J. Pastene

Bio: J. Pastene is an academic researcher from Centre national de la recherche scientifique. The author has contributed to research in topics: Motor imagery. The author has an hindex of 1, co-authored 1 publications receiving 366 citations.

The representing brain: Neural correlates of motor intention and imagery

Abstract: This paper concerns how motor actions are neurally represented and coded. Action planning and motor preparation can be studied using a specific type of representational activity, motor imagery. A close functional equivalence between motor imagery and motor preparation is suggested by the positive effects of imagining movements on motor learning, the similarity between the neural structures involved, and the similar physiological correlates observed in both imaging and preparing. The content of motor representations can be inferred from motor images at a macroscopic level, based on global aspects of the action (the duration and amount of effort involved) and the motor rules and constraints which predict the spatial path and kinematics of movements. A more microscopic neural account calls for a representation of object-oriented action. Object attributes are processed in different neural pathways depending on the kind of task the subject is performing. During object-oriented action, a pragmatic representation is activated in which object affordances are transformed into specific motor schemas (independently of other tasks such as object recognition). Animal as well as human clinical data implicate the posterior parietal and premotor cortical areas in schema instantiation. A mechanism is proposed that is able to encode the desired goal of the action and is applicable to different levels of representational organization.

The Brain's concepts: the role of the Sensory-motor system in conceptual knowledge

Abstract: Concepts are the elementary units of reason and linguistic meaning. They are conventional and relatively stable. As such, they must somehow be the result of neural activity in the brain. The questions are: Where? and How? A common philosophical position is that all concepts-even concepts about action and perception-are symbolic and abstract, and therefore must be implemented outside the brain's sensory-motor system. We will argue against this position using (1) neuroscientific evidence; (2) results from neural computation; and (3) results about the nature of concepts from cognitive linguistics. We will propose that the sensory-motor system has the right kind of structure to characterise both sensory-motor and more abstract concepts. Central to this picture are the neural theory of language and the theory of cogs, according to which, brain structures in the sensory-motor regions are exploited to characterise the so-called "abstract" concepts that constitute the meanings of grammatical constructions and general inference patterns.

The perception–behavior expressway: Automatic effects of social perception on social behavior.

Abstract: Publisher Summary This chapter discusses the functional relation between perception and behavior It presents a general perspective on perception and action along with elaborating the direct relation between perception and behavior and specifically on one consequence of this relation—namely, the imitation The chapter describes the core concepts of social perception Furthermore, the chapter examines all three forms of social perception that lead directly to corresponding overt behavioral tendencies The cognitive approach that has dominated psychology for over 30 years has changed psychology's perspective on perception Certainly, perception is essential for us to comprehend our environment but that does not mean that this understanding is an end in itself The chapter concludes with a discussion on the perception-behavior link from a functional perspective In specific, perception provides an understanding of the world Social perception refers to the activation of a perceptual representation, which generally has a direct effect on social behavior Perceptual inputs are translated automatically into corresponding behavioral outputs

Abnormalities in the awareness and control of action.

Abstract: Much of the functioning of the motor system occurs without awareness. Nevertheless, we are aware of some aspects of the current state of the system and we can prepare and make movements in the imagination. These mental representations of the actual and possible states of the system are based on two sources: sensory signals from skin and muscles, and the stream of motor commands that have been issued to the system. Damage to the neural substrates of the motor system can lead to abnormalities in the awareness of action as well as defects in the control of action. We provide a framework for understanding how these various abnormalities of awareness can arise. Patients with phantom limbs or with anosognosia experience the illusion that they can move their limbs. We suggest that these representations of movement are based on streams of motor commands rather than sensory signals. Patients with utilization behaviour or with delusions of control can no longer properly link their intentions to their actions. In these cases the impairment lies in the representation of intended movements. The location of the neural damage associated with these disorders suggests that representations of the current and predicted state of the motor system are in parietal cortex, while representations of intended actions are found in prefrontal and premotor cortex.