Earnings Management and Investor Protection: An International Comparison

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Recent sovereign defaults in emerging countries are accompanied by interest rate spikes and deep recessions. This paper develops a small open economy model to study default risk and its interaction with output, consumption, and foreign debt. Default probabilities and interest rates depend on incentives for repayment. Default occurs in equilibrium because asset markets are incomplete. The model predicts that default incentives and interest rates are higher in recessions, as observed in the data. The reason is that in a recession, a risk averse borrower finds it more costly to repay non-contingent debt and is more likely to default. In a quantitative exercise the model matches various features of the business cycle in Argentina such as: high volatility of interest rates, higher volatility of consumption relative to output, a negative correlation of interest rates and output and a negative correlation of the trade balance and output. The model can also predict the recent default episode in Argentina.

Default risk and income fluctuations in emerging economies

Recent sovereign defaults in emerging countries are accompanied by interest rate spikes and deep recessions. This paper develops a small open economy model to study default risk and its interaction with output, consumption, and foreign debt. Default probabilities and interest rates depend on incentives for repayment. Default occurs in equilibrium because asset markets are incomplete. The model predicts that default incentives and interest rates are
higher in recessions, as observed in the data. The reason is that in a recession, a risk averse borrower finds it more costly to repay non-contingent debt and is more likely to default. In a quantitative exercise the model matches various features of the business cycle in Argentina
such as: high volatility of interest rates, higher volatility of consumption relative to output, a negative correlation of interest rates and output and a negative correlation of the trade balance and output. The model can also predict the recent default episode in Argentina.

/pdf/default-risk-and-income-fluctuations-in-emerging-economies-3uwetnmpe6.pdf

Default Risk and Income Fluctuations in Emerging Economies

Aggregate and sectoral comovement are central features of business cycles, so the ability to generate comovement is a natural litmus test for macroeconomic models. But it is a test that most models fail. We propose a unified model that generates aggregate and sectoral comovement in response to contemporaneous and news shocks about fundamentals. The fundamentals that we consider are aggregate and sectoral total factor productivity shocks as well as investment specific technical change. The model has three key elements: variable capital utilization, adjustment costs to investment, and preferences that allow us to parameterize the strength of short-run wealth effects on the labor supply. (JEL

/pdf/can-news-about-the-future-drive-the-business-cycle-b482sd6shw.pdf

Can news about the future drive the business cycle

All Matlab and C++ programs necessary to produce the results of the article. There is also a Excel spreadsheet with Mexican data.

Code and data files for "Fiscal Policy and Default Risk in Emerging Markets"

We extend the model used in recent quantitative studies of sovereign default, allowing policymakers of different types to stochastically alternate in power. We show that a default episode may be triggered by a change in the type of policymaker in office, and that such a default is likely to occur only if there is enough political stability and if policymakers encounter poor economic conditions. Under high political stability, political turnover enables the model to generate a weaker correlation between economic conditions and default decisions, a higher and more volatile spread, and lower borrowing levels after a default episode.

/pdf/heterogeneous-borrowers-in-quantitative-models-of-sovereign-cv9g152yg9.pdf

Heterogeneous borrowers in quantitative models of sovereign default

https://www.richmondfed.org/~/media/richmondfedorg/publications/research/working_papers/2009/pdf/wp09-1.pdf

Fiscal policy and default risk in emerging markets

We study the sovereign default model that has been used to account for the cyclical behavior of interest rates in emerging market economies. This model is often solved using the discrete state space technique with evenly spaced grid points. We show that this method necessitates a large number of grid points to avoid generating spurious interestrate movements. This makes the discrete state technique significantly more inefficient than using Chebyshev polynomials or cubic spline interpolation to approximate the value functions. We show that the inefficiency of the discrete state space technique is more severe for parameterizations that feature a high sensitivity of the bond price to the borrowing level for the borrowing levels that are observed more frequently in the simulations. In addition, we find that the efficiency of the discrete state space technique can be greatly improved by (i) finding the equilibrium as the limit of the equilibrium of the finite-horizon version of the model, instead of iterating separately on the value and bond price functions and (ii) concentrating grid points in asset levels at which the bond price is more sensitive to the borrowing level and in levels that are observed more often in the model simulations. Our analysis is also relevant for the study of other credit markets.

/pdf/quantitative-properties-of-sovereign-default-models-solution-3stihmikar.pdf

Quantitative Properties of Sovereign Default Models: Solution Methods Matter

This paper studies the role of the credit crunch in the severe contraction of trade and economic activity at the height of the 2008-09 global financial crisis, using firm-level data from six emerging market economies in Asia. We construct firm-specific measures of global demand, which allow us to disentangle the effect of falling demand from that of financial constraints on sales. The results indicate that: (1) Although the fall in demand adversely affected the sales of all firms during the crisis, sales declined by less for firms with better pre-crisis financial conditions. (2) In the face of the decline in external financing opportunities, some firms relied more on trade credit from suppliers to supplement operating capital during the crisis, which allowed them to post relatively better sales. (3) Export-intensive firms with comparable financial vulnerability resorted less to trade credit as an alternative source of finance, and hence experienced sharper declines in sales than the domestically-oriented firms. These findings point to the presence of credit frictions among the factors that contributed to the disproportionately large decline in international trade during the crisis.

/pdf/financial-frictions-trade-credit-and-the-2008-09-global-4lziaxpf1n.pdf

Horacio Sapriza

Papers

Code and data files for "Fiscal Policy and Default Risk in Emerging Markets"

Heterogeneous borrowers in quantitative models of sovereign default

Fiscal policy and default risk in emerging markets

Quantitative Properties of Sovereign Default Models: Solution Methods Matter

Financial Frictions, Trade Credit, and the 2008-09 Global Financial Crisis