Gregory DeAngelo

Bio: Gregory DeAngelo is an academic researcher from Claremont Graduate University. The author has contributed to research in topics: Law enforcement & Public good. The author has an hindex of 10, co-authored 79 publications receiving 576 citations. Previous affiliations of Gregory DeAngelo include West Virginia University & Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute.

Life and Death in the Fast Lane: Police Enforcement and Traffic Fatalities

Abstract: This paper estimates the causal effect of police on traffic fatalities and injuries. Due to simultaneity, estimating the causal effect of police on crime is often difficult. We overcome this obstacle by focusing on a mass layoff of Oregon State Police in February of 2003, stemming from changes in property tax assessment in the prior decade. Due solely to budget cuts, 35 percent of the roadway troopers were laid off, which dramatically reduced citations. The subsequent decrease in enforcement is associated with a significant increase in injuries and fatalities, with the strongest effects under fair weather conditions outside of city-limits where state police employment levels are most relevant. The effects are similar using control groups chosen either geographically or through data-driven methods. Our estimates suggest that a highway fatality can be prevented with $309,000 of expenditures on state police.

Life and Death in the Fast Lane: Police Enforcement and Traffic Fatalities

Abstract: Simultaneity complicates the estimation of the causal effect of police on crime. We overcome this obstacle by focusing on a mass layoff of Oregon State Police in February of 2003. Due solely to budget cuts, 35 percent of the roadway troopers were laid off, which dramatically reduced citations. The subsequent decrease in enforcement is associated with a significant increase in injuries and fatalities. The effects are similar using control groups chosen either geographically or through data-driven methods. Our estimates suggest that a highway fatality can be prevented with $309,000 of expenditures on state police. (JEL H76, K42, R41)

Deterrence, expected cost, uncertainty and voting: Experimental evidence

Abstract: We conduct laboratory experiments to investigate the effects of deterrence mechanisms under controlled conditions. The effect of the expected cost of punishment of an individual’s decision to engage in a proscribed activity and the effect of uncertainty on an individual’s decision to commit a violation are very difficult to isolate in field data. We use a roadway speeding framing and find that (a) individuals respond considerably to increases in the expected cost of speeding, (b) uncertainty about the enforcement regime yields a significant reduction in violations committed, and (c) people are much more likely to speed when the punishment regime for which they voted is implemented. Our results have important implications for a behavioral theory of deterrence under uncertainty.

Are public and private enforcement complements or substitutes? Evidence from high frequency data

Abstract: A substantial theoretical literature identifies two general approaches to deterring non-norm conforming behavior: public law enforcement to monitor and punish proscribed behavior, and private (community) enforcement to discourage both illegal and legal norm defying activities. Recent papers highlight the importance of both enforcement approaches but empirical identification of their relative effects has been challenging. Utilizing a novel, event-level database from the National Hockey League, we examine the separate and interactive effects of law enforcement (referees) and community, vigilante justice (fighting) on non-conforming behavior. We find that the timing of events is crucial in determining the effectiveness of the different types of enforcement. Community enforcement is effective only when law enforcement is lacking. Conversely, law enforcement actions are effective both independently and in conjunction with community enforcement.

Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction

Abstract: หนงสอ Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction เขยนโดย Colin F. Camerer มวตถประสงคเพอนำเสนอหลกฐานเชงประจกษจากผลการวจยจำนวนมากมายทยนยนอทธพลของปจจยทางจตวทยาทมผลตอการตดสนใจตามทฤษฎเกม หนงสอ เลมนไดนำเสนอแนวคดทฤษฎทเพมความสามารถในการอธบายพฤตกรรมการตดสนใจตามทฤษฎเกม (Game theory) ซง von Neumann; & Morgenstern ไดเสนอไวในป ค.ศ. 1944 โดยชใหเหนวา ปจจยทางจตวทยามอทธพลทำใหการตดสนใจทเกดขนจรงคลาดเคลอนจากการคาดการณของทฤษฎเกม

Criminal Deterrence: A Review of the Literature

Abstract: We review economics research regarding the effect of police, punishments, and work on crime, with a particular focus on papers from the last twenty years. Evidence in favor of deterrence effects is mixed. While there is considerable evidence that crime is responsive to police and to the existence of attractive legitimate labor-market opportunities, there is far less evidence that crime responds to the severity of criminal sanctions. We discuss fruitful directions for future work and implications for public policy.

Natural Experiments: An Overview of Methods, Approaches, and Contributions to Public Health Intervention Research

Abstract: Population health interventions are essential to reduce health inequalities and tackle other public health priorities, but they are not always amenable to experimental manipulation. Natural experiment (NE) approaches are attracting growing interest as a way of providing evidence in such circumstances. One key challenge in evaluating NEs is selective exposure to the intervention. Studies should be based on a clear theoretical understanding of the processes that determine exposure. Even if the observed effects are large and rapidly follow implementation, confidence in attributing these effects to the intervention can be improved by carefully considering alternative explanations. Causal inference can be strengthened by including additional design features alongside the principal method of effect estimation. NE studies often rely on existing (including routinely collected) data. Investment in such data sources and the infrastructure for linking exposure and outcome data is essential if the potential for such ...

The theory of externalities, public goods, and club goods: Externalities and private information

Abstract: The analysis in Chapter 4 suggests that in a world of zero transaction costs, where participants in an exchange know the relevant characteristics of each other's preferences, technology, and endowments, mutually advantageous bargaining opportunities will not be ignored. The individuals may be expected to agree on a Pareto-efficient allocation. The traditional Pigouvian tax/subsidy literature, by contrast, assumes at the outset that equilibrium outcomes may indeed be inefficient. In particular, it presupposes that existing markets will not function in such a way as to eliminate all potential sources of inefficiency and that the introduction of taxes and subsidies into a market system can help by confronting individuals with those costs and benefits that their consumption and production activities generate for other parties and that are not internalized by the market mechanism. In order to justify the possibility of inefficiency in equilibrium, we need to examine more closely the idea of positive transaction costs. We hinted earlier that one way of thinking about such costs is to see them as arising from the presence of private information. Participants in an exchange may know their own preferences, endowments, and technology but may not be so well informed about the relevant characteristics of other potential participants. In analyzing the bargaining process that leads to an equilibrium, it is important to consider carefully the precise nature of the process, the information available to each party, and the implications of such matters for the properties of the equilibrium.