bank regulation and supervision and bank performance and stability, they conclude that:- Countries with policies that promote private monitoring of banks have better bank performance and more stability. Countries with more generous deposit insurance schemes tend to have poorer bank performance and more bank fragility.- Diversification of income streams and loan portfolios - by not restricting bank activities - also tends to improve performance and stability. (This works best when an active securities market exists.) Countries in which banks are encouraged to diversify their portfolios domestically and internationally suffer fewer crises.This paper - a product of Finance, Development Research Group, and the Financial Sector Strategy and Policy Department - is part of a larger effort in the Bank to compile data on financial regulation and supervision and the advise countries on what works best. The study was funded by the Bank's Research Support Budget under the research project "Bank Regulation and Supervision: What Works and What Does Not."

Financial development and economic growth : views and agenda

Abstract: The author argues that the preponderance of theoretical reasoning and empirical evidence suggests a positive first order relationship between financial development and economic growth. There is evidence that the financial development level is a good predictor of future rates of economic growth, capital accumulation, and technological change. Moreover, cross-country, case-style, industry level and firm-level analysis document extensive periods when financial development crucially affects the speed and pattern of economic development. The author explains what the financial system does and how it affects, and is affected by, economic growth. Theory suggests that financial instruments, markets and institutions arise to mitigate the effects of information and transaction costs. A growing literature shows that differences in how well financial systems reduce information and transaction costs influence savings rates, investment decisions, technological innovation, and long-run growth rates. A less developed theoretical literature shows how changes in economic activity can influence financial systems. The author advocates a functional approach to understanding the role of financial systems in economic growth. This approach focuses on the ties between growth and the quality of the functions provided by the financial systems. The author discourages a narrow focus on one financial instrument, or a particular institution. Instead, the author addresses the more comprehensive question: What is the relationship between financial structure and the functioning of the financial system?

Financial Intermediation and Growth: Causality and Causes

Abstract: Legal and accounting reform that strengthens creditor rights, contract enforcement, and accounting practices boosts financial development and accelerates economic growth. Levine, Loayza, and Beck evaluate: Whether the level of development of financial intermediaries exerts a casual influence on economic growth. Whether cross-country differences in legal and accounting systems (such as creditor rights, contract enforcement, and accounting standards) explain differences in the level of financial development. Using both traditional cross-section, instrumental-variable procedures and recent dynamic panel techniques, they find that development of financial intermediaries exerts a large causal impact on growth. The data also show that cross-country differences in legal and accounting systems help determine differences in financial development. Together, these findings suggest that legal and accounting reform that strengthens creditor rights, contract enforcement, and accounting practices boosts financial development and accelerates economic growth. This paper - a product of Macroeconomics and Growth, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to understand the links between the financial system and economic growth. Thorsten Beck may be contacted at tbeck@worldbank.org.

Finance and the Sources of Growth

Abstract: Development of the banking sector exerts a large, causal impact on total factor productivity growth, which in turn causes GDP to grow. Whether banking development has a long-run effect on capital growth or private saving remains to be seen. Beck, Levine, and Loayza evaluate whether the level of development in the banking sector exerts a causal impact on economic growth and its sources- total factor productivity growth, physical capital accumulation, and private saving. They use (1) a pure cross-country instrumental variable estimator to extract the exogenous component of banking development and (2) a new panel technique that controls for country-specific effects and endogeneity. They find that: - Banks do exert a large, causal impact on total factor productivity growth, which feeds through to overall GDP growth. - The long-run links between banking development and both capital growth and private savings are more tenuous. This paper - a product of Finance, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to understand the links between the financial system and economic growth.

Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch 2007-08

Abstract: This paper summarizes and explains the main events of the liquidity and credit crunch in 2007-08. Starting with the trends leading up to the crisis, I explain how these events unfolded and how four different amplification mechanisms magnified losses in the mortgage market into large dislocations and turmoil in financial markets.