Hwee Rhak Park

Bio: Hwee Rhak Park is an academic researcher. The author has contributed to research in topics: International studies. The author has an hindex of 1, co-authored 1 publications receiving 3 citations.

South Korea's failure to implement ʺDefense Reform 2020ʺ

Abstract: Park, Hwee Rhak.December, 2014.South Korea's failure to implement ʺDefense Reform 2020ʺ,Articles,[Seoul, Korea]Korean Association of International Studies,23

The Strategies of ROK’s DEFENSE REFORM with Special Reference to the Peace Process and Arms Control

Abstract: Purpose: The purpose of this article is to analyze the constraints of defense reform of previous governments and to suggest alternatives in connection with future arms control and the peace process on the Korean Peninsula. This article aims to evaluate the history of previous governments' defense reforms and traditional arms building efforts, and seek alternatives to overcome constraints in connection with the peace by analyzing EU’s successful cases of arms control.The key is how to build military power that conflicts with disarmament and a peace regime through the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, which is supported by the power, and the vision of arms control. Method: For better analysis, this article reviews the previous governments’ defense reform plan and pinpoints the limiting factors and suggests the policy options to overcome by taking a Mahoney’s path dependence theory of four actors as utilitarian, functional, power and legitimacy. In Chapter 2 analyzes ways to enhance arms control in connection with a peace regime. In Chapter 3 describes Defense Reform 2.0 key areas and future challenges. In Chapter 4 explores ways to enhance linkage among Defense reform 2.0 and Arms control, and the peace regime. In Chapter 5 suggests policy options to overcome the restricting factors in Arms reform effort of the previous governments. Results: If we pinpoint the limits of past defense reform effort are as follow. First, as an efficacy aspect, past defense reform lacks efficiency in defense reform process due to the corruption. Second, as functional aspect, past defense reform fails to provide an institutional mechanism for strengthening military space power in order to respond North Korea’s threat. Third, as power aspect, the will to reform the military command has interrupted by the changing of the political leadership. Fourth, as legitimacy aspect, national defense reform has failed to win support from the private and military circle. Conclusion: This article concluded that: First, as utilitarian aspect it should contribute to the national economy by minimizing inefficiency and maximizing efficiency through defense reform. Second, as functional aspect defense reform should provide an institutional mechanism for strengthening military space power at the Joint Chiefs of Staff to respond to threats from North Korea and changes in the changing operational environment. Third, as power aspect, the political will to reform the military command should be continued by the president and defense ministers. Much of Defense Reform 2.0 seeks reform in political terms, and efforts should be made to create crisis-taking shared values for national security, breaking away from the risk avoidance culture. Fourth, as legitimacy aspect, national defense reform should be carried out by due process and win support from the private and military. [Keywords]Defense Reform, Peace Process, Arms Control, Political Leadership, Space Force 1.Introduction Publisher: J-INSTITUTE ISSN: 2423-8775 Website: www.j-institute.jp/military/ Editor: military@j-institute.jp Corresponding author E-mail: david1@hanmail.net

A Study on the improvement of military manpower system of ROK armed forces through introduction of partial volunteer force system

Abstract: A study on the improvement of military manpower system of ROK Armed Forces through introduction of partial volunteer force system

The Ministry of National Defence in South Korea: Military dominance despite civilian supremacy?

Abstract: ABSTRACT South Korea’s transition from military-controlled authoritarianism to consolidated civilian-dominated democracy is widely considered a success story. However, civilians’ roles within the MND remain severely limited due to the institutional design of the MND. A decentralised structure emerged in the MND, delegating policy decision-making in critical areas to professional soldiers. Data analysis on 1,060 employees in 21 MND departments shows a clear cut between the military domain and the civilian domain within the MND, which enabled the military to thwart 30 years of civilian efforts to reform the military structure without challenging the principle of civilian supremacy.