The long shadow of public policy; Barriers to a value-based approach in healthcare procurement

A life cycle sustainability assessment of organic and conventional pork supply chains in Sweden

The public health community has become increasingly critical of the role that powerful corporations play in driving unhealthy diets, one of the leading contributors to the global burden of disease. While a substantial amount of work has examined the political strategies used by dominant processed food manufacturers that undermine public health, less attention has been paid to their use of market strategies to build and consolidate power. In this light, this paper aimed to systematically review and synthesise the market strategies deployed by dominant processed food manufacturers to increase and consolidate their power. A systematic review and document analysis of public health, business, legal and media content databases (Scopus, Medline, ABI Inform, Business Source Complete, Thomas Reuters Westlaw, Lexis Advance, Factiva, NewsBank), and grey literature were conducted. Data extracted were analysed thematically using an approach informed by Porter’s ‘Five Forces’ framework. 213 documents met inclusion criteria. The market strategies (n=21) and related practices of dominant processed food manufacturers identified in the documents were categorised into a typological framework consisting of six interconnected strategic objectives: i) reduce intense competition with equivalent sized rivals and maintaining dominance over smaller rivals; ii) raise barriers to market entry by new competitors; iii) counter the threat of market disruptors and drive dietary displacement in favour of their products; iv) increase firm buyer power over suppliers; v) increase firm seller power over retailers and distributors; and vi) leverage informational power asymmetries in relations with consumers. The typological framework is well-placed to inform general and jurisdiction-specific market strategy analyses of dominant processed food manufacturers, and has the potential to assist in identifying countervailing public policies, such as those related to merger control, unfair trading practices, and public procurement, that could be used to address market-power imbalances as part of efforts to improve population diets.

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Market strategies used by processed food manufacturers to increase and consolidate their power: a systematic review and document analysis.

Prosumer in smart grids based on intelligent edge computing: A review on Artificial Intelligence Scheduling Techniques

Commercial and academic communities use private rules to regulate everything from labor conditions to biological weapons. This self-governance is vital in the twenty-first century, where private science and technology networks cross so many borders that traditional regulation and treaty solutions are often impractical. Self-Governance in Science analyzes the history of private regulation, identifies the specific market factors that make private standards stable and enforceable, explains what governments can do to encourage responsible self-regulation, and asks when private power might be legitimate. Unlike previous books which stress sociology or political science perspectives, Maurer emphasizes the economic roots of private power to deliver a coherent and comprehensive account of recent scholarship. Individual chapters present a detailed history of past self-government initiatives, describe the economics and politics of private power, and extract detailed lessons for law, legitimacy theory, and public policy.

Self-Governance in Science: Community-Based Strategies for Managing Dangerous Knowledge

Ce dossier est specialement dedie a la reglementation des pratiques commerciales deloyales de la chaine d'approvisionnement alimentaire, et presente une selection de contributions sur les differents…

Unfair trading practices in the food supply chain

This paper assesses the risks, rationale and justification for the rules on centralisation and aggregation of public procurement in Directive 2014/24. The paper explores the justifications advanced for the aggregation of purchasing and the countervailing risks it generates. In both cases, it focuses in economic and administrative aspects. It then proceeds to a summary overview of the new rules for the aggregation of public procurement in Directive 2014/24, and emphasised how the Directive is expressly recognising possibilities that clearly exceed the more modest approach in Directive 2004/18. Moving on, it then focusses on the potential justification for certain activities now permitted by the 2014 rules, and engages in a critical assessment of their competitive impact. The paper briefly highlights the far-reaching and not necessarily positive implications that a maximisation of the centralisation and aggregation possibilities under Directive 2014/24 could have, and proposes that strict competition law enforcement will be necessary to avoid undesired consequences. Some suggestions for further research are provided by way of conclusions.

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Impact of public procurement aggregation on competition: risks, rationale and justification for the rules in directive 2014/24

Ordoliberalism is a German school of economic thought that advocates regulating the free market economic based on a set of state imposed rules guaranteed by the economic constitution to impose a competitive order in society. It proposes an alternative method to pure laissez-faire and state planned economy for the better regulation of the market economy by having as goals the protection of the competitive process and individual freedom. In this article I submit that ordoliberalism, an indigenous European competition policy, is an adequate economic and analytical tool to base the practice and decision making of competition law a. My aim is twofold: contribute to the discussion on what ordoliberalism is in general and in particular concerning competition policy, and offer a new perspective on an ordoliberal-oriented competition policy.

Competition Law Through an Ordoliberal Lens

For competition lawyers, Uber is an interesting subject to study. Not only does Uber change the dynamics of the transportation market but it also raises interesting competition law questions. Last year for example, a class action suit against Uber in New York raised the question whether Uber is possibly arranging a hub and spoke cartel amongst the drivers by coordinating their selling prices. 2017 has continued to be litigious and interesting.One of these new class action lawsuits might also raise thought-provoking antitrust issues related to big data and buyer power. Uber, the maverick firm that revolutionized passenger transportation services across the world has been now sued over its alleged use of its “Hell” software before the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California filed on April 24th, 2017. The suit alleges a breach of privacy laws due to interception of private communications and unfair competition.This software apparently allowed Uber to track Lyft drivers, its main competitor, create fake Lyft accounts, determine which drivers drove for both companies, and “execut[e] a plan meant to entice double-appers to drive exclusively for them”.In this paper we explore such behaviour from a different perspective, the antitrust one. The focus of this paper is on exploring relevant behavior from a buyer power-oriented focusing on reverse rebates and overbuying, while not engaging in a concrete analysis of Uber’s conduct. This analysis provides us with the opportunity to re-explore traditional antitrust concepts, anchored on the purchasing of raw material, in the data and algorithm driven world, in particular, how companies can use big data in anticompetitive strategies, such as granting supra-competitive bonuses, overbuying, and raising rival’s costs through overbuying input (Less)

Buyer Power In The Big Data And Algorithm Driven World: The Uber & Lyft Example

Ordoliberalism is a German school of economic thought that advocates regulation of the free market economy based on a set of state-imposed rules guaranteed by the economic constitution, to impose a competitive order in society. It proposes an alternative method to pure laissez-faire and state-planned economy for the better regulation of the market economy, where the goals are the protection of the competitive process and individual freedom. In this paper I submit that ordoliberalism, an indigenous European competition policy, is an adequate economic and analytical tool upon which to base the practice and decision-making of competition law. My aim is twofold: to contribute to the discussion on what ordoliberalism is, in general, and in particular concerning competition policy , and offer a fresh perspective on an ordoliberal-oriented competition policy.

https://www.idunn.no/file/pdf/66936561/competition_law_through_an_ordoliberal_lens.pdf

Ignacio Herrera Anchustegui

Papers

Unfair trading practices in the food supply chain

Impact of public procurement aggregation on competition: risks, rationale and justification for the rules in directive 2014/24

Competition Law Through an Ordoliberal Lens

Buyer Power In The Big Data And Algorithm Driven World: The Uber & Lyft Example

Competition law through an Ordoliberal Lens