Glen Dowell

Bio: Glen Dowell is an academic researcher from Cornell University. The author has contributed to research in topics: Institutional theory & Corporate governance. The author has an hindex of 15, co-authored 30 publications receiving 3112 citations. Previous affiliations of Glen Dowell include Mendoza College of Business & University of Notre Dame.

Do Corporate Global Environmental Standards Create or Destroy Market Value

Abstract: Arguments can be made on both sides of the question of whether a stringent global corporate environmental standard represents a competitive asset or liability for multinational enterprises (MNEs) investing in emerging and developing markets. Analyzing the global environmental standards of a sample of U.S.-based MNEs in relation to their stock market performance, we find that firms adopting a single stringent global environmental standard have much higher market values, as measured by Tobin'sq, than firms defaulting to less stringent, or poorly enforced host country standards. Thus, developing countries that use lax environmental regulations to attract foreign direct investment may end up attracting poorer quality, and perhaps less competitive, firms. Our results also suggest that externalities are incorporated to a significant extent in firm valuation. We discuss plausible reasons for this observation.

Difference in degrees : CEO characteristics and firm environmental disclosure

Abstract: We contribute to the literature on firms' responses to institutional pressures and environmental information disclosure We hypothesize that CEO characteristics such as education and tenure will influence firms' likelihood to voluntarily disclose environmental information We test our hypotheses by examining firms' responses to the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) and find that firms led by newly appointed CEOs and CEOs with MBA degrees are more likely to respond to the CDP, while those led by lawyers are less likely to respond Our results have implications for research on strategic responses to institutional pressures and corporate environmental performance

Boards, CEOs, and surviving a financial crisis: Evidence from the internet shakeout

Abstract: We examine whether corporate governance matters more for firms facing financial distress. We theorize that financial crisis changes the relative costs and benefits of governance mechanisms and that more independent and smaller boards become more valuable in distressed firms. We further hypothesize that CEO power becomes increasingly beneficial as concentrated power allows the firm to respond more rapidly to the crisis. Event-history analysis of the failure of publicly traded Internet firms over the period 2000–2002 confirms our hypotheses. Our results suggest that the association between governance and survival depends on firm and environmental context and that one-size-fits-all prescriptions for governance mechanisms are therefore likely to be ineffective. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

How firms respond to mandatory information disclosure

Abstract: Mandatory information disclosure regulations seek to create institutional pressure to spur performance improvement. By examining how organizational characteristics moderate establishments' responses to a prominent environmental information disclosure program, we provide among the first empirical evidence characterizing heterogeneous responses by those mandated to disclose information. We find particularly rapid improvement among establishments located close to their headquarters and among establishments with proximate siblings, especially when the proximate siblings are in the same industry. Large establishments improve more slowly than small establishments in sparse regions, but both groups perform similarly in dense regions, suggesting that density mitigates the power of large establishments to resist institutional pressures. Finally, establishments owned by private firms outperform those owned by public firms. We highlight implications for institutional theory, managers, and policymakers. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Misery Loves Companies: Rethinking Social Initiatives by Business:

Abstract: Companies are increasingly asked to provide innovative solutions to deep-seated problems of human misery, even as economic theory instructs managers to focus on maximizing their shareholders' wealt

Proactive environmental strategies: a stakeholder management perspective

Abstract: This paper includes an empirical analysis of the linkages between environmental strategy and stakeholder management. First, it is shown that several simultaneous improvements in various resource domains are required for firms to shift to an empirically significant, higher level of proactiveness. Second, more proactive environmental strategies are associated with a deeper and broader coverage of stakeholders. Third, environmental leadership is not associated with a rising importance of environmental regulations, thereby suggesting a role for voluntary cooperation between firms and government. Finally, the linkages between environmental strategies and stakeholder management, based on a sample of 197 firms operating in Belgium, appear more limited than expected. Country-specific characteristics may to a large extent account for these results. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Confronting the Environmental Kuznets Curve

Abstract: T he environmental Kuznets curve posits an inverted-U relationship between pollution and economic development. Kuznets's name was apparently attached to the curve by Grossman and Krueger (1993), who noted its resemblance to Kuznets's inverted-U relationship between income inequality and development. In the first stage of industrialization, pollution in the environmental Kuznets curve world grows rapidly because people are more interested in jobs and income than clean air and water, communities are too poor to pay for abatement, and environmental regulation is correspondingly weak. The balance shifts as income rises. Leading industrial sectors become cleaner, people value the environment more highly, and regulatory institutions become more effective. Along the curve, pollution levels off in the middle-income range and then falls toward pre-industrial levels in wealthy societies. The environmental Kuznets curve model has elicited conflicting reactions from researchers and policymakers. Applied econometricians have generally accepted the basic tenets of the model and focused on measuring its parameters. Their regressions, typically fitted to cross-sectional observations across countries or regions, suggest that air and water pollution increase with development until per capita income reaches a range of $5000 to $8000. When income rises beyond that level, pollution starts to decline, as shown in the "conventional EKC" line in Figure 1. In developing countries, some policymakers have interpreted such results as conveying a message about priorities: Grow first, then clean up. Numerous critics have challenged the conventional environmental Kuznets curve, both as a representation of what actually happens in the development process and as a policy prescription. Some pessimistic critics argue that crosssectional evidence for the environmental Kuznets curve is nothing more than a

Corporate responsibility and financial performance: the role of intangible resources

Abstract: This paper examines the effects of a firm's intangible resources in mediating the relationship between corporate responsibility and financial performance. We hypothesize that previous empirical findings of a positive relationship between social and financial performance may be spurious because the researchers failed to account for the mediating effects of intangible resources. Our results indicate that there is no direct relationship between corporate responsibility and financial performance—merely an indirect relationship that relies on the mediating effect of a firm's intangible resources. We demonstrate our theoretical contention with the use of a database comprising 599 companies from 28 countries. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.