Author
Guillermo Owen
Other affiliations: Fordham University, University of Iowa, University of Paris ...read more
Bio: Guillermo Owen is an academic researcher from Naval Postgraduate School. The author has contributed to research in topics: Shapley value & Game theory. The author has an hindex of 36, co-authored 136 publications receiving 6161 citations. Previous affiliations of Guillermo Owen include Fordham University & University of Iowa.
Papers published on a yearly basis
Papers
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TL;DR: The multilinear extension of an n-person game v is a function defined on the n-cube IN which is linear in each variable and which coincides with v at the conrners of the cube, satisfying f(x) = v(i ∣ xi = 1}).
Abstract: The multilinear extension of an n-person game v is a function defined on the n-cube IN which is linear in each variable and which coincides with v at the conrners of the cube, satisfying f(x) = v({i ∣ xi = 1}). Multilinear extensions are useful as a help in computing the values of large games, and give a generalization of the Shapley value.
624 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors present a simple and easily calculated expression for the Shapley value whenever the characteristic function is a "cost" function with the property that the cost of any subset of players is equal to the "largest" player in that subset.
Abstract: We present a simple and easily calculated expression for the Shapley value whenever the characteristic function is a “cost” function with the property that the cost of any subset of players is equal to the cost of the “largest” player in that subset. It turns out that a simple rule previously proposed for calculating airport landing charges generates precisely the Shapley value for an appropriately defined game.
481 citations
TL;DR: An economic production game is treated, in which players pool resources to produce finished goods which can be sold at a given market price anduality theory of linear programming is used to obtain equilibrium price vectors and to prove the non-emptiness of the core.
Abstract: An economic production game is treated, in which players pool resources to produce finished goods which can be sold at a given market price. The production process is linear, so that the characteristic function can be obtained by solving linear programs.
468 citations
TL;DR: The authors review recent work on the accuracy of group judgmental processes as a function of the competences (judgmental accuracies) of individual group members, the group decision procedure, and the group size.
Abstract: We review recent work on the accuracy of group judgmental processes as a function of (a) the competences (judgmental accuracies) of individual group members, (b) the group decision procedure, and (c) group size. This work on individual competence and group accuracy represents an important contribution to democratic theory and a useful complement to the usual emphasis in the social choice literature on individual preference and preference aggregation mechanisms. The work reported on is rooted in a tradition which goes back to scholars such as Condorcet, Poisson, and Bayes.
382 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, it was shown that the Banzhaf value can be obtained by differentiating the multilinear extension of a game at the midpoint of the unit cube, which gives us a composition theorem for the value of compound games.
Abstract: It is shown that the Banzhaf value can be obtained by differentiating the multilinear extension of a game at the midpoint of the unit cube. This gives us a composition theorem for the value of compound games. As an example, the values of the electoral college and presidential election “games” are approximated by the method of extensions.
324 citations
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Book•
01 Jan 1994TL;DR: A Course in Game Theory as discussed by the authors presents the main ideas of game theory at a level suitable for graduate students and advanced undergraduates, emphasizing the theory's foundations and interpretations of its basic concepts.
Abstract: A Course in Game Theory presents the main ideas of game theory at a level suitable for graduate students and advanced undergraduates, emphasizing the theory's foundations and interpretations of its basic concepts. The authors provide precise definitions and full proofs of results, sacrificing generalities and limiting the scope of the material in order to do so. The text is organized in four parts: strategic games, extensive games with perfect information, extensive games with imperfect information, and coalitional games. It includes over 100 exercises.
7,018 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors study the stability and efficiency of social and economic networks when self-interested individuals can form or sever links, and show that there does not always exist a stable network that is efficient.
2,660 citations
TL;DR: The major theme of the review is in what sense and how the graph structure of interactions can modify and enrich the picture of long term behavioral patterns emerging in evolutionary games.
2,548 citations
TL;DR: In this article, a formal mathematical model for the analysis of informant responses to systematic interview questions is presented and tested in a situation in which the ethnographer does not know how much each informant knows about the cultural domain under consideration nor the answers to the questions.
Abstract: This paper presents and tests a formal mathematical model for the analysis of informant responses to systematic interview questions. We assume a situation in which the ethnographer does not know how much each informant knows about the cultural domain under consideration nor the answers to the questions. The model simultaneously provides an estimate of the cultural competence or knowledge of each informant and an estimate of the correct answer to each question asked of the informant. The model currently handles true-false, multiple-choice, andfill-in-the-blank type question formats. In familiar cultural domains the model produces good results from as few as four informants. The paper includes a table showing the number of informants needed to provide stated levels of confidence given the mean level of knowledge among the informants. Implications are discussed.
1,590 citations