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Showing papers by "Ivana Marková published in 2009"


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: This analysis shows mental symptoms to be unstable constructs with implications for both correlational research and further theoretical exploration.
Abstract: Background and Methods: Psychiatric diagnosis is dependent on the identification of mental symptoms. On the assumption that they are ‘natural kinds’, the latter are routinely entered as correlational variables in empirical research. Published work on the philosophy of psychiatry has tended to concentrate on the concept of mental disorder or on individual symptoms but has given less attention to mental symptoms as a class. This paper deals specifically with the epistemology of mental symptoms, that is, with focusing on the nature of mental symptoms as a class of ‘objects’ and how the clinician gets to know them. In order to do this, mental symptoms can be explored from various perspectives, namely: (i) as types of objects, (ii) as structures, (iii) as definitions, (iv) as pockets of meanings, (v) as comprising constituents, (vi) as attractors in specific dialogical contexts, etc. In this paper, on account of space constraints, we deal only with the former 4 perspectives. Results and Conclusion: Our analysis shows mental symptoms to be unstable constructs with implications for both correlational research and further theoretical exploration.

70 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: It is proposed here that insight is best conceived as a mental state rather than symptom or symptom-dimension, and the clinical phenomenon of insight should be understood as independent of any underlying disease albeit influenced by it and by other factors.
Abstract: Analysis of insight in obsessive-compulsive disorders (OCD) raises conceptual problems that need addressing before meaningful empirical work can be undertaken. Insight and OCD are locked within a definitional contradiction relevant both to the nosological boundaries of OCD and the meaning of insight itself. Given that it is a form of self-knowledge, it is proposed here that insight is best conceived as a mental state rather than symptom or symptom-dimension. As an aspect of this mental state, the clinical phenomenon of insight should be understood as independent of any underlying disease albeit influenced by it and by other factors. As the focus of empirical research, the phenomenon of insight is dependent on the concept of insight, the measure by which it is assessed and on the 'object' of insight assessment. Explication of these factors allows for the delineation of specific insight phenomena whose respective usefulness can be determined by empirical research.

34 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: People who attended adult training centres were interviewed and most people felt that in the long-term the services did not make a positive contribution to their lives and wished for ordinary jobs.
Abstract: There is a continuing debate about the future of day services for people with mental handicaps. In this study people who attended adult training centres were interviewed to ascertain their views on their day placements. They were glad to have somewhere to go during the day and enjoyed elements of the daily programmes. However, most people felt that in the long-term the services did not make a positive contribution to their lives and wished for ordinary jobs.

7 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: People living in a mental handicap hospital were interviewed in order to discover their views on living there and every person interviewed wanted to leave the hospital and live in the community.
Abstract: In the controversy surrounding community care the opinions of people with mental handicaps themselves have rarely been heard. In this study people living in a mental handicap hospital were interviewed in order to discover their views on living there. They reported a large number of deficiencies with hospital life. Every person interviewed wanted to leave the hospital and live in the community.

5 citations


Book ChapterDOI
01 Jan 2009
TL;DR: Leudar and Costall as mentioned in this paper show how a single mind comes to realize that there are other minds and how, sooner or later, it starts imputing intentions to others and interacting with them.
Abstract: Many psychologists adopt a dogma they never question: if you want to learn something about the human mind, you must start with the cognition of the individual. Only then can you ask how that single mind comes to realize that there are other minds and how, sooner or later, it starts imputing intentions to others and interacting with them. Considering the dominant belief in the rationality of the individual and the cognitive power of the mind/brain, such dogma is of course a la mode. But dogmas, whether religious, ideological or scientific are not permanent and in the end they give rise to alternative perspectives. And the Theory of Mind is not an exception (cf. special issue in Theory & Psychology, guest editors Leudar and Costall, 2004a).

4 citations