J. T. Wall

Bio: J. T. Wall is an academic researcher from University of Toledo Medical Center. The author has contributed to research in topics: Somatosensory system & Cuneate nucleus. The author has an hindex of 26, co-authored 40 publications receiving 4107 citations. Previous affiliations of J. T. Wall include Ohio University & Vanderbilt University.

Functional reorganization in somatosensory cortical areas 3b and 1 of adult monkeys after median nerve repair: possible relationships to sensory recovery in humans

Abstract: Previous studies have shown that the primary somatosensory cortex of adult mammals undergoes somatotopic reorganization in response to peripheral nerve transection. The present study assesses how cortical organization is affected when a transected nerve subsequently regenerates. The median nerve to one hand of adult owl monkeys was transected and repaired. Following nerve regeneration, the representations of the hand in cortical areas 3b and 1 were studied with neurophysiological mapping methods. The major results were as follows: Peripherally, median nerve transection, repair, and regeneration resulted in reinnervation of the median nerve skin territory. Centrally, both the initial loss and subsequent regeneration of median nerve inputs caused reorganizational changes in cortex. Reorganizational changes were specifically restricted to regions of the hand cortex where inputs from the median nerve were normally represented. The functional features of cortical regions that recovered tactile responsiveness from reinnervated skin regions were abnormal in several respects. Most notably, these regions contained recording sites with abnormally located or multiple cutaneous receptive fields, and contained major topographical changes, such as reestablishment of palmar pad or digit representations in small, discontinuous patches of cortex. Normal organizational features were reestablished to a more limited extent. These features included recovery of delimited, discrete receptive fields and reestablishment of topographic representations for localized skin areas. Different transformations in topographical organization were seen in areas 3b and 1 of the same monkey. These results suggest that nerve regeneration reestablishes the cortical capacity to process tactile information from reinnervated skin via a prolonged reorganizational process that appears dependent on peripheral and central factors. Cortical recovery mechanisms clearly appear to have limitations, since preinjury patterns of cortical organization are not widely recovered even almost 1 year after repair. We suggest possible relationships between cortical reorganizational changes in these primates, and postrepair sensory changes in humans.

Modular distribution of neurons with slowly adapting and rapidly adapting responses in area 3b of somatosensory cortex in monkeys.

Abstract: Recordings from the representations of the glabrous digits in area 3b of the somatosensory cortex of owl and macaque monkeys revealed two types of neurons Rapidly adapting (RA) neurons responded o

Distributed Hierarchical Processing in the Primate Cerebral Cortex

Abstract: In recent years, many new cortical areas have been identified in the macaque monkey. The number of identified connections between areas has increased even more dramatically. We report here on (1) a summary of the layout of cortical areas associated with vision and with other modalities, (2) a computerized database for storing and representing large amounts of information on connectivity patterns, and (3) the application of these data to the analysis of hierarchical organization of the cerebral cortex. Our analysis concentrates on the visual system, which includes 25 neocortical areas that are predominantly or exclusively visual in function, plus an additional 7 areas that we regard as visual-association areas on the basis of their extensive visual inputs. A total of 305 connections among these 32 visual and visual-association areas have been reported. This represents 31% of the possible number of pathways if each area were connected with all others. The actual degree of connectivity is likely to be closer to 40%. The great majority of pathways involve reciprocal connections between areas. There are also extensive connections with cortical areas outside the visual system proper, including the somatosensory cortex, as well as neocortical, transitional, and archicortical regions in the temporal and frontal lobes. In the somatosensory/motor system, there are 62 identified pathways linking 13 cortical areas, suggesting an overall connectivity of about 40%. Based on the laminar patterns of connections between areas, we propose a hierarchy of visual areas and of somatosensory/motor areas that is more comprehensive than those suggested in other recent studies. The current version of the visual hierarchy includes 10 levels of cortical processing. Altogether, it contains 14 levels if one includes the retina and lateral geniculate nucleus at the bottom as well as the entorhinal cortex and hippocampus at the top. Within this hierarchy, there are multiple, intertwined processing streams, which, at a low level, are related to the compartmental organization of areas V1 and V2 and, at a high level, are related to the distinction between processing centers in the temporal and parietal lobes. However, there are some pathways and relationships (about 10% of the total) whose descriptions do not fit cleanly into this hierarchical scheme for one reason or another. In most instances, though, it is unclear whether these represent genuine exceptions to a strict hierarchy rather than inaccuracies or uncertainities in the reported assignment.

A sensorimotor account of vision and visual consciousness-Authors' Response-Acting out our sensory experience

Abstract: Many current neurophysiological, psychophysical, and psychological approaches to vision rest on the idea that when we see, the brain produces an internal representation of the world. The activation of this internal representation is assumed to give rise to the experience of seeing. The problem with this kind of approach is that it leaves unexplained how the existence of such a detailed internal representation might produce visual consciousness. An alternative proposal is made here. We propose that seeing is a way of acting. It is a particular way of exploring the environment. Activity in internal representations does not generate the experience of seeing. The outside world serves as its own, external, representation. The experience of seeing occurs when the organism masters what we call the governing laws of sensorimotor contingency. The advantage of this approach is that it provides a natural and principled way of accounting for visual consciousness, and for the differences in the perceived quality of sensory experience in the different sensory modalities. Several lines of empirical evidence are brought forward in support of the theory, in particular: evidence from experiments in sensorimotor adaptation, visual \"filling in,\" visual stability despite eye movements, change blindness, sensory substitution, and color perception.

A sensorimotor account of vision and visual consciousness

Abstract: Many current neurophysiological, psychophysical, and psychological approaches to vision rest on the idea that when we see, the brain produces an internal representation of the world. The activation of this internal representation is assumed to give rise to the experience of seeing. The problem with this kind of approach is that it leaves unexplained how the existence of such a detailed internal representation might produce visual consciousness. An alternative proposal is made here. We propose that seeing is a way of acting. It is a particular way of exploring the environment. Activity in internal representations does not generate the experience of seeing. The outside world serves as its own, external, representation. The experience of seeing occurs when the organism masters what we call the governing laws of sensorimotor contingency. The advantage of this approach is that it provides a natural and principled way of accounting for visual consciousness, and for the differences in the perceived quality of sensory experience in the different sensory modalities. Several lines of empirical evidence are brought forward in support of the theory, in particular: evidence from experiments in sensorimotor adaptation, visual “filling in,” visual stability despite eye movements, change blindness, sensory substitution, and color perception.

The columnar organization of the neocortex.

Abstract: The modular organization of nervous systems is a widely documented principle of design for both vertebrate and invertebrate brains of which the columnar organization of the neocortex is an example. The classical cytoarchitectural areas of the neocortex are composed of smaller units, local neural circuits repeated iteratively within each area. Modules may vary in cell type and number, in internal and external connectivity, and in mode of neuronal processing between different large entities; within any single large entity they have a basic similarity of internal design and operation. Modules are most commonly grouped into entities by sets of dominating external connections. This unifying factor is most obvious for the heterotypical sensory and motor areas of the neocortex. Columnar defining factors in homotypical areas are generated, in part, within the cortex itself. The set of all modules composing such an entity may be fractionated into different modular subsets by different extrinsic connections. Linkages between them and subsets in other large entities form distributed systems. The neighborhood relations between connected subsets of modules in different entities result in nested distributed systems that serve distributed functions. A cortical area defined in classical cytoarchitectural terms may belong to more than one and sometimes to several distributed systems. Columns in cytoarchitectural areas located at some distance from one another, but with some common properties, may be linked by long-range, intracortical connections.

CORTICAL PLASTICITY: From Synapses to Maps

Abstract: It has been clear for almost two decades that cortical representations in adult animals are not fixed entities, but rather, are dynamic and are continuously modified by experience. The cortex can preferentially allocate area to represent the particular peripheral input sources that are proportionally most used. Alterations in cortical representations appear to underlie learning tasks dependent on the use of the behaviorally important peripheral inputs that they represent. The rules governing this cortical representational plasticity following manipulations of inputs, including learning, are increasingly well understood. In parallel with developments in the field of cortical map plasticity, studies of synaptic plasticity have characterized specific elementary forms of plasticity, including associative long-term potentiation and long-term depression of excitatory postsynaptic potentials. Investigators have made many important strides toward understanding the molecular underpinnings of these fundamental plasticity processes and toward defining the learning rules that govern their induction. The fields of cortical synaptic plasticity and cortical map plasticity have been implicitly linked by the hypothesis that synaptic plasticity underlies cortical map reorganization. Recent experimental and theoretical work has provided increasingly stronger support for this hypothesis. The goal of the current paper is to review the fields of both synaptic and cortical map plasticity with an emphasis on the work that attempts to unite both fields. A second objective is to highlight the gaps in our understanding of synaptic and cellular mechanisms underlying cortical representational plasticity.