In this exploratory article, we ask how states come to be understood as entities with particular spatial characteristics, and how changing relations between practices of government and national territories may be challenging long-established modes of state spatiality. In the first part of this article, we seek to identify two principles that are key to state spatialization: vertically (thestate is "above"society) andencompassm ent (thestate "encompasses" its localities). We use ethnographic evidence from a maternal health project in India to illustrate our argument that perceptions of verticality and encompassment are produced through routine bureaucratic practices. In the second part, we develop a concept of transnational governmentality as a way of grasping how new practices of government and new forms of "grassroots" politics may call into question the principles of vertical ity and encompassment that have long helped to legitimate and naturalize states' authority over "the local." [states, space, governmentality, globalization, neoliberalism, India, Africa] Recent years have seen a new level of anthropological concern with the modern

/pdf/spatializing-states-toward-an-ethnography-of-neoliberal-17uche94wu.pdf

Spatializing States: Toward an Ethnography of Neoliberal Governmentality

https://blogs.ubc.ca/lebillon/files/2015/01/ecowar.pdf

The political ecology of war: natural resources and armed conflicts

1. Introduction: institutions and ethnic politics Part I. Accounting for the Ethnic Cleavage Structure: 2. Accounting for Zambia's ethnic cleavage structure I: the emergence of tribal identities in colonial Northern Rhodesia 3. Accounting for Zambia's ethnic cleavage structure II: the emergence of language identities in colonial Northern Rhodesia Part II. Accounting for Ethnic Coalition-Building Choices: 4. Ethnicity and ethnic politics in post-independence Zambia 5. Explaining changing patterns of ethnic politics Part III. Testing the Model: 6. Competing explanations 7. Ethnic campaigning: testing the observable implications of the model for elite behavior 8. Ethnic voting: testing the observable implications of the model for mass behavior Part IV. Beyond Zambia: 9. Regime change and ethnic politics in Africa 10. Beyond regime change, beyond Africa Appendix A. Native authorities and tribal identifications Appendix B. Survey and focus group methodologies Appendix C. Tribal affiliations of parliamentary candidates Appendix D. Tribal demographies of electoral constituencies.

/pdf/institutions-and-ethnic-politics-in-africa-43ag877dp2.pdf

Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa

During much of the 1980s and 90s, a literature emerged suggesting that ‘developmental states’ were impossible in Africa. The arguments given ranged from cultural ones about the pervasive nature of clientalism to structural ones on the dependence of African economies or the atypical levels of rent seeking in African economies. This paper argues that Africa has had states that were ‘developmental’ in both their aspirations and economic performance. It further argues that these experiences need to be examined critically for useful lessons, an exercise that has been hindered by an excessive levelling of the African political and economic landscapes.

Thinking about developmental states in Africa

With an increased awareness of the detrimental effects of corruption on development, strategies to fight it are now a top priority in policy circles. Yet, in countries ridden with systemic corruption, few successes have resulted from the investment. On the basis of an interview study conducted in Kenya and Uganda—two arguably typically thoroughly corrupt countries—we argue that part of an explanation to why anticorruption reforms in countries plagued by widespread corruption fail is that they are based on a theoretical mischaracterization of the problem of systemic corruption. More specifically, the analysis reveals that while contemporary anticorruption reforms are based on a conceptualization of corruption as a principal–agent problem, in thoroughly corrupt settings, corruption rather resembles a collective action problem. This, in turn, leads to a breakdown of any anticorruption reform that builds on the principal–agent framework, taking the existence of noncorruptible so-called principals for granted.

/pdf/why-anticorruption-reforms-fail-systemic-corruption-as-a-3rof48xq31.pdf

Why Anticorruption Reforms Fail—Systemic Corruption as a Collective Action Problem

Introduction - transitions and continuities - the question of analysis. Part 1 The informalization of politics: whither the state? the illusions of civil society recycled elites. Part 2 The re-traditionalization of society: of masks and men - the question of identity the use and abuse of the irrational - witchcraft and religion warlords bosses and thugs - the profits of violence. Part 3 The productivity of economic "failure": the moral economy of corruption the bounties of dependence what if Africa refused to develop?. Conclusion - a new paradigm - the political instrumentalization of disorder.

J-P Daloz

Papers

Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument