Ilyas Khan

Bio: Ilyas Khan is an academic researcher from University of Cambridge. The author has contributed to research in topics: Consciousness & Hard problem of consciousness. The author has an hindex of 2, co-authored 2 publications receiving 18 citations.

A Compositional Model of Consciousness based on Consciousness-Only

Abstract: Scientific studies of consciousness rely on objects whose existence is assumed to be independent of any consciousness. On the contrary, we assume consciousness to be fundamental, and that one of the main features of consciousness is characterized as being other-dependent. We set up a framework which naturally subsumes this feature by defining a compact closed category where morphisms represent conscious processes. These morphisms are a composition of a set of generators, each being specified by their relations with other generators, and therefore co-dependent. The framework is general enough and fits well into a compositional model of consciousness. Interestingly, we also show how our proposal may become a step towards avoiding the hard problem of consciousness, and thereby address the combination problem of conscious experiences.

A Compositional Model of Consciousness Based on Consciousness-Only.

Abstract: Scientific studies of consciousness rely on objects whose existence is assumed to be independent of any consciousness. On the contrary, we assume consciousness to be fundamental, and that one of the main features of consciousness is characterized as being other-dependent. We set up a framework which naturally subsumes this feature by defining a compact closed category where morphisms represent conscious processes. These morphisms are a composition of a set of generators, each being specified by their relations with other generators, and therefore co-dependent. The framework is general enough and fits well into a compositional model of consciousness. Interestingly, we also show how our proposal may become a step towards avoiding the hard problem of consciousness, and thereby address the combination problem of conscious experiences.

Quantum cognition: A new theoretical approach to psychology

Abstract: What type of probability theory best describes the way humans make judgments under uncertainty and decisions under conflict? Although rational models of cognition have become prominent and have achieved much success, they adhere to the laws of classical probability theory despite the fact that human reasoning does not always conform to these laws. For this reason we have seen the recent emergence of models based on an alternative probabilistic framework drawn from quantum theory. These quantum models show promise in addressing cognitive phenomena that have proven recalcitrant to modeling by means of classical probability theory. This review compares and contrasts probabilistic models based on Bayesian or classical versus quantum principles, and highlights the advantages and disadvantages of each approach.

Reconstructing quantum theory from diagrammatic postulates

Abstract: We present a reconstruction of finite-dimensional quantum theory where all of the postulates are stated entirely in diagrammatic terms, making them intuitive. Equivalently, they are stated in category-theoretic terms, making them mathematically appealing. Again equivalently, they are stated in process-theoretic terms, establishing the fact that the conceptual bare-bones of quantum theory concerns the manner in which systems and processes compose. Aside from the diagrammatic form, the key novel aspect of this reconstruction is the introduction of a new postulate, symmetric purification. Unlike the ordinary purification postulate, symmetric purification applies equally well to classical theory as well as quantum theory. We therefore first reconstruct the full process theoretic description of quantum theory, consisting of composite classical-quantum systems and their interactions, before restricting ourselves to just the `fully quantum' systems in a final step. We propose two novel alternative manners of doing so, `no-leaking' (roughly that information gain causes disturbance) and `purity of cups' (roughly the existence of entangled states). Interestingly, these turn out to be equivalent in any process theory with cups and caps. Additionally, we show how the standard purification postulate can then be seen as an immediate consequence of the symmetric purification postulate and purity of cups. Other tangential results concern the specific frameworks of generalised probabilistic theories (GPTs) and process theories (a.k.a.~CQM). Firstly, we provide a diagrammatic presentation of GPTs, which, henceforth, can now be subsumed under process theories. Secondly, we have now characterised necessary additional axioms for a process theory to correspond to the Hilbert space model, and in particular, that a `sharp dagger' is indeed the right choice of a dagger structure.

Explanatory profiles of models of consciousness: towards a systematic classification

Abstract: Models of consciousness aim to inspire new experimental protocols and aid interpretation of empirical evidence to reveal the structure of conscious experience. Nevertheless, no current model is univocally accepted on either theoretical or empirical grounds. Moreover, a straightforward comparison is difficult for conceptual reasons. In particular, we argue that different models explicitly or implicitly subscribe to different notions of what constitutes a satisfactory explanation, use different tools in their explanatory endeavours and even aim to explain very different phenomena. We thus present a framework to compare existing models in the field with respect to what we call their ‘explanatory profiles’. We focus on the following minimal dimensions: mode of explanation, mechanisms of explanation and target of explanation. We also discuss the empirical consequences of the discussed discrepancies among models. This approach may eventually lead to identifying driving assumptions, theoretical commitments, experimental predictions and a better design of future testing experiments. Finally, our conclusion points to more integrative theoretical research, where axiomatic models may play a critical role in solving current theoretical and experimental contradictions.

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences

Abstract: Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences is an international journal that offers a forum for illuminating the intersections between phenomenology, empirical science, and analytic philosophy of mind. The journal builds bridges between continental phenomenological approaches in the Husserlian tradition and disciplines that have not always been open to or aware of phenomenological contributions to understanding cognition and related topics. The journal presents work by phenomenologists, scientists, and philosophers who study cognition. In addition the journal offers discussion of methodological issues involving the variety of approaches appropriate for addressing these problems. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences provides critical review articles that address recent work in areas relevant to the connection between empirical results in experimental science and first-person perspective.