Giorgio Topa

Bio: Giorgio Topa is an academic researcher from Federal Reserve Bank of New York. The author has contributed to research in topics: Inflation & Monetary policy. The author has an hindex of 29, co-authored 92 publications receiving 5224 citations. Previous affiliations of Giorgio Topa include Institute for the Study of Labor & University of Chicago.

Social interactions, local spillovers and unemployment

Abstract: I analyse a model that explicitly incorporates local interactions and allows agents to exchange information about job openings within their social networks. Agents are more likely to be employed if their social contacts are also employed. The model generates a stationary distribution of unemployment that exhibits positive spatial correlations. I estimate the model via an indirect inference procedure, using Census Tract data for Chicago. I find a significantly positive amount of social interactions across neighbouring tracts. The local spillovers are stronger for areas with less educated workers and higher fractions of minorities. Furthermore, they are shaped by ethnic dividing lines and neighbourhood boundaries.

Place of Work and Place of Residence: Informal Hiring Networks and Labor Market Outcomes

Abstract: We use a novel dataset and research design to empirically detect the effect of social interactions among neighbors on labor market outcomes. Specifically, using Census data that characterize residential and employment locations down to the city block, we examine whether individuals residing in the same block are more likely to work together than those in nearby blocks. We find evidence of significant social interactions operating at the block level: residing on the same versus nearby blocks increases the probability of working together by over 33 percent. The results also indicate that this referral effect is stronger when individuals are similar in sociodemographic characteristics (e.g., both have children of similar ages) and when at least one individual is well attached to the labor market. These findings are robust across various specifications intended to address concerns related to sorting and reverse causation. Further, having determined the characteristics of a pair of individuals that lead to an especially strong referral effect, we provide evidence that the increased availability of neighborhood referrals has a significant impact on a wide range of labor market outcomes including employment and wages.

Place of Work and Place of Residence: Informal Hiring Networks and Labor Market Outcomes

Abstract: We use a novel research design to empirically detect the effect of social interactions on labor market outcomes. Using Census data on residential and employment locations, we examine whether individuals residing in the same city block are more likely to work together than those in nearby blocks. We find evidence of significant social interactions. The estimated referral effect is stronger when individuals are similar in sociodemographic characteristics. These findings are robust across specifications intended to address sorting and reverse causation. Further, the increased availability of neighborhood referrals has a significant impact on a wide range of labor market outcomes.

Does Microcredit Reach the Poor and Vulnerable? Evidence from Northern Bangladesh

Abstract: Subsidized loans have a history of being diverted to the rich. Yet recently microcredit programs, such as the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, have become popular among donors and governments as a way to channel funds to the poor. This paper uses a unique panel dataset from two Bangladeshi villages to test if the modern microcredit movement is different from its predecessors. Poverty is measured by levels of consumption. Vulnerability is measured as fluctuations in consumption associated with inefficient risk sharing. We find that subsidized credit is largely successful at reaching the poor and vulnerable. The probability that a microcredit member is below the poverty line is substantially higher than that of a randomly picked household in both villages. In the village where female headed households were found to be vulnerable, nearly half of the female headed households belonged to microcredit programs yet only a quarter of male headed households were microcredit members. While restricting loans to the landless is not effective in reaching the poor and vulnerable, targeting female headed households is.

Socio-economic distance and spatial patterns in unemployment

Abstract: This paper examines the spatial patterns of unemployment in Chicago between 1980 and 1990. We study unemployment clustering with respect to different social and economic distance metrics that reflect the structure of agents' social networks. Specifically, we use physical distance, travel time, and differences in ethnic and occupational distribution between locations. Our goal is to determine whether our estimates of spatial dependence are consistent with models in which agents' employment status is affected by information exchanged locally within their social networks. We present non-parametric estimates of correlation across Census tracts as a function of each distance metric as well as pairs of metrics, both for unemployment rate itself and after conditioning on a set of tract characteristics. Our results indicate that there is a strong positive and statistically significant degree of spatial dependence in the distribution of raw unemployment rates, for all our metrics. However, once we condition on a set of covariates, most of the spatial autocorrelation is eliminated, with the exception of physical and occupational distance. Racial and ethnic composition variables are the single most important factor in explaining the observed correlation patterns. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

General Diagnostic Tests for Cross Section Dependence in Panels

Abstract: This paper proposes simple tests of error cross section dependence which are applicable to a variety of panel data models, including stationary and unit root dynamic heterogeneous panels with short T and large N. The proposed tests are based on average of pair-wise correlation coefficients of the OLS residuals from the individual regressions in the panel, and can be used to test for cross section dependence of any fixed order p, as well as the case where no a priori ordering of the cross section units is assumed, referred to as CD(p) and CD tests, respectively. Asymptotic distribution of these tests are derived and their power function analyzed under different alternatives. It is shown that these tests are correctly centred for fixed N and T, and are robust to single or multiple breaks in the slope coefficients and/or error variances. The small sample properties of the tests are investigated and compared to the Lagrange multiplier test of Breusch and Pagan using Monte Carlo experiments. It is shown that the tests have the correct size in very small samples and satisfactory power, and as predicted by the theory, quite robust to the presence of unit roots and structural breaks. The use of the CD test is illustrated by applying it to study the degree of dependence in per capita output innovations across countries within a given region and across countries in different regions. The results show significant evidence of cross dependence in output innovations across many countries and regions in the World.

博弈论 : 矛盾冲突分析 = Game theory : analysis of conflict

Abstract: Preface 1. Decision-Theoretic Foundations 1.1 Game Theory, Rationality, and Intelligence 1.2 Basic Concepts of Decision Theory 1.3 Axioms 1.4 The Expected-Utility Maximization Theorem 1.5 Equivalent Representations 1.6 Bayesian Conditional-Probability Systems 1.7 Limitations of the Bayesian Model 1.8 Domination 1.9 Proofs of the Domination Theorems Exercises 2. Basic Models 2.1 Games in Extensive Form 2.2 Strategic Form and the Normal Representation 2.3 Equivalence of Strategic-Form Games 2.4 Reduced Normal Representations 2.5 Elimination of Dominated Strategies 2.6 Multiagent Representations 2.7 Common Knowledge 2.8 Bayesian Games 2.9 Modeling Games with Incomplete Information Exercises 3. Equilibria of Strategic-Form Games 3.1 Domination and Ratonalizability 3.2 Nash Equilibrium 3.3 Computing Nash Equilibria 3.4 Significance of Nash Equilibria 3.5 The Focal-Point Effect 3.6 The Decision-Analytic Approach to Games 3.7 Evolution. Resistance. and Risk Dominance 3.8 Two-Person Zero-Sum Games 3.9 Bayesian Equilibria 3.10 Purification of Randomized Strategies in Equilibria 3.11 Auctions 3.12 Proof of Existence of Equilibrium 3.13 Infinite Strategy Sets Exercises 4. Sequential Equilibria of Extensive-Form Games 4.1 Mixed Strategies and Behavioral Strategies 4.2 Equilibria in Behavioral Strategies 4.3 Sequential Rationality at Information States with Positive Probability 4.4 Consistent Beliefs and Sequential Rationality at All Information States 4.5 Computing Sequential Equilibria 4.6 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria 4.7 Games with Perfect Information 4.8 Adding Chance Events with Small Probability 4.9 Forward Induction 4.10 Voting and Binary Agendas 4.11 Technical Proofs Exercises 5. Refinements of Equilibrium in Strategic Form 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Perfect Equilibria 5.3 Existence of Perfect and Sequential Equilibria 5.4 Proper Equilibria 5.5 Persistent Equilibria 5.6 Stable Sets 01 Equilibria 5.7 Generic Properties 5.8 Conclusions Exercises 6. Games with Communication 6.1 Contracts and Correlated Strategies 6.2 Correlated Equilibria 6.3 Bayesian Games with Communication 6.4 Bayesian Collective-Choice Problems and Bayesian Bargaining Problems 6.5 Trading Problems with Linear Utility 6.6 General Participation Constraints for Bayesian Games with Contracts 6.7 Sender-Receiver Games 6.8 Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria 6.9 Communication in Extensive-Form and Multistage Games Exercises Bibliographic Note 7. Repeated Games 7.1 The Repeated Prisoners Dilemma 7.2 A General Model of Repeated Garnet 7.3 Stationary Equilibria of Repeated Games with Complete State Information and Discounting 7.4 Repeated Games with Standard Information: Examples 7.5 General Feasibility Theorems for Standard Repeated Games 7.6 Finitely Repeated Games and the Role of Initial Doubt 7.7 Imperfect Observability of Moves 7.8 Repeated Wines in Large Decentralized Groups 7.9 Repeated Games with Incomplete Information 7.10 Continuous Time 7.11 Evolutionary Simulation of Repeated Games Exercises 8. Bargaining and Cooperation in Two-Person Games 8.1 Noncooperative Foundations of Cooperative Game Theory 8.2 Two-Person Bargaining Problems and the Nash Bargaining Solution 8.3 Interpersonal Comparisons of Weighted Utility 8.4 Transferable Utility 8.5 Rational Threats 8.6 Other Bargaining Solutions 8.7 An Alternating-Offer Bargaining Game 8.8 An Alternating-Offer Game with Incomplete Information 8.9 A Discrete Alternating-Offer Game 8.10 Renegotiation Exercises 9. Coalitions in Cooperative Games 9.1 Introduction to Coalitional Analysis 9.2 Characteristic Functions with Transferable Utility 9.3 The Core 9.4 The Shapkey Value 9.5 Values with Cooperation Structures 9.6 Other Solution Concepts 9.7 Colational Games with Nontransferable Utility 9.8 Cores without Transferable Utility 9.9 Values without Transferable Utility Exercises Bibliographic Note 10. Cooperation under Uncertainty 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Concepts of Efficiency 10.3 An Example 10.4 Ex Post Inefficiency and Subsequent Oilers 10.5 Computing Incentive-Efficient Mechanisms 10.6 Inscrutability and Durability 10.7 Mechanism Selection by an Informed Principal 10.8 Neutral Bargaining Solutions 10.9 Dynamic Matching Processes with Incomplete Information Exercises Bibliography Index

Estimation and Inference in Large Heterogeneous Panels with a Multifactor Error Structure

Abstract: This paper presents a new approach to estimation and inference in panel data models with a multifactor error structure where the unobserved common factors are (possibly) correlated with exogenously given individual-specific regressors, and the factor loadings differ over the cross section units. The basic idea behind the proposed estimation procedure is to filter the individual-specific regressors by means of (weighted) cross-section aggregates such that asymptotically as the cross-section dimension (N) tends to infinity the differential effects of unobserved common factors are eliminated. The estimation procedure has the advantage that it can be computed by OLS applied to an auxiliary regression where the observed regressors are augmented by (weighted) cross sectional averages of the dependent variable and the individual specific regressors. Two different but related problems are addressed: one that concerns the coefficients of the individual-specific regressors, and the other that focusses on the mean of the individual coefficients assumed random. In both cases appropriate estimators, referred to as common correlated effects (CCE) estimators, are proposed and their asymptotic distribution as N with T (the time-series dimension) fixed or as N and T (jointly) are derived under different regularity conditions. One important feature of the proposed CCE mean group (CCEMG) estimator is its invariance to the (unknown but fixed) number of unobserved common factors as N and T (jointly). The small sample properties of the various pooled estimators are investigated by Monte Carlo experiments that confirm the theoretical derivations and show that the pooled estimators have generally satisfactory small sample properties even for relatively small values of N and T.

Estimation and Inference in Large Heterogeneous Panels with a Multifactor Error Structure

Abstract: This paper presents a new approach to estimation and inference in panel data models with a general multifactor error structure. The unobserved factors and the individual-specific errors are allowed to follow arbitrary stationary processes, and the number of unobserved factors need not be estimated. The basic idea is to filter the individual-specific regressors by means of cross-section averages such that asymptotically as the cross-section dimension (N) tends to infinity, the differential effects of unobserved common factors are eliminated. The estimation procedure has the advantage that it can be computed by least squares applied to auxiliary regressions where the observed regressors are augmented with cross-sectional averages of the dependent variable and the individual-specific regressors. A number of estimators (referred to as common correlated effects (CCE) estimators) are proposed and their asymptotic distributions are derived. The small sample properties of mean group and pooled CCE estimators are investigated by Monte Carlo experiments, showing that the CCE estimators have satisfactory small sample properties even under a substantial degree of heterogeneity and dynamics, and for relatively small values of N and T.

The microfinance promise

Abstract: In the past decade, microfinance programs have demonstrated that it is possible to lend to low-income households while maintaining high repayment rates--even without requiring collateral. The programs promise a revolution in approaches to alleviating poverty and spreading financial services, and millions of poor households are served globally. A growing body of economic theory demonstrates how new contractual forms offer a key to microfinance success--particularly the use of group-lending contracts with joint liability. For the most part, however, high repayment rates have not translated into profits, and studies of impacts on poverty yield a mixed picture. In describing emerging tensions, the paper highlights the diversity of innovative mechanisms beyond group-lending contracts, the measurement of financial sustainability, the estimation of economic and social impacts, the costs and benefits of subsidization, and the potential to reduce poverty through savings programs rather than just credit. The promise of microfinance has pushed far ahead of the evidence, and an agenda is put forward for addressing critical empirical gaps and sharpening the terms of policy discussion.