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Ingo Vogelsang

Bio: Ingo Vogelsang is an academic researcher from Boston University. The author has contributed to research in topics: Competition (economics) & Incentive. The author has an hindex of 33, co-authored 145 publications receiving 4270 citations. Previous affiliations of Ingo Vogelsang include Ifo Institute for Economic Research & RAND Corporation.


Papers
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Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, an incentive mechanism that is shown to enforce the use of Ramsey prices by multiproduct monopolies is described, which limits information requirements on the regulatory agency to bookkeeping data of the firm.
Abstract: This paper describes an incentive mechanism that is shown to enforce the use of Ramsey prices by multiproduct monopolies. The constraint given is simple. It limits information requirements on the regulatory agency to bookkeeping data of the firm. Its implementation could be easily controlled by outside courts or auditors. The process, therefore, makes use of invisible hand properties shifting the workload of welfare optimization from the regulatory agency to the regulated firm.

284 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
Ingo Vogelsang1
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors propose to use price caps for essential inputs and eventually lead to partial deregulation of end-user prices in the public utility sector, based on the assumption that the underlying natural market structure is unknown.
Abstract: Over the last 20 years, incentives in general and price caps in particular have breathed new life into public utility regulation. Price caps successfully combine incentives for cost reduction with incentives for more efficient pricing. These properties also facilitate opening public utility sectors to competition. Relatively tight price caps likely imply the right amount of competition, when the underlying natural market structure is unknown. While price caps make a regulated incumbent competitively more aggressive, this aggression is likely to improve on the unregulated outcome. Potentially anticompetitive behavior by the incumbent has led to regulation of essential inputs on the basis of benchmarked costs. Benchmarked costs should evolve into price caps for essential inputs and eventually lead to partial deregulation of end-user prices.

257 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: This article provides a roadmap vis-a-vis the competing policy objectives for access price regulation among the numerous pricing rules discussed, none clearly dominates.
Abstract: Without access of networks to each other, competition in the telecommunications sector would hardly have spread so quickly. Such mutual access is necessary for carriers to provide ubiquitous service and enable endusers to call and be called by anybody without subscribing to a system-wide monopolist. One-way access concerns bottleneck inputs provided by an incumbent network to entrants, while two-way access concerns the interconnection between networks. Whereas one-way access regulation is exclusively driven by containment of market power, two-way access is additionally affected by collusion possibilities. Among the numerous pricing rules discussed, none clearly dominates. This article provides a roadmap vis-a-vis the competing policy objectives for access price regulation.

249 citations

Book
29 Nov 1991
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors discuss the development in the Normative Economic Theory of Tariffs (NETT) and its application in the provision of telephone services in the United States.
Abstract: List of figures List of tables Acknowledgments Part I. Pricing and Telecommunications: 1. Introduction 2. Telecommunications production, costs, and pricing Part II. Recent Development in the Normative Economic Theory of Tariffs: 3. Types of tariffs 4. Linear tariffs 5. Nonlinear tariffs 6. Cost-based tariffs Part III. Telephone rate Structures in the United States: 7. Regulation and US retail rates 8. Optional calling plans 9. Business bulk-rate tariffs 10. Pricing of carrier services 11. Social tariffs Part IV. Synthesis: 12. Synthesis of theory and practice Appendix Bibliography Index Selected list of RAND books.

228 citations


Cited by
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Book
01 Jan 2007
TL;DR: A new era of theoretical computer science addresses fundamental problems about auctions, networks, and human behavior in a bid to solve the challenges of 21st Century finance.
Abstract: A new era of theoretical computer science addresses fundamental problems about auctions, networks, and human behavior.

1,994 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors emphasize the use of accounting data in regulatory or procurement contracts when the supplier has superior information about the cost of the project and invests in cost reduction, and the main result states that, under risk neutrality, the supplier announces an expected cost and is given an incentive contract linear in cost overruns.
Abstract: The paper emphasizes the use of accounting data in regulatory or procurement contracts when the supplier (1) has superior information about the cost of the project and (2) invests in cost reduction. The main result states that, under risk neutrality, the supplier announces an expected cost and is given an incentive contract linear in cost overruns. This (optimal) contract moves toward a fixed-price contract as the announced cost decreases. An investment choice is then introduced and the use of a rate-of-return regulation is studied.

1,278 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors proposed a mechanism in which the price the regulated firm receives depends on the costs of identical firms, and in equilibrium each firm chooses a socially efficient level of cost reduction.
Abstract: In the typical regulatory scheme a franchised monopoly has little incentive to reduce costs. This article proposes a mechanism in which the price the regulatedfirm receives depends on the costs of identical firms. In equilibrium each firm chooses a socially efficient level of cost reduction. The mechanism generalizes to cover heterogeneous firms with observable differences. Medicare's prospective reimbursement of hospitals by using diagnostically related groups is a scheme very similar to the one outlined here.

1,271 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The application of transaction cost economics to the study of governance is discussed in this article, where the authors present a sketch of the New Institutional Economics, with special emphasis on the "institutional environment" and "institutions of governance".
Abstract: This paper begins with a sketch of the New Institutional Economics, with special emphasis on the ‘institutional environment’ (North and others) and the ‘institutions of governance’ (Coase and others) Thereafter the paper mainly emphasizes the applications of transaction cost economics to the study of governance, the object being to effect an economizing alignment between transactions, which differ in their attributes, and governance structures (firms, markets, hybrids, bureaus), which differ in their cost and competence I raise a series of issues – phenomena of interest, describing human agents, describing firms, purposes served, scaling up – to which any would-be theory of the firm should be expected to speak and indicate how transaction cost economics responds to each I thereafter describe the mechanisms through which transaction cost economics is implemented and develop some of the core conceptual supports out of which it works Applications to public bureaus, strategic management, and intractable transactions are sketched

1,202 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The main models of innovation diffusion were established by 1970 as discussed by the authors, and the main categories of these modifications are: the introduction of marketing variables in the parameterisation of the models; generalising the models to consider innovations at different stages of diffusions in different countries; and generalizing the models by considering the diffusion of successive generations of technology.

728 citations