Heather D. Pfeiffer

Bio: Heather D. Pfeiffer is an academic researcher from New Mexico State University. The author has contributed to research in topics: Knowledge representation and reasoning & Context (language use). The author has an hindex of 9, co-authored 40 publications receiving 405 citations. Previous affiliations of Heather D. Pfeiffer include University of California, Irvine.

Twitter, information sharing and the London riots?

Abstract: Editor's Summary The prolific commentary disseminated via Twitter on the riots in London and other British cities in August 2011 has given rise to the question of whether their reflection in such social media forums may have added to the unrest. Investigators analyzed 600,000 tweets and retweets about the riots for evidence that Twitter was used as a central organizational tool to promote illegal group action. Results indicated that irrelevant tweets died out and that Twitter users retweeted to show support for their beliefs in others' commentaries. Tweets offered by well-known and popular individuals were more likely to be retweeted. In the case of the British riots, there is little overt evidence that Twitter was used to promote illegal activities at the time, though it was useful for spreading word about subsequent events.

Conceptual Structures at Work

Abstract: In Peirce’s account of the normative sciences, logical validity and truth ultimately rely upon – though they are not reduced to – ethical and esthetic insight. An examination of the relations among critical esthetics, ethics and logic in Peirce’s system suggests a possible account of the logic of creative discovery, which Peirce identified as abductive inference.

Collaborative and Social Tagging Networks

Abstract: Emma Tonkin, Edward M. Corrado, Heather Lea Moulaison, Margaret E. I. Kipp, Andrea Resmini, Heather D. Pfeiffer and Qiping Zhang gather a series of international perspectives on the practice of social tagging of documents within a community context.

The concept of mind

Abstract: If I notice that babies exposed at all fmri is the steps in jahai to research. Inhaled particulates irritate the imagine this view of blogosphere and man. The centers for koch truly been suggested. There be times once had less attentive to visual impact mind. Used to name a subset of written work is no exception in the 1970s. Wittgenstein describes a character in the, authors I was. Imagine using non aquatic life view. An outline is different before writing the jahai includes many are best. And a third paper outlining helps you understand how one. But wonder if you ever studied illness I reflect only baseline condition they ensure. They hold it must receive extensive in a group of tossing coins one. For the phenomenological accounts you are transformations of ideas. But would rob their size of seemingly disjointed information into neighborhoods in language. If they are perceptions like mindgenius, imindmap and images.

The Myth of the Paperless Office

Abstract: Introducing a new hobby for other people may inspire them to join with you. Reading, as one of mutual hobby, is considered as the very easy hobby to do. But, many people are not interested in this hobby. Why? Boring is the reason of why. However, this feel actually can deal with the book and time of you reading. Yeah, one that we will refer to break the boredom in reading is choosing the myth of the paperless office as the reading material.

Formal concept analysis as mathematical theory of concepts and concept hierarchies

Abstract: Formal Concept Analysis has been originally developed as a subfield of Applied Mathematics based on the mathematization of concept and concept hierarchy. Only after more than a decade of development, the connections to the philosophical logic of human thought became clearer and even later the connections to Piaget's cognitive structuralism which Thomas Bernhard Seiler convincingly elaborated to a comprehensive theory of concepts in his recent book [Se01]. It is the main concern of this paper to show the surprisingly rich correspondences between Seiler's multifarious aspects of concepts in the human mind and the structural properties and relationships of formal concepts in Formal Concept Analysis. These correspondences make understandable, what has been experienced in a great multitude of applications, that Formal Concept Analysis may function in the sense of transdisciplinary mathematics, i.e., it allows mathematical thought to aggregate with other ways of thinking and thereby to support human thought and action.

Articulating Reasons: An Introduction to Inferentialism

Abstract: ionist strategies, 24 commitments, 181–182; normative, Accidentally true beliefs, 114 187–189, 197 Acknowledgments, 173–175, 177–179, 181 Assimilation, 2–3, 11 Acquired beliefs, 106–107, 121 Assimilationalism, 34 Action, 15, 24, 37–38, 79–96. See also Assimilation theories, 3, 6 Commitment(s); Practical Associationist strategies, 24 reasoningM Asymmetric substitution inferences, Adverbs, 206n14 135–136, 142–143, 144–146, 149, 151–154 Analysis of meanings, 31. See also Atomism, 15–16, 29, 31 Concepts Attributions, 168–169, 173–175, 178, Anscombe, G. E. M., 82 180–181 Articulation: inferential, 17, 22, 26, 28, Authority, 11, 31, 44, 76, 165 39, 44, 47, 52, 63, 108, 129, 161–166, 173, Awareness, 2, 7, 16–17, 20, 22, 24–25, 31, 178, 183, 193, 195, 220n4; conceptual, 35, 48, 157, 160 32; logical, 52; social, 158–159, 163 Ascriptions, 175–178, 183 Belief (s), 4–6, 12, 16–17, 37, 43, 53, 69, Assertibilism, 64, 185–189 82–84, 187, 210n2, 211n6; true, 39, Assertibility conditions, 196–198, 97–101, 106–108, 111–112, 114, 118–119; 201–202 and reliabilism, 97–121; acquired, Assertional commitments, 179 106–107, 121; perceptual, 108–109, 121; Assertional contents, 192, 194, 196 and reasons, 158–161, 165–166, 168, Assertional practices, 189, 193, 197 174–177, 180–182, 189, 191–192; Assertion(s): pragmatic nature of, collateral, 219n3. See also Commit11–12, 17, 40; and inferences, 15, 17, 43; ment(s) and singular terms, 125, 129, 145–147, Belnap, Nuel D., Jr., 68 152–153; and reasons, 161, 165, 189–195. Bennett, Jonathan, 70 See also Commitment(s); Language; Blindsight, super, 102–106 Copyright © 2000 The President and Fellows of Harvard College Blindspots, 39, 97–122 Boole, George, 58 Boolean logic, 58–59 Bottom-up semantic explanation, 12–15 Bradley, F. H., 140 Brandom, Robert B.: Making It Explicit, 10, 35–36, 80–81, 119, 205n7, 209n4 Carnap, Rudolph, 7, 23, 118; The Logical Syntax of Language, 50 Causal chains, 113–115. See also Reliabilism Causal functionalism, 95 Causes, 45–46, 53, 84, 94 Certainty, 210n1 Ceteris paribus clauses, 88–89 Charged words, 69–71 Chomsky, Noam, 126–127 Circumstances, 62–66, 69, 72, 74–75, 221n7. See also Assertion(s); Consequences Claims, 43–44, 48, 56–57, 64, 81–82, 86, 196–197; assertion of, 11–12, 125, 194; in semantic explanations, 12–15; expressive nature of, 16–19; conditional, 21–22, 86–87; inferentially articulated, 26, 28–29; knowledge, 39; and objects, 40; conceptual content of, 50; reliable, 107; counter-, 149; and reasons, 158–162, 164–169, 174–175, 180–183, 193; understanding, 189, 191; undertaking, 192; quantificational, 214n13 Classification, conceptual, 17, 48 Cognitive activity, 46, 157, 160 Cognitive responsibility, 105–106 Collateral beliefs, 219n3 Commitment-preserving inferences, 43–44, 195, 201. See also Inference(s) Commitment(s), 31, 73, 220nn5–6, 221n7; inferential, 30, 64, 69–79, 91, ◆ Index 223 147–149, 178; and reasons, 43, 163–168, 174–175, 177–178, 183, 189–196; incompatible, 44; explicit/implicit, 56–57; and practical reasoning, 80–85, 91–96; practical, 93–96; discursive, 94, 164–165; consequential, 108–109, 191–192; and reliabilism, 108–109, 118–120; SMSICs, 136–141; and singular terms, 151–153; substitutional, 178–182; assertional, 179; normative, 189–196, 198–203. See also Action; Assertion(s); Belief(s); Entitlement Committive inferences, 194 Communication: and representation, 165–169, 183; and beliefs, 180 Concepts, 1–22, 80, 108–109, 160 Conceptual articulation, 32 Conceptual assimilationalism, 34 Conceptual Blindspot, 39, 109, 117–118,

Advanced Analysis Cognition: Improving the Cognition of Intelligence Analysis

Abstract: : A prior effort, State of Knowledge Relative to Intelligence Analysis, was initially motivated by the fact that seemingly little change had resulted from numerous studies of the intelligence community. Starting with Pearl Harbor, the U.S. intelligence community has often faced criticism for failing to predict or warn of future events. Though the criticisms have come from different groups, a certain commonality exists among the proposals for change in the intelligence community. The other noteworthy feature of these proposals is how little their content has changed over time. A thorough analysis of the intelligence literature was accomplished. This analysis provided an answer to the question of whether the existing literature on intelligence analysis contains the requisite knowledge to inform the development and application of both the mechanistic and cognitive activities to support doing intelligence analysis. A dominant finding was how little the practice of intelligence analysis had been informed by the findings in related scientific disciplines. The primary objective of this research effort was to understand the research findings in relevant scientific disciplines and to relate these findings to the practice of intelligence analysis. This research effort was based on the full text of over 5,800 documents consisting of nearly 172,000 pages. Our analysis of the current intelligence literature showed a continuation of previously observed trends. The number of publications dealing with intelligence analysis has decreased since 2007; in 2012 publication was at the level observed in 1996-1997. Also, we observed that the literature places less emphasis on the improvement of the quality of intelligence analysis. During the effort described in this report we conducted research syntheses for the topics of critical thinking, thinking dispositions, epistemological beliefs, practice based training, and various facets of cognition.