Author
Hans-Theo Normann
Other affiliations: EA Digital Illusions CE, Humboldt State University, University of London ...read more
Bio: Hans-Theo Normann is an academic researcher from University of Düsseldorf. The author has contributed to research in topics: Cournot competition & Collusion. The author has an hindex of 48, co-authored 177 publications receiving 8154 citations. Previous affiliations of Hans-Theo Normann include EA Digital Illusions CE & Humboldt State University.
Papers published on a yearly basis
Papers
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TL;DR: The model seems to capture various behavioral motives in different games but the correlation of these motives is low within subjects, and it is found that within-subject tests can differ markedly from aggregate-level analyses.
Abstract: We assess the predictive power of a model of other-regarding preferences, inequality aversion, using a within-subjects design. We run four different experiments (ultimatum game, dictator game, sequential prisoner's dilemma and public-good game) with the same sample of subjects. From the data we estimate parameters of aversion to disadvantageous and advantageous inequality. We then use these estimates to test several hypotheses across games. Our data show that results from within-subject tests can differ markedly from aggregate-level analysis. The inequality-aversion model has predictive power at the aggregate level but performs less well at the individual level.
529 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors investigate how the competitiveness of Cournot markets varies with the number of firms in an industry and find that three-firm oligopolies tend to produce outputs at the Nash level and four or five firms are never collusive and typically settle at or above the Cournot outcome.
Abstract: In this paper we investigate how the competitiveness of Cournot markets varies with the number of firms in an industry. We review previous Cournot experiments in the literature. Additionally, we conduct a new series of experiments studying oligopolies with two, three, four, and five firms in a unified frame. With two firms we find some collusion. Three-firm oligopolies tend to produce outputs at the Nash level. Markets with four or five firms are never collusive and typically settle at or above the Cournot outcome. Some of those markets are actually quite competitive with outputs close to the Walrasian outcome.
483 citations
TL;DR: This paper assess the predictive power of a model of other-regarding preferences (inequality aversion) using a within-subject design using four different games (ultimatum game, dictator game, sequential-move prisoners dilemma and public-good game) with the same sample of subjects.
414 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors derived theoretical predictions for the learning theories and test these predictions by varying the information given to subjects, finding that some subjects imitate successful behavior if they have the necessary information; and if they imitate, markets are more competitive.
Abstract: This experiment was designed to test various learning theories in the context of a Cournot oligopoly. We derive theoretical predictions for the learning theories and test these predictions by varying the information given to subjects. The results show that some subjects imitate successful behavior if they have the necessary information; and if they imitate, markets are more competitive. Other subjects follow a best reply process. On the aggregate level we find that more information about demand and cost conditions yields less competitive behavior, while more information about the quantities and profits of other firms yields more competitive behavior.
337 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors explore the difference between explicit and tacit collusion by investigating the impact communication has in experimental markets, and find strong evidence that talking helps to obtain higher profits for any number of firms, however, the gain from communicating is non-monotonic in the number of companies, with medium-sized industries having the largest additional profit from talking.
319 citations
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TL;DR: The authors demonstrate that people are motivated by both their pecuniary payoff and their relative payoff standing, and demonstrate that a simple model, constructed on the premise that people were motivated by either their payoff or their relative standing, organizes a large and seemingly disparate set of laboratory observations as one consistent pattern, which explains observations from games where equity is thought to be a factor, such as ultimatum and dictator, games where reciprocity is played a role and games where competitive behavior is observed.
Abstract: We demonstrate that a simple model, constructed on the premise that people are motivated by both their pecuniary payoff and their relative payoff standing, organizes a large and seemingly disparate set of laboratory observations as one consistent pattern The model is incomplete information but nevertheless posed entirely in terms of directly observable variables The model explains observations from games where equity is thought to be a factor, such as ultimatum and dictator, games where reciprocity is thought to play a role, such as the prisoner's dilemma and gift exchange, and games where competitive behavior is observed, such as Bertrand markets (JEL C78, C90, D63, D64, H41)
5,391 citations
01 Jan 1977
TL;DR: In the Hamadryas baboon, males are substantially larger than females, and a troop of baboons is subdivided into a number of ‘one-male groups’, consisting of one adult male and one or more females with their young.
Abstract: In the Hamadryas baboon, males are substantially larger than females. A troop of baboons is subdivided into a number of ‘one-male groups’, consisting of one adult male and one or more females with their young. The male prevents any of ‘his’ females from moving too far from him. Kummer (1971) performed the following experiment. Two males, A and B, previously unknown to each other, were placed in a large enclosure. Male A was free to move about the enclosure, but male B was shut in a small cage, from which he could observe A but not interfere. A female, unknown to both males, was then placed in the enclosure. Within 20 minutes male A had persuaded the female to accept his ownership. Male B was then released into the open enclosure. Instead of challenging male A , B avoided any contact, accepting A’s ownership.
2,364 citations
1,549 citations