Herbert Gintis

Bio: Herbert Gintis is an academic researcher from Santa Fe Institute. The author has contributed to research in topics: Strong reciprocity & Game theory. The author has an hindex of 66, co-authored 269 publications receiving 35339 citations. Previous affiliations of Herbert Gintis include Central University, India & Central European University.

Schooling in Capitalist America: Educational Reform and the Contradictions of Economic Life

Abstract: The Contradictions Of Liberal Educational Reform Beyond the Educational Frontier: The Great American Dream Freeze Broken Promises: School Reform in Retrospect * Education And The Structure Of Economic Life At the Root of the Problem: The Capitalist Economy Education, Inequality, and the Meritocracy Education and Personal Development: The Long Shadow of Work * The Dynamics Of Educational Change The Origins of Mass Public Education Corporate Capital and Progressive Education The Transformation of Higher Education and the Emerging White-Collar Proletariat Capital Accumulation, Class Conflict, and Educational Change * Getting There Educational Alternatives Education, Socialism, and Revolution

In search of homo economicus: Behavioral experiments in 15 small-scale societies

Abstract: We can summarize our results as follows. First, the canonical model is not supported in any society studied. Second, there is considerably more behavioral variability across groups than had been found in previous cross-cultural research, and the canonical model fails in a wider variety of ways than in previous experiments. Third, group-level differences in economic organization and the degree of market integration explain a substantial portion of the behavioral variation across societies: the higher the degree of market integration and the higher the payoffs to cooperation, the greater the level of cooperation in experimental games. Fourth, individual-level economic and demographic variables do not explain behavior either within or across groups. Fifth, behavior in the experiments is generally consistent with economic patterns of everyday life in these societies.

“Economic man” in cross-cultural perspective: Behavioral experiments in 15 small-scale societies

Abstract: Researchers from across the social sciences have found consistent deviations from the predictions of the canonical model of self-interest in hundreds of experiments from around the world. This research, however, cannot determine whether the uniformity re- sults from universal patterns of human behavior or from the limited cultural variation available among the university students used in virtually all prior experimental work. To address this, we undertook a cross-cultural study of behavior in ultimatum, public goods, and dictator games in a range of small-scale societies exhibiting a wide variety of economic and cultural conditions. We found, first, that the canonical model - based on self-interest - fails in all of the societies studied. Second, our data reveal substantially more behavioral vari- ability across social groups than has been found in previous research. Third, group-level differences in economic organization and the structure of social interactions explain a substantial portion of the behavioral variation across societies: the higher the degree of market integration and the higher the payoffs to cooperation in everyday life, the greater the level of prosociality expressed in experimental games. Fourth, the available individual-level economic and demographic variables do not consistently explain game behavior, either within or across groups. Fifth, in many cases experimental play appears to reflect the common interactional patterns of everyday life.

The evolution of altruistic punishment

Abstract: Both laboratory and field data suggest that people punish noncooperators even in one-shot interactions. Although such “altruistic punishment” may explain the high levels of cooperation in human societies, it creates an evolutionary puzzle: existing models suggest that altruistic cooperation among nonrelatives is evolutionarily stable only in small groups. Thus, applying such models to the evolution of altruistic punishment leads to the prediction that people will not incur costs to punish others to provide benefits to large groups of nonrelatives. However, here we show that an important asymmetry between altruistic cooperation and altruistic punishment allows altruistic punishment to evolve in populations engaged in one-time, anonymous interactions. This process allows both altruistic punishment and altruistic cooperation to be maintained even when groups are large and other parameter values approximate conditions that characterize cultural evolution in the small-scale societies in which humans lived for most of our prehistory.

The iron cage revisited institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields

Abstract: What makes organizations so similar? We contend that the engine of rationalization and bureaucratization has moved from the competitive marketplace to the state and the professions. Once a set of organizations emerges as a field, a paradox arises: rational actors make their organizations increasingly similar as they try to change them. We describe three isomorphic processes-coercive, mimetic, and normative—leading to this outcome. We then specify hypotheses about the impact of resource centralization and dependency, goal ambiguity and technical uncertainty, and professionalization and structuration on isomorphic change. Finally, we suggest implications for theories of organizations and social change.

Research Methods in Education

Abstract: Part One: The Context Of Educational Research Part Two: Planning Educational Research Part Three: Styles Of Educational Research Part Four: Strategies And Instruments For Data Collection And Researching Part Five: Data Analysis

The New Meaning of Educational Change

Abstract: Part I Understanding Educational Change 1. A Brief History of Educational Change 2. Sources of Educational Change 3. The Meaning of Educational Change 4. The Causes and Problems of Initiation 5. The Causes and Problems of Implementation and Continuation 6. Planning Doing and Coping with Change Part II Educational Change at the Local Level 7. The Teacher 8. The Principal 9. The Student 10. The District Administrator 11. The Consultant 12. The Parent and the Community Part III Educational Change at Regional and National Levels 13. Governments 14. Professional Preparation of Teachers 15. Professional Development of Educators 16. The Future of Educational Change

The WEIRDest People in the World

Abstract: Behavioral scientists routinely publish broad claims about human psychology and behavior in the world's top journals based on samples drawn entirely from Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic (WEIRD) societies. Researchers - often implicitly - assume that either there is little variation across human populations, or that these "standard subjects" are as representative of the species as any other population. Are these assumptions justified? Here, our review of the comparative database from across the behavioral sciences suggests both that there is substantial variability in experimental results across populations and that WEIRD subjects are particularly unusual compared with the rest of the species - frequent outliers. The domains reviewed include visual perception, fairness, cooperation, spatial reasoning, categorization and inferential induction, moral reasoning, reasoning styles, self-concepts and related motivations, and the heritability of IQ. The findings suggest that members of WEIRD societies, including young children, are among the least representative populations one could find for generalizing about humans. Many of these findings involve domains that are associated with fundamental aspects of psychology, motivation, and behavior - hence, there are no obvious a priori grounds for claiming that a particular behavioral phenomenon is universal based on sampling from a single subpopulation. Overall, these empirical patterns suggests that we need to be less cavalier in addressing questions of human nature on the basis of data drawn from this particularly thin, and rather unusual, slice of humanity. We close by proposing ways to structurally re-organize the behavioral sciences to best tackle these challenges.

Wage Discrimination: Reduced Form and Structural Estimates

Abstract: Regressions explaining the wage rates of white males, black males, and white females are used to analyze the white-black wage differential among men and the male-female wage differential among whites A distinction is drawn between reduced form and structural wage equations, and both are estimated They are shown to have very different implications for analyzing the white-black and male-female wage differentials When the two sets of estimates are synthesized, they jointly imply that 70 percent of the overall race differential and 100 percent of the overall sex differential are ultimately attributable to discrimination of various sorts