This article traces the evolution of interpretations of international law and international cyber norms on responsible state behaviour in cyberspace by reassessing five major – and allegedly state-led – cyber operations: Stuxnet 2010; Belgacom 2013-2014, the Ukrainian power grid 2015, the US presidential election 2016, and NotPetya 2017. Taking recent normative developments and emerging state practices as primary points of refence, it investigates how the current normative landscape can shed light on the nature, (il)legitimacy, and (un)lawfulness of these past operations. For each case, the analysis engages with: i) the elements triggering the violation of norms, principles and international law; ii) the legal and normative significance of recent sources of norms and interpretations of international law; and iii) the legal and political obstacles still lying beyond their application. Taken together, the reassessment of these cyber operations reveals how, in hindsight, the international community has come a long way in calibrating its normative language and practices in calling out irresponsible behaviour in cyberspace. With states taking small, but unprecedented, steps through public attributions and statements on international law in cyberspace, most of the past cyber operations analysed here would arguably feature an attribution in the current climate. At the same time, substantial differences in national interpretations of international law continue to stand in the way of clarity on the terms of its application. In light of this, this article ultimately suggests that cyber norms and the interpretations of international law require further granularity to become ‘lines in the sand’. 

https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/23738871.2022.2041061?needAccess=true

Revisiting past cyber operations in light of new cyber norms and interpretations of international law: inching towards lines in the sand?

This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 7th International Symposium on Security in Computing and Communications, SSCC 2019, held in Trivandrum, India, in December 2019. The 22 revised full papers and 7 revised short papers presented were carefully reviewed and selected from 61 submissions. The papers cover wide research fields including cryptography, database and storage security, human and societal aspects of security and privacy.

Security in Computing and Communications : 7th International Symposium, SSCC 2019, Trivandrum, India, December 18–21, 2019, Revised Selected Papers

This study argues that the fundamental tenets Carl von Clausewitz presented about warfare in his influential book On War can be applied to defensive cyberwar. This will help in forming a new multidisciplinary perspective on the topic, which can benefit policy makers, political and military scientists and cyber security specialists alike. Moreover, by applying Clausewitz’s principles of defensive warfare and his concepts of uncertainty and friction to cyberdefense, we outline a conceptual framework for resilient and proactive cyberdefense.

Controlling Uncertainty with Proactive Cyber Defense: A Clausewitzian Perspective

No AccessChapter 8: Qualitative methods of measuring the effectiveness of Russian influence in Poland in the area of disinformationKatarzyna ŚwierszczKatarzyna ŚwierszczSearch for more papers by this authorhttps://doi.org/10.14220/9783737014069.89SectionsPDF/EPUB ToolsAdd to favoritesDownload CitationsTrack Citations ShareShare onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail About Previous chapter Next chapter FiguresReferencesRelatedDetails Download book cover 1st editionISBN: 978-3-8471-1406-2 eISBN: 978-3-7370-1406-9HistoryPublished online:May 2023 PDF download 

Chapter 8: Qualitative methods of measuring the effectiveness of Russian influence in Poland in the area of disinformation

This chapter looks at a prominent case study, the Russo-Ukrainian crisis— from the protests at Euromaidan to the occupation of Crimea and the war in Eastern Ukraine—with the aim to understand the effects and the strategic role of offensive cyber operations. An analysis of the cyber incidents in Ukraine supports the argument that the underlying nature of interstate armed conflict has not yet revolutionarily changed due to the use of offensive cyber operations. The chapter reveals that, whilst playing an important role, offensive cyber operations have not provided a decisive advantage for states.

Henry Rõigas

Papers

Cyber War in Perspective: Lessons from the Conflict in Ukraine