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The Great Escape: health, Wealth, and the Origins of Inequality

The Digital Person: Technology and Privacy in the Information Age Daniel J. Solove. New York: New York University Press, 2006. 290 pp. $29.95.Daniel J. Solove, like most contemporary writers on privacy, offers a sky-is-falling perspective on privacy in the modern paperless, transactional age. Due in part to the rise of so-called "digital dossiers" and perhaps, in the opinion of the reviewer, due in part to apathy, Solove observes recent developments as a new paradigm of the privacy problematic. The goal is "to rethink longstanding notions of privacy to grapple with the consequences of living in an information age" (p. 2). Much of what is covered here is not new. As Solove comments in his introduction: "There are hundreds of companies that are constructing gigantic databases of psychological profiles, amassing data about an individual's race, gender, income, hobbies, and purchases" (p. 2). Although the combination of private and public information "has long been viewed as problematic" (p. 6), Solove never adequately explains why or moves beyond the obvious: Marketing, credit, and related research companies have been engaging in such practices for years; in fairness to Solove, perhaps the difference is capacity to collect, to share, to compile, etc. This is the power of "aggregation" which contributes to the inability to assign adequate value to personal information. Though Solove does not make the connection, this may be a key to understanding the power of apathy or more kindly the unawareness that immobilizes individual responses to personal privacy protection. What is new is that "beyond articulating a new understanding of contemporary privacy problems" Solove attempts "to demonstrate the ways that the problems can be solved" (p. 6). After observing traditional conceptualizations such as big brother (Orwellian, pp. 29-35), secrecy and invasion (though he uses the idea of invasion to describe both), Solove claims to use a new Kafkaesque metaphor of irresponsible bureaucracy (pp. 36-41).On the way to this metaphor, Chapter 2 recounts the rise of public and private sector databases and the new uses of the web as a point and source of data collection. Chapter 3 reviews various metaphors and views the ultimate harm as one affecting human dignity through misjudgments, diminished capacity to participate, and unfairness (perhaps unevenness is more descriptive) in the collection of information. Chapter 4 reviews the inadequacy of the private (traditional tort and more recent statutory sector by sector approaches) and public law of privacy in the United States. …

The Digital Person: Technology and Privacy in the Information Age

Over the past twenty years, Europe has deregulated many industries, protected consumer welfare, and created strongly independent regulators. These policies represent a stark departure from historical traditions in continental Europe. How and why did this turnaround happen? We build a political economy model of market regulation and we compare the design of national and supra-national regulators. We show that countries in a single market willingly promote a supranational regulator that enforces free markets beyond the preferences of any individual country. We test and confirm the predictions of the model. European institutions are indeed more independent and enforce competition more strongly than any individual country ever did. Countries with ex-ante weaker institutions benefit more from the delegation of competition policy to the EU level.

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How EU Markets Became More Competitive Than US Markets: A Study of Institutional Drift

The enforcement of EU competition law in cartel cases : seeking effectiveness in divergence

The Politics of Justice in European Private Law intends to highlight the differences between the Member States' concepts of social justice, which have developed historically, and the distinct European concept of access justice. Contrary to the emerging critique of Europe's justice deficit in the aftermath of the Euro crisis, this book argues that beneath the larger picture of the Monetary Union, a more positive and more promising European concept of justice is developing. European access justice is thinner than national social justice, but access justice represents a distinct conception of justice nevertheless. Member States or nation states remain free to complement European access justice and bring to bear their own pattern of social justice.

The Politics of Justice in European Private Law: Social Justice, Access Justice, Societal Justice

Modernisierung der Missbrauchsaufsicht für marktmächtige Unternehmen

Services of General Economic Interest: European Law's Impact on the Role of Markets and of Member States

Introduction 1. Recent Reforms of EU Competition Law and their Historical Foundations 2. The Evolution of the Law on Art 81 and Art 82: Ordoliberalism and its Keynesian Challenge 3. The Drafting and the Role of Regulation 17: A Fragile Balance 4. National Traditions of Competition Law: Europeanization through Convergence? 5. American Influences on EU Competition Law: Two Paths, How Much Dependence? 6. Competition Law and Industrial Policy: Imperfect Harmony 7. Towards a Concept of a Workable European Competition Law: Revisiting the Formative Period

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The Historical Foundations of EU Competition Law

Interoperability has become a buzzword in European policy debates on the future of the digital economy. In its Digital Agenda, the EU Commission has identified a lack of interoperability as one of the significant obstacles for the thriving of the digital economy. The EU Commission and a number of other actors have advocated far-reaching policies for ensuring the interoperability of digital goods, services, platforms and communication networks. In this paper, we present a systematic framework for discussing interoperability problems from an economic and legal perspective and apply it to several interoperability issues, as, e.g., standardization, interoperability regulation in the field of electronic communication, duties of dominant firms (including platforms) to ensure horizontal and vertical interoperability and IP law exceptions in favour of interoperability. The complex trade-offs between benefits and costs of a higher degree of interoperability suggest the need for a careful and separate analysis of each specific interoperability issue, caution regarding a (top down) imposition of mandatory standards and interoperability obligations, and a greater focus on unilateral solutions of interoperability problems, like adapters or converters. EU competition law may be better advised to develop, within the framework of Art. 102 TFEU, a workable test to address hurdles for unilateral interoperability solutions created by dominant firms, than to continue focusing on the essential facilities doctrine to mandate interoperability.

Interoperability in the digital economy

The so-called "commitment decision" procedure, introduced into European competition law with Art. 9 of Regulation 1/2003, was meant to provide the Commission with the possibility to dispose of competition law cases by way of a kind of formal settlement, roughly analogous to the US consent decree. It has quickly become an important instrument of European competition law enforcement. Since May 2004, roughly 50 % of all Commission decisions applying Art. 81 or Art. 82 in non-hardcore-cartel cases have been taken under Art. 9 of Reg. 1/2003. However, the CFI's Alrosa judgment of 11 July 2007 calls into question the Commission's commitment decision practice in various respects. Alrosa does not conceive commitment decisions as "settlements" proper, but treats them as public law enforcement largely analogous to infringement decisions under Art. 7 of Reg. 1/2003. It emphasizes the Commission's duty to investigate and clearly formulate the competitive concern, insists on a full judicial review of the proportionality of the commitments and underlines the full judicial protection of the concerned undertakings' procedural rights, namely the right to access to the file and the right to be heard. This paper provides an overview of the Commission's commitment decision practice since Art. 9 of Reg. 1/2003 has entered into force, discusses the concerns that this practice has raised and the implications of the Alrosa judgment, should it be upheld by the ECJ. According to the author, the Alrosa judgment fundamentally re-conceptualizes the function and structure of commitment decision procedures, with likely repercussions on analogous provisions in national competition laws. It creates important safeguards against the real risk that the Commission's incentives to settle cases may diverge from the public interest in effective protection of competition.

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Heike Schweitzer

Papers

Modernisierung der Missbrauchsaufsicht für marktmächtige Unternehmen

Services of General Economic Interest: European Law's Impact on the Role of Markets and of Member States

The Historical Foundations of EU Competition Law

Interoperability in the digital economy

Commitment Decisions under Art. 9 of Regulation 1/2003: The Developing EC Practice and Case Law