Author
Hans Keiding
Other affiliations: Roskilde University, Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Bio: Hans Keiding is an academic researcher from University of Copenhagen. The author has contributed to research in topics: Cost effectiveness & Solution concept. The author has an hindex of 16, co-authored 94 publications receiving 890 citations. Previous affiliations of Hans Keiding include Roskilde University & Hebrew University of Jerusalem.
Papers published on a yearly basis
Papers
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TL;DR: In this paper, Fan's fixed-point theorem and the existence of an equilibrium in a generalized game are extended to a larger class of orderings, which allows one to generalize slightly several existence theorems and seems to be useful for the applications.
174 citations
Book•
01 Jan 1991
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present a characterization of strong Nash implementable social choice correspondences and their implementation in coalition-proof Nash equilibria, including the effectivity functions of repeated games.
Abstract: 1. Introduction.- 1. Collective decisions and power structure.- 2. Social choice.- 3. Games and game forms.- 4. The effectivity functions of a game form.- 5. Effectivity functions and cooperative games.- 6. An overview of the book.- 7. Notes.- 2. The structure of effectivity functions.- 1. Introduction.- 2. Fundamental concepts.- 3. Polarity.- 4. Selected families of effectivity functions.- 5. Topological effectivity functions.- 6. Notes.- 3. Stability.- 1. Introduction.- 2. The core of an effectivity function.- 3. Stable effectivity functions.- 4. Stability of convex effectivity functions.- 5. Acyclicity and stability.- 6. Stable veto functions.- 7. Notes.- 4. Implementation.- 1. Introduction.- 2. Implementation of social choice correspondences by game forms.- 3. Monotonic social choice functions.- 4. Notes.- 5. Implementation in strong Nash equilibrium.- 1. Strong Nash equilibrium.- 2. The effectivity functions of a strongly Nash implementable social choice correspondence.- 3. The fundamental theorem.- 4. The nucleus.- 5. The supernucleus.- 6. The subcore.- 7. A characterization of strong Nash implementable social choice correspondences.- 8. Notes.- 6. Exact and strong consistency.- 1. Self-implementation.- 2. Successive elimination and exact and.- consistency.- 3. The Holzman conditions.- 4. Notes.- 7. Implementation in coalition proof Nash equilibrium.- 1. Coalition proof Nash equilibrium.- 2. Implementation in coalition proof Nash equilibrium.- 3. Uniform domination.- 4. U-effectiveness and indirect u-domination.- 5. Notes.- 8. Other effectivity functions.- 1. Introduction.- 2. The ?-effectivity function.- 3. Cooperative equilibria of type 1.- 4. Equilibria of type 2 and 3.- 5. Notes.- 9. Value of effectivity functions.- 1. Introduction.- 2. Effectivity functions with convex feasible sets.- 3. Correlated strategies and effectivity functions.- 4. Effectivity functions of repeated games.- 5. Notes.- References.
107 citations
TL;DR: The study shows that immunotherapy with SQ allergen extract is cost-effective in a wide range of national environments, and that cost-effectiveness differences by country are largely a result of different practices in the up-dosing phase.
Abstract: Background: Seasonal allergic rhinoconjunctivitis can, for some people, reduce quality of life and the ability to cope with everyday tasks.Scope: In this paper we investigate the cost-effectiveness of immunization therapy with Alutard SQ (ASQ) and compare the cost-effectiveness in countries where the therapy has been in use in order to assess the impact of national therapeutic practices on the results of health economic assessments. Data are obtained from a clinical trial carried out in 2001–2002. To evaluate the cost-effectiveness of immunization we have added data on resource use in Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden.Findings: The computations result in cost-effectiveness ratios for allergen immunization between €10 000 and €20 000 per QALY even without provision for indirect costs, and achieving dominance in most countries where indirect costs have also been taken into account. The country comparisons show that the direct cost of administrating the up-dosing and ma...
40 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors introduced the compromise value as a single-valued solution concept for NTU-games and showed that it coincides with the τ-value and with the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution for bargaining problems.
Abstract: The compromise value is introduced as a single-valued solution concept for NTU-games. It is shown that the compromise value coincides with the τ-value for TU-games and with the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution for bargaining problems. In addition the axiomatic characterizations of both the two-person Kalai-Smorodinsky solution and the τ-value can be extended to the compromise value for large classes of NTU-games.
40 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors demonstrate how to implement the information on environmental damage costs within a DEA-based environmental performance index, and estimate these indices at product level by using Danish input-output data and environmental data from 1997.
39 citations
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01 Jan 2007TL;DR: A new era of theoretical computer science addresses fundamental problems about auctions, networks, and human behavior in a bid to solve the challenges of 21st Century finance.
Abstract: A new era of theoretical computer science addresses fundamental problems about auctions, networks, and human behavior.
1,994 citations
1,632 citations
TL;DR: A range of effective interventions is available to support adequate nutrition and hydration in older persons in order to maintain or improve nutritional status and improve clinical course and quality of life.
700 citations