Bio: Gerrit Rooks is an academic researcher from Eindhoven University of Technology. The author has contributed to research in topics: Social capital & Database transaction. The author has an hindex of 17, co-authored 44 publications receiving 803 citations. Previous affiliations of Gerrit Rooks include Utrecht University & Makerere University Business School.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine the effects of the social context of economic exchange on the governance of transactions in buyer-supplier relations between firms and argue that social embeddedness provides alternatives for costly contractual planning, such as reciprocity and conditional co-operation.
Abstract: This paper examines the effects of the social context of economic exchange on the governance of transactions in buyer-supplier relations between firms. We distinguish three dimensions of social embeddedness of transactions, namely, repeated exchange between the partners (temporal embeddedness), relations with third parties such as other firms (network embeddedness) and social institutions that allow for credible agreements and commitments (institutional embeddedness). Together with transaction characteristics, social embeddedness shapes trust problems in economic exchange and how firms mitigate such trust problems through contractual planning. More precisely, we analyse how transaction characteristics and social embeddedness affect effort invested in contractual planning. We argue that social embeddedness provides alternatives for costly contractual planning, such as reciprocity and conditional co-operation. Forty purchase managers participated in a factorial survey. Virtual transactions were presented. E...
13 May 2002
TL;DR: In this article, the authors focus on transactions between buyers and suppliers and divide the management of these transactions into two hypothetical stages, an ex ante stage before the agreement is signed, and an ex post stage afterwards.
Abstract: Dissertation of the University of Utrecht The reality of business relations is opposed to the assumptions commonly held by legal experts on the role of contract law in society, or so Macaulay (see his classic 1963 study) would have us believe. Empirical studies Macaulay conducted in the United States in the 1950s and 1960s show that business transactions were not planned down to the last little detail or stipulated in contracts nearly as much as expected. If there were any problems or differences of opinion, contracts were rarely used to settle them. Even in the event of significant disputes, legal procedures were rarely resorted to, and only very few cases were put before a judge. As time passed though, reservations did arise as to Macaulay’s observations. In fact ‘The Transformation of American Business Disputing’ (Galanter, Macaulay, Palay and Rogers 1991), a large-scale research program headed by Macaulay himself, focused on whether the pattern he had described was still valid a few decades later. Influenced in part by the increasing volume and complexity of transactions and growing competition among firms, one might expect (see Galanter, Macaulay, Palay and Rogers 1991: 18-19) the image of business relations that entail informally settling important issues over a meal or a drink to have gradually eroded. The internationalization of economic traffic, and the growing spatial and sociocultural distance between companies accompanying it are also thought to have led to a change in the picture described by Macaulay. To an increasing extent, contracts were thought to be taken seriously in the business world, and disputes were thought to lead to legal procedures between companies. No matter how plausible this might seem in the first instance, it was not confirmed by later research in the field (see Dunworth and Rogers 1996 on the situation in the United States). The picture presented by Macaulay might still well be valid today (Macaulay 1996, see also Jettinghoff 2001: 17-18 and 55-58). This is striking in view of the unmistakably growing opportunities and stimuli for opportunism. Successful long-term cooperation between companies is no trivial matter (Raub and Tazelaar 2000: 20). A transaction partner can supply a lower quality or expend less effort than agreed upon, certainly if the other partner has no easy way of observing or monitoring it. So despite the stimuli for opportunism, and despite the lack of attention for detailed contractual planning, how is it possible that parties can nonetheless do successful business, and jointly solve whatever problems might come up without the help of contracts or third parties? In answering this general question in this book, I focus specifically on transactions between buyers and suppliers. I divide the management of these transactions into two hypothetical stages, an ex ante stage before the agreement is signed, and an ex post stage afterwards. Based on this division, I then distinguish three topics, and examine each of them separately and in conjunction with each other. The first topic is ex ante management, which is focused on preventing problems and designing damage control measures if they do occur. Regardless of all the planning input, in practice there can still be problems after an agreement is signed. The second topic is thus the performance of the supplier. I consider the extent to which there are problems in implementing the agreement. The third topic has to do with what happens after problems occur in the implementation of the agreement, and pertains to how problems are dealt with. The question on ex post management plays a central role here: How are problems dealt with, and what is done to reduce the damage?
TL;DR: In this article, the authors proposed that network effects differ between collectivistic and individualistic contexts, and they found partial support for their hypotheses, and hypothesized that networks will be more beneficial in individual contexts compared with collectiveistic context.
Abstract: Classical network theory states that social networks are a form of capital because they provide access to resources. In this article, we propose that network effects differ between collectivistic and individualistic contexts. In a collectivistic context, resource sharing will be “value based.” It is expected that members of a group support each other and share resources. In contrast, in an individualistic context, resource sharing will be more often based on reciprocity and trust. Hence, we hypothesized that networks will be more beneficial in individual contexts compared with collectivistic context. We found partial support for our hypotheses.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors focus on ex post governance of inter-firm transactions and develop and test hypotheses on the occurrence of ex post problems like delivery delays, inferior quality, and insufficient service in buyer-supplier transactions.
Abstract: This paper focuses on ex post governance of inter-firm transactions. We develop and test hypotheses on the occurrence of ex post problems like delivery delays, inferior quality, and insufficient service in buyer–supplier transactions. Our hypotheses address effects of transaction characteristics, of social embeddedness, and of contractual governance on the occurrence of problems. Other than earlier research on embeddedness effects in this field, we consider not only effects of dyadic embeddedness but also effects of network embeddedness. We test hypotheses using rich survey data on more than 1200 purchases of information technology (IT) products: hardware and software, both standard and complex. We find evidence for effects of transaction characteristics on the occurrence of problems, while our data do not support hypotheses on effects of contractual governance. Our data provide rather consistent support for hypotheses on the effects of embeddedness. Specifically, we find evidence that network embeddedness reduces problems.
01 Jan 2009
TL;DR: In this paper, the characteristics and determinants of entrepreneurial behavior in Uganda are discussed based on a recent survey of urban and rural entrepreneurs, executed in May 2008, and the main dependent variables are business success, gestation activities and innovative performance.
Abstract: This paper discusses the characteristics and determinants of entrepreneurial behaviour in Uganda. It is based on a recent survey of urban and rural entrepreneurs, executed in May 2008. The main dependent variables are business success, gestation activities and innovative performance. The paper focuses in particular on the interplay of human and social capital in determining entrepreneurial performance. A prominent question in the literature is whether human capital and social capital act as complements or substitutes in furthering entrepreneurial dynamism. We find that Ugandan enterprises are predominantly very small and not very dynamic. Most enterprises are young, with little or no growth of employment since start-up. Only a very small subset of sample entrepreneurs could be classified as entrepreneur in the dynamic Schumpeterian sense.
TL;DR: A theme of the text is the use of artificial regressions for estimation, reference, and specification testing of nonlinear models, including diagnostic tests for parameter constancy, serial correlation, heteroscedasticity, and other types of mis-specification.
Abstract: Offering a unifying theoretical perspective not readily available in any other text, this innovative guide to econometrics uses simple geometrical arguments to develop students' intuitive understanding of basic and advanced topics, emphasizing throughout the practical applications of modern theory and nonlinear techniques of estimation. One theme of the text is the use of artificial regressions for estimation, reference, and specification testing of nonlinear models, including diagnostic tests for parameter constancy, serial correlation, heteroscedasticity, and other types of mis-specification. Explaining how estimates can be obtained and tests can be carried out, the authors go beyond a mere algebraic description to one that can be easily translated into the commands of a standard econometric software package. Covering an unprecedented range of problems with a consistent emphasis on those that arise in applied work, this accessible and coherent guide to the most vital topics in econometrics today is indispensable for advanced students of econometrics and students of statistics interested in regression and related topics. It will also suit practising econometricians who want to update their skills. Flexibly designed to accommodate a variety of course levels, it offers both complete coverage of the basic material and separate chapters on areas of specialized interest.
01 Jan 2012
TL;DR: The 2008 crash has left all the established economic doctrines - equilibrium models, real business cycles, disequilibria models - in disarray as discussed by the authors, and a good viewpoint to take bearings anew lies in comparing the post-Great Depression institutions with those emerging from Thatcher and Reagan's economic policies: deregulation, exogenous vs. endoge- nous money, shadow banking vs. Volcker's Rule.
Abstract: The 2008 crash has left all the established economic doctrines - equilibrium models, real business cycles, disequilibria models - in disarray. Part of the problem is due to Smith’s "veil of ignorance": individuals unknowingly pursue society’s interest and, as a result, have no clue as to the macroeconomic effects of their actions: witness the Keynes and Leontief multipliers, the concept of value added, fiat money, Engel’s law and technical progress, to name but a few of the macrofoundations of microeconomics. A good viewpoint to take bearings anew lies in comparing the post-Great Depression institutions with those emerging from Thatcher and Reagan’s economic policies: deregulation, exogenous vs. endoge- nous money, shadow banking vs. Volcker’s Rule. Very simply, the banks, whose lending determined deposits after Roosevelt, and were a public service became private enterprises whose deposits determine lending. These underlay the great moderation preceding 2006, and the subsequent crash.
01 Jan 2008
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that rational actors make their organizations increasingly similar as they try to change them, and describe three isomorphic processes-coercive, mimetic, and normative.
Abstract: What makes organizations so similar? We contend that the engine of rationalization and bureaucratization has moved from the competitive marketplace to the state and the professions. Once a set of organizations emerges as a field, a paradox arises: rational actors make their organizations increasingly similar as they try to change them. We describe three isomorphic processes-coercive, mimetic, and normative—leading to this outcome. We then specify hypotheses about the impact of resource centralization and dependency, goal ambiguity and technical uncertainty, and professionalization and structuration on isomorphic change. Finally, we suggest implications for theories of organizations and social change.
01 Jan 2011
TL;DR: In this article, the authors proposed a method to solve the problem of "labeling" for the purpose of improving the quality of the labels of the products of a company's products.
Abstract: 第１章 ＧＥＭ調査の概要（分析の枠組み；調査方法；起業活動の定義；起業活動率；起業活動と経済成長；起業の計画と失敗） 第２章 起業家と事業特性（起業家の背景；起業家の能力；事業特性；起業家教育） 第３章 起業の環境（社会的資源；起業家に対する評価；経済危機の影響；起業活動の投資環境） 第４章 専門家調査（資金調達；政府の方針；支援プログラム；教育システム；技術移転；コマーシャル・サービス；起業文化；事業機会；経営能力；起業家に対する評価；女性への支援；急成長への注目；イノベーションへの関心；調査結果） 第５章 政策への提