J. C. Shaw

Bio: J. C. Shaw is an academic researcher from RAND Corporation. The author has contributed to research in topics: Theory & Adaptive reasoning. The author has an hindex of 10, co-authored 12 publications receiving 2796 citations.

The Processes of Creative Thinking

Abstract: : We ask first whether we need a theory of creative thinking distinct from a theory of problem solving. Subject to minor qualifications, we conclude there is no such need - that we call problem solving creative when the problems solved are relatively new and difficult. Next, we summarize what has been learned about problem solving by simulating certain human prblem solving pro cesses with digital computers. Finally, we indicate some of the differences in degree that might be observed in comparing relatively creative with relatively routine problem solving. (Author)

Chess-playing programs and the problem of complexity

Abstract: This paper traces the development of digital computer programs that play chess. The work of Shannon, Turing, the Los Alamos group, Bernstein, and the authors is treated in turn. The efforts to program chess provide an indication of current progress in understanding and constructing complex and intelligent mechanisms.

Empirical explorations of the logic theory machine: a case study in heuristic

Abstract: This paper is a case study in problem solving, representing part of a program of research on complex information-processing systems. We have specified a system for finding proofs of theorems in elementary symbolic logic, and by programming a computer to these specifications, have obtained empirical data on the problem-solving process in elementary logic. The program is called the Logic Theory Machine (LT); it was devised to learn how it is possible to solve difficult problems such as proving mathematical theorems, discovering scientific laws from data, playing chess, or understanding the meaning of English prose.

How people learn: Brain, mind, experience, and school.

Abstract: New developments in the science of learning science of learning overview mind and brain how experts differ from novices how children learn learning and transfer the learning environment curriculum, instruction and commnity effective teaching - examples in history, mathematics and science teacher learning technology to support learning conclusions from new developments in the science of learning.

The role of tutoring in problem solving

Abstract: THIS PAPER is concerned with the nature of the tutorial process; the means whereby an adult or \"expert\" helps somebody who is less adult or less expert. Though its aim is general, it is expressed in terms of a particular task: a tutor seeks to teach children aged 3, 4 and 5 yr to build a particular three-dimensional structure that requires a degree of skill that is initially beyond them. It is the usual type of tutoring situation in which one member \"knows the answer\" and the other does not, rather like a \"practical\" in which only the instructor \"knows how\". The changing interaction of tutor and children provide our data. A great deal of early problem solving by the developing child is of this order. Although from the earliest months of life he is a \"natural\" problem solver in his own right (e.g. Bruner, 1973) it is often the ease that his efforts are assisted and fostered by others who are more skilful than he is (Kaye, 1970). Whether he is learning the procedures that constitute the skills of attending, communicating, manipulating objects, locomoting, or, indeed, a more effective problem solving procedure itself, there are usually others in attendance who help him on his way. Tutorial interactions are, in short, a crucial feature of infancy and childhood. Our species, moreover, appears to be the only one in which any \"intentional\" tutoring goes on (Bruner, 1972; Hinde, 1971). For although it is true that many of the higher primate species learn by observation of their elders (Hamburg, 1968; van Lawick-Goodall, 1968), there is no evidence that those elders do anything to instruct their charges in the performance of the skill in question. What distinguishes man as a species is not only his capacity for learning, but for teaching as well. It is the main aim of this paper to examine some of the major implications of this interactive, instructional relationship between the developing child and his elders for the study of skill acquisition and problem solving. The acquisition of skill in the human child can be fruitfully conceived as a hierarchical program in which component skills are combined into \"higher skills\" by appropriate orchestration to meet new, more complex task requirements (Bruner, 1973). The process is analogous to problem solving in which mastery of \"lower order\" or constituent problems in a sine qua non for success with a larger jjroblcm, each level influencing the other—as with reading where the deciphering of words makes possible the deciphering of sentences, and sentences then aid in the deciphering of particular words (F. Smith, 1971). Given persistent intention in the young learner, given a \"lexicon\" of constituent skills, the crucial task is often one of com-

Some philosophical problems from the standpoint of artificial intelligence

Abstract: A computer program capable of acting intelligently in the world must have a general representation of the world in terms of which its inputs are interpreted. Designing such a program requires commitments about what knowledge is and how it is obtained. Thus, some of the major traditional problems of philosophy arise in artificial intelligence. More specifically, we want a computer program that decides what to do by inferring in a formal language that a certain strategy will achieve its assigned goal. This requires formalizing concepts of causality, ability, and knowledge. Such formalisms are also considered in philosophical logic. The first part of the paper begins with a philosophical point of view that seems to arise naturally once we take seriously the idea of actually making an intelligent machine. We go on to the notions of metaphysically and epistemo-logically adequate representations of the world and then to an explanation of can, causes, and knows in terms of a representation of the world by a system of interacting automata. A proposed resolution of the problem of freewill in a deterministic universe and of counterfactual conditional sentences is presented. The second part is mainly concerned with formalisms within which it can be proved that a strategy will achieve a goal. Concepts of situation, fluent, future operator, action, strategy, result of a strategy and knowledge are formalized. A method is given of constructing a sentence of first-order logic which will be true in all models of certain axioms if and only if a certain strategy will achieve a certain goal. The formalism of this paper represents an advance over McCarthy (1963) and Green (1969) in that it permits proof of the correctness of strategies that contain loops and strategies that involve the acquisition of knowledge; and it is also somewhat more concise. The third part discusses open problems in extending the formalism of part 2. The fourth part is a review of work in philosophical logic in relation to problems of artificial intelligence and a discussion of previous efforts to program ‘general intelligence’ from the point of view of this paper.

The social psychology of creativity: A componential conceptualization.

Abstract: Despite the clear importance of social and environmental' influences on creative performance, a social psychology of creativity is yet to be developed. Theory and research have focused almost exclusively on a personality approach to creativity and, to a lesser extent, a cognitive-abilities approach. Following a consideration of the definition and assessment of creativity, a componential framework for conceptualizing creativity is presented here. Including domain-relevant skills, creativity-relevant skills, and task motivation as a set of necessary and sufficient components of creativity, the framework describes the way in which cognitive abilities, personality characteristics, and social factors might contribute to different stages of the creative process. The discussion emphasizes the previously neglected social factors and highlights the contributions that a social psychology of creativity can make to a comprehensive view of creative performance. A striking feature of many phenomenological accounts of creativity is the degree to which outstandingly creative individuals feel influenced by social and environmental factors. In many cases, these factors are quite ordinary, mundane events; it appears that even seemingly insignificant features of the environment can be detrimental or conducive to creativity in some individuals. For example, in a letter to a friend, Tchaikovsky (1906) described the devastating effect that