Herbert J. Hovenkamp

Bio: Herbert J. Hovenkamp is an academic researcher from University of Pennsylvania. The author has contributed to research in topics: Competition (economics) & Supreme court. The author has an hindex of 23, co-authored 295 publications receiving 2864 citations. Previous affiliations of Herbert J. Hovenkamp include Washington and Lee University & University of Iowa.

Federal Antitrust Policy: The Law of Competition and Its Practice

Abstract: Policy and Measurement: Basic Economics of Antitrust; History and Ideology in Antitrust Policy; Market Power and Market Definition; The Substance of Antitrust: Antitrust Policy Toward Collusion and Oligopoly; Joint Ventures of Competitors, Concerted Refusals, Patent Licensing, and Rule of Reason; Exclusionary Practices and the Dominant Firm: Basic Doctrine of Monopolization and Attempt; Exclusionary Practices in Monopolization and Attempt Cases; Predatory Pricing; Vertical Integration and Vertical Mergers; Tie-Ins, Reciprocity, Exclusive Dealing and the Franchise Contract; Intrabrand Restraints on Distribution; Mergers of Competitors; Conglomerate Mergers; Price Discrimination and the Robinson-Patman Act; Antitrust as a Regulatory Institution: Public Enforcement of the Federal Antitrust Laws; Private Enforcement; Damages; Antitrust and the Process of Democratic Government; Antitrust and Federal Regulatory Policy; Antitrust Federalism and the State Action Doctrine; Reach of the Federal Antitrust Laws.

Antitrust Law: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles and Their Application

Abstract: Recognized by antitrust practitioners and the courts as the most authoritative and comprehensive treatise on antitrust principles and practice, Antitrust Law explains the interplay of judicial, statutory, public policy, and economic forces that shape the world of antitrust. Its thorough analysis and criticism of U.S. Supreme Court, appellate court and major lower court antitrust decisions will help you truly understand the underpinnings of the law and frame successful arguments in litigation. The most recently revised volumes contain greatly expanded coverage of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine; state action, implied, and statutory immunity; and the international and extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust laws. Author Herbert Hovenkamp is recognized as one of the foremost experts on antitrust law in the country and has consulted extensively for both the government and the private sector.

The Antitrust Enterprise: Principle and Execution

Abstract: Preface Introduction Part I. Limits and Possibilities 1. The Legal and Economic Structure of the Antitrust Laws 2. The Design of Antitrust Rules 3. The Promises and Hazards of Private Antitrust Enforcement 4. Expert Testimony and the Predicament of Antitrust Fact Finding Part II. Traditional Antitrust Rules 5. Unreasonable Exercises of Market Power 6. Combinations of Competitors 7. Dominant Firms and Exclusionary Practices 8. Antitrust and Distribution 9. The National Policy on Business Mergers Part III. Regulation, Innovation, and Connectivity 10. Antitrust under Regulation and Deregulation 11. The Conflict between Antitrust and Intellectual Property Rights 12. Network Industries and Computer Platform Monopoly Epilogue: Antitrust Reform Notes Index

Book Review - Enterprise and American Law, 1836-1937

Abstract: Preface Introduction: Classicism, Democracy, and the Rule of Law Part I: The Classical Corporation and State Policy I. Classical Political Economy and the Business Corporation 2. Vested Corporate Rights 3. Politics and Public Goods 4. The Corporate Personality 5. Limited Liability 6. Corporate Power and Its Abuse Part Ii: The Economic Constitution 7. A Moral Theory of Political Economy 8. The Classical Theory of Federalism 9. An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution Part Iii: The Rise of Regulated Industry 10. Market Failure and Constitutional Classicism: The Slaughter-House Cases 11. Regulation and Incorporation 12. The Railroads and the Development of Regulatory Policy 13. Federalism and Rate Discrimination Part Iv: The Political Economy of Substantive Due Process 14. Historical Explanation and Substantive Due Process 15. The American School of Political Economy 16. The Wages Fund 17. Market Failure and the Constitution Part V: The Labor Combination In American Law 18. Classical Theory and the Labor Cartel 19. Coercion and Its Meaning: Antitrust and the Labor Injunction Part Vi: The Antitrust Movement and the Theory of the Firm 20. American Merger Policy and the Failure of Corporate Law 21. The Classical Theory of Competition 22. The Rise of Industrial Organization 23. The Fixed-Cost Controversy 24. Potential Competition 25. Vertical Integration and Resale Price Maintenance Epilogue: Classical Enterprise in Decline Notes Index

Enterprise and American law, 1836-1937

Abstract: Preface Introduction: Classicism, Democracy, and the Rule of Law Part I: The Classical Corporation and State Policy I. Classical Political Economy and the Business Corporation 2. Vested Corporate Rights 3. Politics and Public Goods 4. The Corporate Personality 5. Limited Liability 6. Corporate Power and Its Abuse Part Ii: The Economic Constitution 7. A Moral Theory of Political Economy 8. The Classical Theory of Federalism 9. An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution Part Iii: The Rise of Regulated Industry 10. Market Failure and Constitutional Classicism: The Slaughter-House Cases 11. Regulation and Incorporation 12. The Railroads and the Development of Regulatory Policy 13. Federalism and Rate Discrimination Part Iv: The Political Economy of Substantive Due Process 14. Historical Explanation and Substantive Due Process 15. The American School of Political Economy 16. The Wages Fund 17. Market Failure and the Constitution Part V: The Labor Combination In American Law 18. Classical Theory and the Labor Cartel 19. Coercion and Its Meaning: Antitrust and the Labor Injunction Part Vi: The Antitrust Movement and the Theory of the Firm 20. American Merger Policy and the Failure of Corporate Law 21. The Classical Theory of Competition 22. The Rise of Industrial Organization 23. The Fixed-Cost Controversy 24. Potential Competition 25. Vertical Integration and Resale Price Maintenance Epilogue: Classical Enterprise in Decline Notes Index

Myopic loss aversion and the equity premium puzzle

Abstract: The equity premium puzzle refers to the empirical fact that stocks have outperformed bonds over the last century by a surprisingly large margin. We offer a new explanation based on two behavioral concepts. First, investors are assumed to be "loss averse," meaning that they are distinctly more sensitive to losses than to gains. Second, even long-term investors are assumed to evaluate their portfolios frequently. We dub this combination "myopic loss aversion." Using simulations, we find that the size of the equity premium is consistent with the previously estimated parameters of prospect theory if investors evaluate their portfolios annually. There is an enormous discrepancy between the returns on stocks and fixed income securities. Since 1926 the annual real return on stocks has been about 7 percent, while the real return on treasury bills has been less than 1 percent. As demonstrated by Mehra and Prescott [1985], the combination of a high equity premium, a low risk-free rate, and smooth consumption is difficult to explain with plausible levels of investor risk aversion. Mehra and Prescott estimate that investors would have to have coefficients of relative risk aversion in excess of 30 to explain the historical equity premium, whereas previous estimates and theoretical arguments suggest that the actual figure is close to 1.0. We are left with a pair of questions: why is the equity premium so large, or why is anyone willing to hold bonds? The answer we propose in this paper is based on two concepts from the psychology of decision-making. The first concept is loss aversion. Loss aversion refers to the tendency for individuals to be more sensitive to reductions in their levels of well-being than to increases. The concept plays a central role in Kahneman and Tversky's [1979] descriptive theory of decision-making under

The Black Box Society: The Secret Algorithms That Control Money and Information

Abstract: Every day, corporations are connecting the dots about our personal behaviorsilently scrutinizing clues left behind by our work habits and Internet use. The data compiled and portraits created are incredibly detailed, to the point of being invasive. But who connects the dots about what firms are doing with this information? The Black Box Society argues that we all need to be able to do soand to set limits on how big data affects our lives. Hidden algorithms can make (or ruin) reputations, decide the destiny of entrepreneurs, or even devastate an entire economy. Shrouded in secrecy and complexity, decisions at major Silicon Valley and Wall Street firms were long assumed to be neutral and technical. But leaks, whistleblowers, and legal disputes have shed new light on automated judgment. Self-serving and reckless behavior is surprisingly common, and easy to hide in code protected by legal and real secrecy. Even after billions of dollars of fines have been levied, underfunded regulators may have only scratched the surface of this troubling behavior. Frank Pasquale exposes how powerful interests abuse secrecy for profit and explains ways to rein them in. Demanding transparency is only the first step. An intelligible society would assure that key decisions of its most important firms are fair, nondiscriminatory, and open to criticism. Silicon Valley and Wall Street need to accept as much accountability as they impose on others.

Current index to legal periodicals

Abstract: American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review 17 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev., No. 1, Spring, 2009. Boston College Law Review 50 B.C. L. Rev., No. 3, May, 2009. Boston University Public Interest Law Journal 18 B.U. Pub. Int. L.J., No. 2, Spring, 2009. Cardozo Journal of Conflict Resolution 10 Cardozo J. Conflict Resol., No. 2, Spring, 2009. Cardozo Public Law, Policy, & Ethics Journal 7 Cardozo Pub. L. Pol’y & Ethics J., No. 3, Summer, 2009. Chicago Journal of International Law 10 Chi. J. Int’l L., No. 1, Summer, 2009. Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy 20 Colo. J. Int’l Envtl. L. & Pol’y, No. 2, Winter, 2009. Columbia Journal of Law & the Arts 32 Colum. J.L. & Arts, No. 3, Spring, 2009. Connecticut Public Interest Law Journal 8 Conn. Pub. Int. L.J., No. 2, Spring-Summer, 2009. Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy 18 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y, No. 1, Fall, 2008. Cornell Law Review 94 Cornell L. Rev., No. 5, July, 2009. Creighton Law Review 42 Creighton L. Rev., No. 3, April, 2009. Criminal Law Forum 20 Crim. L. Forum, Nos. 2-3, Pp. 173-394, 2009. Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 34 Del. J. Corp. L., No. 2, Pp. 433-754, 2009. Environmental Law Reporter News & Analysis 39 Envtl. L. Rep. News & Analysis, No. 7, July, 2009. European Journal of International Law 20 Eur. J. Int’l L., No. 2, April, 2009. Family Law Quarterly 43 Fam. L.Q., No. 1, Spring, 2009. Georgetown Journal of International Law 40 Geo. J. Int’l L., No. 3, Spring, 2009. Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics 22 Geo. J. Legal Ethics, No. 2, Spring, 2009. Golden Gate University Law Review 39 Golden Gate U. L. Rev., No. 2, Winter, 2009. Harvard Environmental Law Review 33 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev., No. 2, Pp. 297-608, 2009. International Review of Law and Economics 29 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ., No. 1, March, 2009. Journal of Environmental Law and Litigation 24 J. Envtl. L. & Litig., No. 1, Pp. 1-201, 2009. Journal of Legislation 34 J. Legis., No. 1, Pp. 1-98, 2008. Journal of Technology Law & Policy 14 J. Tech. L. & Pol’y, No. 1, June, 2009. Labor Lawyer 24 Lab. Law., No. 3, Winter/Spring, 2009. Michigan Journal of International Law 30 Mich. J. Int’l L., No. 3, Spring, 2009. New Criminal Law Review 12 New Crim. L. Rev., No. 2, Spring, 2009. Northern Kentucky Law Review 36 N. Ky. L. Rev., No. 4, Pp. 445-654, 2009. Ohio Northern University Law Review 35 Ohio N.U. L. Rev., No. 2, Pp. 445-886, 2009. Pace Law Review 29 Pace L. Rev., No. 3, Spring, 2009. Quinnipiac Health Law Journal 12 Quinnipiac Health L.J., No. 2, Pp. 209-332, 2008-2009. Real Property, Trust and Estate Law Journal 44 Real Prop. Tr. & Est. L.J., No. 1, Spring, 2009. Rutgers Race and the Law Review 10 Rutgers Race & L. Rev., No. 2, Pp. 441-629, 2009. San Diego Law Review 46 San Diego L. Rev., No. 2, Spring, 2009. Seton Hall Law Review 39 Seton Hall L. Rev., No. 3, Pp. 725-1102, 2009. Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal 18 S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J., No. 3, Spring, 2009. Stanford Environmental Law Journal 28 Stan. Envtl. L.J., No. 3, July, 2009. Tulsa Law Review 44 Tulsa L. Rev., No. 2, Winter, 2008. UMKC Law Review 77 UMKC L. Rev., No. 4, Summer, 2009. Washburn Law Journal 48 Washburn L.J., No. 3, Spring, 2009. Washington University Global Studies Law Review 8 Wash. U. Global Stud. L. Rev., No. 3, Pp.451-617, 2009. Washington University Journal of Law & Policy 29 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol’y, Pp. 1-401, 2009. Washington University Law Review 86 Wash. U. L. Rev., No. 6, Pp. 1273-1521, 2009. William Mitchell Law Review 35 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev., No. 4, Pp. 1235-1609, 2009. Yale Journal of International Law 34 Yale J. Int’l L., No. 2, Summer, 2009. Yale Journal on Regulation 26 Yale J. on Reg., No. 2, Summer, 2009.

Theory of business enterprise

Abstract: Veblen has been claimed and rejected both by sociologists and economists as being one of theirs. He enriched and attacked both disciplines, as he did so many others: philosophy, history, social psychology, politics, and linguistics. Because he took all knowledge as necessary and relevant to adequate understanding, Veblen was a holistic analyst of the social process. First published in 1904, this classic analysis of the U.S. economy has enduring value today. In it, Veblen posited a theory of business fluctuations and economic growth which included chronic depression and inflation. He predicted the socioeconomic changes that would occur as a result: militarism, imperialism, fascism, consumerism, and the development of the mass media as well as the corporate bureaucracy. Douglas Dowd's introduction places the volume within the traditions of both macroeconomics and microeconomics, tracing Veblen's place among social thinkers, and the place of this volume in the body of his work.