Howard Rosenthal

Bio: Howard Rosenthal is an academic researcher from New York University. The author has contributed to research in topics: Voting & Polarization (politics). The author has an hindex of 55, co-authored 158 publications receiving 17665 citations. Previous affiliations of Howard Rosenthal include Princeton University & Carnegie Mellon University.

Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll Call Voting

Abstract: In this wide-ranging study, the authors use 200 years of congressional roll call voting as a framework for an interpretation of important episodes in American political and economic history. By tracing the voting patterns of Congress throughout the country's history, Poole and Rosenthal find that, despite a wide array of issues facing legislators, over 80 percent of a legislator's voting decisions can be attributed to a consistent ideological position ranging from ultraconservatism to ultraliberalism.

Polarized America: The Dance of Ideology and Unequal Riches

Abstract: The idea of America as politically polarized--that there is an unbridgeable divide between right and left, red and blue states--has become a cliche. What commentators miss, however, is that increasing polarization in recent decades has been closely accompanied by fundamental social and economic changes--most notably, a parallel rise in income inequality. In Polarized America, Nolan McCarty, Keith Poole, and Howard Rosenthal examine the relationships of polarization, wealth disparity, immigration, and other forces, characterizing it as a dance of give and take and back and forth causality.Using NOMINATE (a quantitative procedure that, like interest group ratings, scores politicians on the basis of their roll call voting records) to measure polarization in Congress and public opinion, census data and Federal Election Commission finance records to measure polarization among the public, the authors find that polarization and income inequality fell in tandem from 1913 to 1957 and rose together dramatically from 1977 on; they trace a parallel rise in immigration beginning in the 1970s. They show that Republicans have moved right, away from redistributive policies that would reduce income inequality. Immigration, meanwhile, has facilitated the move to the right: non-citizens, a larger share of the population and disproportionately poor, cannot vote; thus there is less political pressure from the bottom for redistribution than there is from the top against it. In "the choreography of American politics" inequality feeds directly into political polarization, and polarization in turn creates policies that further increase inequality.

Political resource allocation, controlled agendas, and the status quo

Abstract: Economic analysis requires modelling political as well as market resource allocation. Voting institutions, in particular two-candidate majority rule elections and voting on motions, have been a primary focus of recent analytical developments. In the case of a single good to be allocated politically, standard assumptions lead to 'single-peakedness' of voter preferences over the set of alternatives. When, in choosing between a pair of available alternatives, every voter votes for his preferred alternative, the allocative equilibrium is the 'Condorcet point' or political allocation most desired by the median voter (Bowen, 1943; Black, 1958; Riker and Ordeshook, 1973). This result concerning the dominance of the median voter's ideal allocation depends importantly on the nature of competition in the allocation process. In the context of the political allocation of economic goods, the 'median voter' outcome is typically justified on the basis of an underlying but usually unmodeled process of political competition between two candidates for elective office, wherein the dominant strategy for each candidate is to offer to provide the level of public spending that corresponds to the median voter's ideal expenditure. Such a view of equilibrium under majority rule (when equilibrium exists) may be very unrepresentative of political processes. Many such processes, particularly those related to collective expenditure determination, may be more appropriately characterized as ones in which some group has the power to make a proposal to the voters, and thereby set the agenda. This group, which we call the agenda setter, by having monopoly power over the proposal placed before the electorate, can confront the voters with a 'take it or leave it' choice. Because 'competitive' substitutes to the setter's proposal are not offered, the median voter cannot simply 'hold out' until the Condorcet point is proposed. When the setter has monopoly power, voters are forced to choose between

Partisan Politics, Divided Government, and the Economy

Abstract: This book develops an integrated approach to understanding the American economy and national elections. Economic policy is generally seen as the result of a compromise between the President and Congress. Because Democrats and Republicans usually maintain polarised preferences on policy, middle-of-the-road voters seek to balance the President by reinforcing in Congress the party not holding the White House. This balancing leads, always, to relatively moderate policies and, frequently, to divided government. The authors outline the rational partisan business cycle, where Republican administrations begin with recessions, and Democratic ones with expansions, and the midterm cycle, where the President's party loses votes in the midterm congressional election. The book argues that both cycles are the result of uncertainty about the outcome of presidential elections. Other topics covered include retrospective voting on the economy, coat-tails, and incumbency advantage.

A Spatial Model for Legislative Roll Call Analysis

Abstract: A general nonlinear logit model is used to analyze political choice data The model assumes probabilistic voting based on a spatial utility function The parameters of the utility function and the spatial coordinates of the choices and the choosers can all be estimated on the basis of observed choices Ordinary Guttman scaling is a degenerate case of this model Estimation of the model is implemented in the NOMINATE program for one dimensional analysis of two alternative choices with no nonvoting The robustness and face validity of the program outputs are evaluated on the basis of roll call voting data for the US House and Senate

Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games

Abstract: Domestic politics and international relations are often inextricably entangled, but existing theories (particularly “state-centric” theories) do not adequately account for these linkages. When national leaders must win ratification (formal or informal) from their constituents for an international agreement, their negotiating behavior reflects the simultaneous imperatives of both a domestic political game and an international game. Using illustrations from Western economic summitry, the Panama Canal and Versailles Treaty negotiations, IMF stabilization programs, the European Community, and many other diplomatic contexts, this article offers a theory of ratification. It addresses the role of domestic preferences and coalitions, domestic political institutions and practices, the strategies and tactics of negotiators, uncertainty, the domestic reverberation of international pressures, and the interests of the chief negotiator. This theory of “two-level games” may also be applicable to many other political phenomena, such as dependency, legislative committees, and multiparty coalitions.

A Rational Theory of the Size of Government

Abstract: In a general equilibrium model of a labor economy, the size of government, measured by the share of income redistributed, is determined by majority rule. Voters rationally anticipate the disincentive effects of taxation on the labor-leisure choices of their fellow citizens and take the effect into account when voting. The share of earned income redistributed depends on the voting rule and on the distribution of productivity in the economy. Under majority rule, the equilibrium tax share balances the budget and pays for the voters' choices. The principal reasons for increased size of government implied by the model are extensions of the franchise that change the position of the decisive voter in the income distribution and changes in relative productivity. An increase in mean income relative to the income of the decisive voter increases the size of government.

A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence

Abstract: This paper presents a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence. Political equilibrium depends on the efficiency of each group in producing pressure, the effect of additional pressure on their influence, the number of persons in different groups, and the deadweight cost of taxes and subsidies. An increase in deadweight costs discourages pressure by subsidized groups and encourages pressure by taxpayers. This analysis unifies the view that governments correct market failures with the view that they favor the politically powerful: both are produced by the competition for political favors.

Economic growth and income inequality

Abstract: We investigate whether income inequality affects subsequent growth in a cross-country sample for 1965-90, using the models of Barro (1997), Bleaney and Nishiyama (2002) and Sachs and Warner (1997), with negative results. We then investigate the evolution of income inequality over the same period and its correlation with growth. The dominating feature is inequality convergence across countries. This convergence has been significantly faster amongst developed countries. Growth does not appear to influence the evolution of inequality over time. Outline

Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms

Abstract: With the publication of The Logic of Collective Action in 1965, Mancur Olson challenged a cherished foundation of modern democratic thought that groups would tend to form and take collective action...