Gurvan Le Clec'H

Bio: Gurvan Le Clec'H is an academic researcher from French Institute of Health and Medical Research. The author has contributed to research in topics: Brain morphometry & Subliminal stimuli. The author has an hindex of 3, co-authored 3 publications receiving 1587 citations.

Imaging unconscious semantic priming

Abstract: Visual words that are masked and presented so briefly that they cannot be seen may nevertheless facilitate the subsequent processing of related words, a phenomenon called masked priming It has been debated whether masked primes can activate cognitive processes without gaining access to consciousness Here we use a combination of behavioural and brain-imaging techniques to estimate the depth of processing of masked numerical primes Our results indicate that masked stimuli have a measurable influence on electrical and haemodynamic measures of brain activity When subjects engage in an overt semantic comparison task with a clearly visible target numeral, measures of covert motor activity indicate that they also unconsciously apply the task instructions to an unseen masked numeral A stream of perceptual, semantic and motor processes can therefore occur without awareness

The visual word form area: a prelexical representation of visual words in the fusiform gyrus.

Abstract: Event-related fMRI was used to test the hypothesis that the visual word form area in the left fusiform gyrus holds a modality-specific and prelexical representation of visual words. Subjects were engaged in a repetition-detection task on pairs of words or pronounceable pseudo-words that could be written or spoken. The visual word form area responded only to written stimuli, not to spoken stimuli, independently of their semantic content. We propose that the occasional activation of the fusiform gyrus when listening to spoken words is due to the topdown recruitment of visual orthographic or object representations.

Inferring behavior from functional brain images.

Abstract: Most neuroimaging experiments aim to identify brain areas whose activation correlates tightly with an aspect of the subjects' behavioral task. If the logic of neuroimaging is correct, however, it should also be possible to reverse this sequence of operations. Once we understand the function of a given brain area or network of areas, it should be possible to use on-line activation measurements to infer what kind of task the subject was performing. As a first step in this direction, we report here that functional magnetic resonance images (fMRI) of motor cortex have sufficient signal-to-noise ratio to accurately predict the subject's manual behavior on a single-trial basis with close to 100% accuracy.

Imaging Cognition II: An Empirical Review of 275 PET and fMRI Studies

Abstract: Positron emission tomography (PET) and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) have been extensively used to explore the functional neuroanatomy of cognitive functions. Here we review 275 PET and fMRI studies of attention (sustained, selective, Stroop, orientation, divided), perception (object, face, space/motion, smell), imagery (object, space/ motion), language (written/spoken word recognition, spoken/ no spoken response), working memory (verbal/numeric, object, spatial, problem solving), semantic memory retrieval (categorization, generation), episodic memory encoding (verbal, object, spatial), episodic memory retrieval (verbal, nonverbal, success, effort, mode, context), priming (perceptual, conceptual), and procedural memory (conditioning, motor, and nonmotor skill learning). To identify consistent activation patterns associated with these cognitive operations, data from 412 contrasts were summarized at the level of cortical Brodmann's areas, insula, thalamus, medial-temporal lobe (including hippocampus), basal ganglia, and cerebellum. For perception and imagery, activation patterns included primary and secondary regions in the dorsal and ventral pathways. For attention and working memory, activations were usually found in prefrontal and parietal regions. For language and semantic memory retrieval, typical regions included left prefrontal and temporal regions. For episodic memory encoding, consistently activated regions included left prefrontal and medial-temporal regions. For episodic memory retrieval, activation patterns included prefrontal, medial-temporal, and posterior midline regions. For priming, deactivations in prefrontal (conceptual) or extrastriate (perceptual) regions were consistently seen. For procedural memory, activations were found in motor as well as in non-motor brain areas. Analysis of regional activations across cognitive domains suggested that several brain regions, including the cerebellum, are engaged by a variety of cognitive challenges. These observations are discussed in relation to functional specialization as well as functional integration.

Bayesian T Tests for Accepting and Rejecting the Null Hypothesis

Abstract: Progress in science often comes from discovering invariances in relationships among variables; these invariances often correspond to null hypotheses. As is commonly known, it is not possible to state evidence for the null hypothesis in conventional significance testing. Here we highlight a Bayes factor alternative to the conventional t test that will allow researchers to express preference for either the null hypothesis or the alternative. The Bayes factor has a natural and straightforward interpretation, is based on reasonable assumptions, and has better properties than other methods of inference that have been advocated in the psychological literature. To facilitate use of the Bayes factor, we provide an easy-to-use, Web-based program that performs the necessary calculations.

Three parietal circuits for number processing

Abstract: Did evolution endow the human brain with a predisposition to represent and acquire knowledge about numbers? Although the parietal lobe has been suggested as a potential substrate for a domain-specific representation of quantities, it is also engaged in verbal, spatial, and attentional functions that may contribute to calculation. To clarify the organisation of number-related processes in the parietal lobe, we examine the three-dimensional intersection of fMRI activations during various numerical tasks, and also review the corresponding neuropsychological evidence. On this basis, we propose a tentative tripartite organisation. The horizontal segment of the intraparietal sulcus (HIPS) appears as a plausible candidate for domain specificity: It is systematically activated whenever numbers are manipulated, independently of number notation, and with increasing activation as the task puts greater emphasis on quantity processing. Depending on task demands, we speculate that this core quantity system, analogous t...

A sensorimotor account of vision and visual consciousness-Authors' Response-Acting out our sensory experience

Abstract: Many current neurophysiological, psychophysical, and psychological approaches to vision rest on the idea that when we see, the brain produces an internal representation of the world. The activation of this internal representation is assumed to give rise to the experience of seeing. The problem with this kind of approach is that it leaves unexplained how the existence of such a detailed internal representation might produce visual consciousness. An alternative proposal is made here. We propose that seeing is a way of acting. It is a particular way of exploring the environment. Activity in internal representations does not generate the experience of seeing. The outside world serves as its own, external, representation. The experience of seeing occurs when the organism masters what we call the governing laws of sensorimotor contingency. The advantage of this approach is that it provides a natural and principled way of accounting for visual consciousness, and for the differences in the perceived quality of sensory experience in the different sensory modalities. Several lines of empirical evidence are brought forward in support of the theory, in particular: evidence from experiments in sensorimotor adaptation, visual \"filling in,\" visual stability despite eye movements, change blindness, sensory substitution, and color perception.

A sensorimotor account of vision and visual consciousness

Abstract: Many current neurophysiological, psychophysical, and psychological approaches to vision rest on the idea that when we see, the brain produces an internal representation of the world. The activation of this internal representation is assumed to give rise to the experience of seeing. The problem with this kind of approach is that it leaves unexplained how the existence of such a detailed internal representation might produce visual consciousness. An alternative proposal is made here. We propose that seeing is a way of acting. It is a particular way of exploring the environment. Activity in internal representations does not generate the experience of seeing. The outside world serves as its own, external, representation. The experience of seeing occurs when the organism masters what we call the governing laws of sensorimotor contingency. The advantage of this approach is that it provides a natural and principled way of accounting for visual consciousness, and for the differences in the perceived quality of sensory experience in the different sensory modalities. Several lines of empirical evidence are brought forward in support of the theory, in particular: evidence from experiments in sensorimotor adaptation, visual “filling in,” visual stability despite eye movements, change blindness, sensory substitution, and color perception.