Moral Hazard and the financial crisis

Under contingent fees the attorney gets a share of the judgement; under conditional fees the lawyer gets an upscale premium if the case is won which is, however, unrelated to the adjudicated amount. We compare conditional and contingent fees in a framework where lawyers are uninformed about the clients’ cases. If there is asymmetric information about the merits of cases, in equilibrium attorneys will offer only conditional fees. If there is asymmetric information about the risk of cases, only contingent fee contracts are offered in equilibrium.

Conditional versus Contingent Fees

This chapter compares strict liability and negligence rules on the basis of the incentives they provide to "appropriately" reduce accident losses. Under strict liability, the outcome is efficient, and again the reasoning is a little different from that in the last subcase. Under the negligence rule, restaurants will decide to avoid liability by taking appropriate precautions to prepare meals under sanitary conditions. The unilateral case is studied for two reasons. First, it is descriptive of situations in which whatever changes in the behavior of victims that could reasonably be expected to result from changes in liability rules would have only a small influence on accident losses. The second reason is pedagogical; it is easier to understand the general bilateral case after having studied the unilateral case. In the bilateral case, two additional liability rules are considered, strict liability with a defense of contributory negligence and the negligence rule with that defense.

Strict liability versus negligence

The question is asked how the incentives of private parties to bring suit relate to what would be socially appropriate given the costs of using the legal system; and the answer presented in the model that is examined involves two elements. The first is that as a potential plaintiff takes into account only his own legal expenses in deciding whether to bring suit, the private cost of suit is evidently less than the social cost (which would include the defendant's legal expenses), suggesting a tendency toward excessive litigation, other things equal. But consideration of the second element complicates matters: as the plaintiff takes into account his own expected gains but not the social gains attaching to suit (which in the model is the general effect of suit on potential defendants' behavior), and as these social gains could be either larger or smaller than his gains, there is a tendency in respect to litigation that could either counter or reinforce the previous tendency.

The Social versus the Private Incentive to Bring Suit in a Costly Legal System

Third party litigation funding (TPLF) has emerged as one of the most important developments in civil litigation. Courts and policymakers in several countries are looking to each other as they debate the costs and benefits of this growing industry, and the need for regulatory oversight. Such cross-pollination in the public and jurisprudential debates on TPLF can be enormously helpful, but must be approached with caution. The TPLF industry operates in very different procedural environments, and any comparative analysis must take into account the various jurisdictions’ unique litigation culture and architecture. In this paper, the authors explore TPLF in the U.S., Australia and Canada, with a focus on class action litigation in the latter two jurisdictions. They examine the historical development of TPLF, current practices, the legal and procedural context within which such funding takes place, and how each jurisdiction is addressing regulation of this form of finance. In the final part of the paper, they engage in a comparative analysis of TPLF in the three countries, and highlight important differences that may ultimately result in unique approaches to regulatory oversight of the industry.

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID2138511_code609399.pdf?abstractid=2064980&mirid=1

Justice for Profit: A Comparative Analysis of Australian, Canadian and U.S. Third Party Litigation Funding

In Third Party Funding, Gian Marco Solas, for the first time, describes third party funding (TPF) as stand-alone practice within the wider litigation and legal services' markets. The book reports on legal issues related to TPF in both common law and civil law jurisdictions, and in the international context. It then discusses the incentives and economics of TPF transactions in different legal contexts while explaining how the practice emerged and how it is likely to develop. In addition, the book offers practical insights into TPF transactions and analyzes a number of regulatory proposals that could affect its use and desirability. This work should be read by scholars, practitioners, policymakers, and anyone else interested in how TPF is changing the practice of law.

Gian Marco Solas

Papers

Third Party Funding: Law, Economics and Policy