자연주의적 탐구조사(Naturalistic Inquiry)

.................................................................................................................................ii Acknowledgments..................................................................................................................iii Dedication ..............................................................................................................................iv Table of

On multiculturalism's margins: oral history and Afghan former refugees in early twenty-first century Winnipeg

Focusing on the status of Muslim women, this paper examines the market employment of the second generation of migrants in multicultural Australia and highlights their differentials with non-Muslims This group of Muslim women was born and educated in a country clearly characterised by a high level of women's employment Accordingly, it is theorised that the employment level of second-generation Muslim migrants might also be high as a consequence of assimilation and a greater freedom from religiously ascribed gender roles The possibility of disadvantage through discrimination is also considered in this analysis Dealing with assimilation and discrimination hypotheses, the empirical findings of this analysis explain the employment differentials of the second generation of Muslim migrants with non-Muslims in this multicultural setting

Employment Differentials of Second-Generation Muslim Immigrants: Assimilation and Discrimination Hypotheses

The Maastricht Graduate School of Governance (MGSoG) was founded in September 2004 at Maastricht University. The mission of the School is to train specialists who combine a high level of academic scholarship with leadership, in order to strengthen democratic governance in domestic and international organizations, by focusing on policy analysis, risk assessment, policy design, monitoring and evaluation, and methodologies and techniques of policy research.

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Moving back or moving forward? : Return migration after conflict

International stereotypes tend to portray Iran as a ‘traditional’ society resistant to many aspects of social change. Based on this assumption, the generally held view is that Iran is experiencing one of the highest fertility rates in the world, and that demographic transition has not started yet. Recent statistics has proved, however, that the reality is profoundly different. Iran has experienced an astonishing fertility decline in recent years. This study aims to review the trends and changes in fertility over the period 1976 to 1996. The Islamic Republic of Iran experienced a moderate increase in fertility during 1976-1986, mainly due to the relaxation of family planning programs by the government. On the other hand, fertility began to decline in 1984, and has sharply declined since 1988. The question has arisen to what extent this significant change has been due to the changes in nuptiality and marital fertility. The own-children data from the 1986 and 1996 censuses allow us to analyse the change in fertility in the last two decades, and to decompose the change in fertility into two main components of nuptiality and marital fertility. The result has shown that around 85 percent of the changes is due to marital fertility, which suggests that most of the fertility of Iranian women has been controlled within marriage. Around 15 percent of the change is attributable to changes in nuptiality, specifically an increase in age at marriage and thus a reduction in the proportion of women married at early ages. After reviewing the literature on the demographic transition in Iran, the paper will first analyse the changes in nuptiality patterns during the last two decades. Second, the changes in fertility trends and levels will briefly be discussed for the period 1976 to 1996. Then the change of fertility will be decomposed into the two components of nuptiality and marital fertility. Tentative explanations for the dramatic decline in marital fertility will be put forward; and the future prospects of the fertility decline, policy implications and issues for further studies will be discussed. EFFECTS OF MARITAL FERTILITY AND NUPTIALITY ON FERTILITY TRANSITION IN THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN, 1976-1996 Mohammad Jalal Abbasi-Shavazi * DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION IN IRAN DURING THE 20 CENTURY At the beginning of the 20 century the population of Iran was estimated to be around 10 million (Bharier 1968); it increased to 13 million in 1933, to 34 million in 1976 and to 49 million in 1986. By 1996 the Iranian population had reached 60 million, a more than sixfold increase in a century (Statistical Centre of Iran 1996). Although the first nationwide Iranian census in 1956 was indicative of a sudden rise in the population growth rate, Iran was among the countries that voted against the issue of government intervention in fertility control put forward by the United Nations General Assembly in 1962. The government attitude, however, changed after the release of the 1966 census results, and the Imperial Government of Iran then adopted a national family planning policy in 1966 and established an active family planning program in 1967 (Mehryar et al. 1998: 4). The aggressive family planning program was not warmly welcomed by the people, however, as little attention was given to sociocultural and religious contexts of the society. Therefore, the program could not reach its goals a decade later. During 1966-1976 the Iranian population experienced a modest fertility decline, but restricted to urban areas (Aghajanian & Mehryar 1999; Mehryar et al. 1998; Mirzaie 1998). Immediately after the Islamic Revolution, the family planning program was suspended and the Ministry of Health, responsible for the program, discontinued all * The author is a Postdoctoral Fellow at the Demography Program, Research School of Social Sciences, the Australian National University, and Assistant Professor (on leave), Department of Demography, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran. I am grateful to Peter McDonald for his valuable comments and useful discussions on all the stages of data analysis for this paper, and to Geoffrey McNicoll, Chris Wilson and Terence Hull for their useful comments and insight. I am also indebted to my colleagues at the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Tehran, particularly Mohammad Mirzaie and Taghi Azad-Armaki, for their support and encouragement, and to the Statistical Centre of Iran, especially Nemat Nassiri and Taha Norollahi, for providing the data necessary for this project. Final thanks are due to Wendy Cosford for her editorial suggestions and to Ehsan Abbasi-Shavazi for his kind help in preparation of the tables. This paper is based on the findings of a project on Fertility Transition in Iran supported by the Wellcome Trust (Ref: 05278/Z/IGS/HJS) undertaken by the author. Correspondence to: Mohammad.Abbasi@anu.edu.au 2 MOHAMMAD J. ABBASI family planning services. In addition, the new government adopted a pronatalist approach encouraging earlier marriage in the society. The eight-year war with Iraq also created a pronatalist atmosphere in Iran. A rationing system was introduced for food and basic necessities, and this was helpful to large families. The pronatalist policies continued even after the revelation of the high population growth rate by the 1986 census, but the government population policy was reversed and a new antinatalist family planning program was officially inaugurated in December 1989. The details of this fundamental policy reversal and its success in such a short period of time have been elaborated elsewhere (Mehryar et al. 1998). A number of studies have been undertaken to analyse the fertility of Iranian women before and after the Revolution (Aghajanian 1994, 1995a, 1995b; Aghajanian & Mehryar 1999; Mehryar & Gholipour 1995; Mehryar et al. 1999; Mirzaie 1998). Aghajanian and Mehryar (1999) analysed the fertility transition in Iran over three time periods associated with different social, economic and political environments. The first stage of the transition started in the 1970s. The stalled transition stage began after the 1979 Revolution when pronatalist policies emerged, and lasted till 1989 when the official family planning program was inaugurated. Abbasi-Shavazi (1999b, 2000) has proposed that the Iranian fertility transition took place in five periods: a fall in fertility in the early 1970s after a long history of high fertility; a rise during 1977-1979 due to circumstances before and during the Islamic Revolution; a fairly constant trend until 1983 due to the social changes and pronatalist policies after the Islamic Revolution; a moderate decrease from 1984 to 1988; followed by a remarkable decline after the introduction of the new antinatalist policies by the government. The question arises: how and under what conditions has fertility in Iran dropped so much in such a short time? Several factors have been proposed to explain the fertility transition and differentials in Iran. The family planning program has been seen as the keystone of the transition, and it is widely accepted that the fertility transition accelerated after the inauguration of the new family planning program in 1989 (Aghajanian & Mehryar 1999; Mehryar et al. 1998). However, Abbasi-Shavazi (2000) demonstrated that fertility rose from 1976 to 1984 and fell thereafter, suggesting that there was a rise and a fall that occurred independently of the official family planning program. It is of great interest FERTILITY TRANSITION IN IRAN 3 therefore, to consider the role of social change beyond the family planning program. For example, it has been claimed that ideational change in recent years and demand for fewer children due to the fall in infant mortality rates have also had a role in the fertility transition (Aghajanian & Mehryar 1999; Raftery et al. 1995). It is not clear, however, how and under what conditions the fertility behaviour of Iranian women in different provinces across the country has been affected by ideational change. Support and guidance from religious leaders (Aghajanian 1995a; Ladier-Fouladi 1996), as well as the commitment of the government (McNicoll 1998) have all legitimized the revived family planning program, which has contributed to the decline. As Aghajanian (1995a: 3) noted, the most important aspect of Iran’s success in family planning is the interest, support and guidance of religious leaders, and this holds many implications for other societies with strong religious traditions. Exploring the role of such social, economic, religious and political institutions on population policy changes in Iran and their interaction with ‘individual attitudes and behaviour and what goes on in people’s heads’ (McNicoll 1985: 177) would deepen the understanding of fertility decline in Iran. The province-by-province analysis covering a period of about three decades has added considerable detail to the knowledge of demographic transition and fertility differentials in Iran. Abbasi-Shavazi (2000) has observed that all provinces and urbanrural regions of the country have followed fertility patterns and trends that are similar to the national trends. Similarity of such patterns across the country inevitably calls for precise description and for explanation. Although all provinces displayed trends similar to the national level in recent years, there exist substantial fertility differences among provinces and between rural and urban areas. A comparison of the fertility levels and patterns of each province against the national average during 1972-96 revealed several fertility patterns. Provinces such as Sistan-Baluchistan, Hormozgan, Kohgilooyeh-Booirahmad and Ilam had considerably higher fertility than the national average, while Gilan, Semnan, Tehran and Yazd, on the other hand, displayed substantially lower fertility than that of the total population (Abbasi-Shavazi 2000). Fertility differentials have also b

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Effects of Marital Fertility and Nuptiality On Fertility Transition in the Islamic Republic of Iran, 1976-1996

In 2006, around 1.2 million documented Afghans remained in Iran, of whom half were second generation. This paper is based on the results of a qualitative study conducted in three settings: Tehran, Mashhad and Isfahan, and draws on data collected via 80 in-depth interviews and six focus group discussions with second generation Afghans in Iran. The aim of the paper is to explore the adaptation of second-generation Afghans in Iran, particularly in relation to marriage and family formation. The results show that educational achievements and occupational skills of the second-generation Afghans in Iran facilitated their adaptation to the host society, and inspired different marriage and family behaviors and aspirations in comparison with the first generation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Marriage and Family Formation of the Second-Generation Afghans in Iran: Insights from a Qualitative Study†

International migration is increasingly important in shaping national population dynamics, both directly through adding or subtracting people, and indirectly, through the fertility of immigrants. International migrants rarely share the fertility characteristics of either origin or destination populations. However, the relationship between migration and fertility is little understood, especially that relating to refugee populations. This study examined the fertility differentials of one of the world’s largest refugee populations, the Afghans in Iran, in relation to the host population. Based on multivariate analysis, the study demonstrated that Afghan immigrants were moving from a high fertility regime to a low fertility regime. The findings suggest that fertility change among Afghans is associated with their adaptation to Iranian society. The role of education in mediating immigrant–native fertility differentials was also uncovered.

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Immigrant-native fertility differentials: The Afghans in Iran

Most migration researchers have focused their attention either at the aggregate (community/state/national) – or alternatively at the individual level in studying patterns, causes and consequences of the move. However, there has been a major shift in recent demographic studies by considering family and household as the unit of analysis. This chapter examines the impacts of refugee and forced migration on family formation and dynamics. In doing so, the chapter identifies various aspects of family that are affected by forced movements. The degree to which family is influenced prior to, during, and after an involuntary move is discussed. Various hypotheses on the relationship between forced migration and family change are elaborated. The demographic data needed for the analysis of family change in each of these stages are assessed, and the gaps in the information and data are presented. An illustration of the impact of forced migration on family dynamics will be made using the data on Afghan refugees in Iran. Having reviewed the research on forced migration and family, the current status and future direction of research on the topic are proposed.

Family Dynamics in the Context of Forced Migration

The subject of women’s economic productivity has been contentious for more than two decades. An important reason is that measurement of women’s economic participation is to some extent subject to social, economic and cultural factors. For example, women’s work at home has not normally been considered as an economic activity, even though its effect on economic productivity is substantial. Also, in many societies the work of women in the agricultural sector typically is not counted as economic activity because such work is part of family chores and not remunerated in cash even though this work is essential for agricultural activity. In other words, there has been a well-established tendency among male economists in both developed and undeveloped countries to devalue the work of women unless there is evidence of women receiving wages for their work. Furthermore, even when women are gainfully employed, for those whose hours worked per week are less than the country average considered as full time, their contribution to economic activity is devalued. Yet it is often social and cultural approaches to women’s work that limit the number of hours they may work, and thus these factors can play a significant role in whether their work is counted as an economic activity. The lack of a uniform definition for the rate of economic participation of women is thus problematic. However, regarding improvements in data and information related to economic participation and using the same definitions and concepts, the possibility of obtaining a general definition of economic participation seems to be possible. As a result, comparing the rates, between different societies and between different sub-populations within a specific society, is made much easier than before.

Hossein Mahmoudian

Papers

Marriage and Family Formation of the Second-Generation Afghans in Iran: Insights from a Qualitative Study†

Immigrant-native fertility differentials: The Afghans in Iran

Family Dynamics in the Context of Forced Migration

Socio-demographic Factors Affecting Women's Labor Force Participation in Iran, 1976–96

Spatial modeling of migration using GIS-based multi-criteria decision analysis: A case study of Iran