Helen V. Milner

Bio: Helen V. Milner is an academic researcher from Princeton University. The author has contributed to research in topics: Commercial policy & Free trade. The author has an hindex of 47, co-authored 126 publications receiving 12529 citations. Previous affiliations of Helen V. Milner include Columbia University.

Historical Institutionalism in Contemporary Political Science

Abstract: Al igual que el personaje en la obra de Moliere que habló en prosa durante toda su vida sin saberlo, los cientistas políticos contemporáneos están familiarizados con los ejemplos clásicos de la investigación del institucionalismo histórico sin por ello ser conscientes de que ejemplifican un género coherente, que cuenta con elementos que funcionan en forma similar al de los otros dos grandes enfoques de investigación de la ciencia política contemporánea, el conductismo basado en encuestas y los modelos de la elección racional. Los institucionalistas históricos analizan las configuraciones organizacionales mientras otros observan escenarios particulares aislados; ponen atención en coyunturas críticas y procesos de largo plazo, mientras que otros solamente consideran porciones de tiempo o maniobras de corto plazo. De este modo, al aproximarse a cuestiones importantes, los institucionalistas históricos hacen visibles y comprensibles contextos más amplios y procesos que interactúan, dan forma y reforman los estados, la política y el diseño de la política pública. El trabajo de Stephen Skowronek, The Politics Presidents Make (1997), por ejemplo, revela ciclos recurrentes en la naturaleza y éxito del liderazgo presidencial a través de la historia de los Estados Unidos. Otro estudio de largo plazo en la política americana, Gaining Access: Congress and the Farm Lobby, 1919-1981 (1991), de John Mark Hansen, desarrolla un modelo de interacción entre grupos de interés y el gobierno con el objetivo de explicar la emergencia, persistencia y eclipse final de la influencia nacional de las asociaciones rurales nacionales. Atravesando naciones y períodos de tiempo, Peter A. Hall, en su libro de 1986, Governing the Economy: The Politics of State Intervention in Britain and France, explica como las instituciones y organizaciones se intersectan para dar forma no sólo a las políticas gubernamentales sino también a las estrategias y alianzas de los grupos de interés e intelectuales. Yendo aun más lejos, Shaping the Political Arena: Critical Junctures, the Labor Movement, and Regime Dynamics in Latin America, escrito por Ruth Berins Collier y David Collier (1991) y Birth of the Leviathan: Building States and Regimes in Early Modern Europe, por Thomas Ertman (1997), explican las dinámicas de los regímenes y la variedad de formaciones de los estados nacionales modernos.

The Politics of Foreign Direct Investment into Developing Countries: Increasing FDI through International Trade Agreements?

Abstract: The flow of foreign direct investment into developing countries varies greatly across countries and over time. The political factors that affect these flows are not well understood. Focusing on the relationship between trade and investment, we argue that international trade agreements—GATT/WTO and preferential trade agreements (PTAs)—provide mechanisms for making commitments to foreign investors about the treatment of their assets, thus reassuring investors and increasing investment. These international commitments are more credible than domestic policy choices, because reneging on them is more costly. Statistical analyses for 122 developing countries from 1970 to 2000 support this argument. Developing countries that belong to the WTO and participate in more PTAs experience greater FDI inflows than otherwise, controlling for many factors including domestic policy preferences and taking into account possible endogeneity. Joining international trade agreements allows developing countries to attract more FDI and thus increase economic growth.

Internationalization and domestic politics

Abstract: Part I. Theoretical Framework: 1. Internationalization and domestic politics: an introduction Helen V. Milner and Robert O. Keohane 2. The impact of the international economy on national policies Jeffrey A. Friedan and Ronald Rogowski 3. Internationalization, institutions, and political change Geoffrey Garrett and Peter Lange Part II. The Industrialized Democracies: 4. Capital mobility, trade and the domestic politics of economic policy Geoffrey Garrett 5. Economic integration and the politics of monetary policy in the United States Jeffrey A. Friedan 6. Internationalization and electoral politics in Japan Frances McCall Rosenbluth Part III. Internationalization and Socialism: 7. Stalin's revenge: institutional barriers to internationalization in the Soviet Union Matthew Evangelista 8. Internationalization and China's economic reforms Susan Shirk Part IV. International Economic Crisis and Developing Countries: 9. The political economy of financial internationalization in the developing world Stephan Haggard and Sylvia Maxfield Part V. Conclusion: 10. Internationalization and domestic politics: a conclusion Helen V. Milner and Robert O. Keohane.

Why Democracies Cooperate More: Electoral Control and International Trade Agreements

Abstract: Over the past fifty years, barriers to international trade have decreased substantially. A key source of this decline in protectionism has been the proliferation of agreements among countries to liberalize commerce. In this article, we analyze the domestic political conditions under which states have concluded such agreements and, more generally, explore the factors affecting interstate economic cooperation. We argue that interstate cooperation on commercial issues depends heavily on the political regime types of participants: as states become more democratic, they are increasingly likely to conclude trade agreements. To test our claim, we examine whether the regime types of states have influenced their propensity to form and expand preferential trading arrangements (PTAs) during the period since World War II. We find that democratic countries are about twice as likely to form a PTA as autocratic countries, and that pairs of democracies are roughly four times as likely to do so as autocratic pairs. These results provide strong evidence that democracies are more commercially cooperative than less democratic countries.

Interests, Institutions, and Information: Domestic Politics and International Relations

Abstract: Presents a theory of domestic politics, showing how it affects international outcomes. In developing this rational choice theory, the text argues that any explanation that treats states as unitary actors is misleading. It describes all states as polyarchic, where decision-making power is shared between two or more actors (such as legislature and executive). A model is constructed based on two-level game theory, reflecting the political activity at both the domestic and international levels. The model is illustrated by the question of co-operation between nations.

Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games

Abstract: Domestic politics and international relations are often inextricably entangled, but existing theories (particularly “state-centric” theories) do not adequately account for these linkages. When national leaders must win ratification (formal or informal) from their constituents for an international agreement, their negotiating behavior reflects the simultaneous imperatives of both a domestic political game and an international game. Using illustrations from Western economic summitry, the Panama Canal and Versailles Treaty negotiations, IMF stabilization programs, the European Community, and many other diplomatic contexts, this article offers a theory of ratification. It addresses the role of domestic preferences and coalitions, domestic political institutions and practices, the strategies and tactics of negotiators, uncertainty, the domestic reverberation of international pressures, and the interests of the chief negotiator. This theory of “two-level games” may also be applicable to many other political phenomena, such as dependency, legislative committees, and multiparty coalitions.

Social Theory of International Politics

Abstract: Drawing upon philosophy and social theory, Social Theory of International Politics develops a theory of the international system as a social construction. Alexander Wendt clarifies the central claims of the constructivist approach, presenting a structural and idealist worldview which contrasts with the individualism and materialism which underpins much mainstream international relations theory. He builds a cultural theory of international politics, which takes whether states view each other as enemies, rivals or friends as a fundamental determinant. Wendt characterises these roles as 'cultures of anarchy', described as Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian respectively. These cultures are shared ideas which help shape state interests and capabilities, and generate tendencies in the international system. The book describes four factors which can drive structural change from one culture to another - interdependence, common fate, homogenization, and self-restraint - and examines the effects of capitalism and democracy in the emergence of a Kantian culture in the West.