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James Konow

Bio: James Konow is an academic researcher from Loyola Marymount University. The author has contributed to research in topics: Equity (economics) & Economic Justice. The author has an hindex of 18, co-authored 44 publications receiving 3588 citations. Previous affiliations of James Konow include University of Kiel & University of Gothenburg.

Papers
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Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors propose a theory of decision making that attempts to elucidate the roles of fairness, self-interest, and selfdeception in the allocation of economic rewards.
Abstract: Everyone has observed people invoking fairness arguments in defense of their opinions or actions, and it is not uncommon for such arguments to be wielded on both sides of an issue about which views conflict. For example, during a televised debate Representative Charles B. Rangel said, “I think [Affirmative Action] has to involve a search for fairness,” whereas commentator Avi Nelson opined that “you promote more unfairness than fairness when you depart from the basic criterion, which is that individuals should be treated as individuals” (Annenberg/CPB Collection, 1984). On the 1986 tax reform legislation, Senator Robert Packwood stated: “Taxes are about more than money and they’re about more than economics. They’re about fairness, and this bill is fair,” whereas Senator Carl M. Levin argued: “For our economy, this is the wrong bill at the wrong time ... making deficit reduction more difficult and less fair” (Los Angeles Times, September 28, 1986 pp. A1, A8). Such cases contribute to the frequent conclusion that justice is merely a ploy, a vacuous concept used opportunistically by selfinterested and self-serving agents. If fairness arguments were sheer subterfuge, however, it would be difficult to account for their use at all, let alone their frequent use or earnest consideration by others. That they have at least occasional impact on outcomes may be inferred from the very fact that they are advanced. Those who take justice seriously also claim more direct evidence of its effects on legal proceedings, government regulatory and taxation policies, wage and benefit structures in the workplace, results of bargaining experiments in the laboratory, and even pricing policies in the market (e.g., Daniel Kahneman et al., 1986b; R. Mark Isaac et al., 1991; H. Peyton Young, 1994; Linda Babcock et al., 1995). On the other hand, the ostensibly self-serving manipulation of fairness arguments also presents a problem for proponents of justice and defenders of its importance in social interaction. If people value equity so highly that they make personal sacrifices for its sake, how is it that they also apparently distort it for their own selfish ends? Although most studies of bargaining behavior suggest nontrivial deviations from narrow self-interest (e.g., Werner Güth et al., 1982; Alvin E. Roth et al., 1991), some of these same studies reject the “fairness hypothesis” that fairness alone accounts for this behavior (e.g., Gary E. Bolton, 1991; Robert Forsythe et al., 1994). This paper proposes and tests a theory of decision making that attempts to elucidate the roles of fairness, self-interest, and selfdeception in the allocation of economic rewards. Fairness is treated as a genuine value, but there also exists an incentive and a potential for changing beliefs about it. This suggests an explanation for why arguments about it are advanced and considered, but sometimes conflict, as in the affirmative action and taxation examples cited earlier. In addition to the standard “material utility” from the agent’s own allocation of a good, the theory integrates concepts of fairness and cognitive dissonance into the objective function. When the decision maker has * Department of Economics, Loyola Marymount University, 7900 Loyola Boulevard, Los Angeles, CA 90045. The author gratefully acknowledges the helpful comments and suggestions of two anonymous referees of this Review and of Reinhard Selten, Werner Güth, Gabriel Fuentes, Gary Biglaiser, and of seminar participants at the University of Bonn, the University of Arizona, Humboldt University, and the 1997 Economic Science Association meetings. I also thank Tim Cason, John Conlisk, Joseph Earley, Zaki Eusufzai, Gabriel Fuentes, and Petra Konow for their advice or assistance conducting the experiments, and the LMU Research Committee and College of Liberal Arts for financial support. Any remaining errors are, of course, my own. 1 Material utility is what is meant when (narrow) selfinterest or selfishness are mentioned in this paper. Of course, if fairness is assumed to be a goal of the agent, one may argue that it is in his or her self-interest to be, to some

824 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors evaluate various positive and normative theories of justice in terms of how accurately they describe the impartial fairness preferences of real people, and they propose and defend an integrated justice theory based on preferences over four distinct and sometimes conflicting forces.
Abstract: This paper evaluates numerous positive and normative theories of justice in positive terms, i.e., in terms of how accurately they describe the impartial fairness preferences of real people. In addition, the paper proposes and defends an integrated justice theory based on preferences over four distinct and sometimes conflicting forces. These forces frame the analysis of the individual theories and inspire four corresponding theoretical classes: equality and need, utilitarianism and welfare economics, equity and desert, and context. This synthesis enables one to treat justice rigorously and to reconcile results that often appear contradictory or at odds with alternative theories.

798 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors present a positive theory of economic fairness which strives for generality by characterizing the fairness values which people share across differing contexts and attempt to isolate these underlying values from more situation-specific perceptual effects (e.g., framing effects) which may have an impact on reported fairness.
Abstract: This paper presents a positive theory of economic fairness which strives for generality by characterizing the fairness values which people share across differing contexts. The study attempts to isolate these underlying values from the more situation-specific perceptual effects (e.g., framing effects) which may have an impact on reported fairness. Central to the proposed theory is the Accountability Principle which, roughly speaking, requires that a person's fair allocation (e.g., of income) vary in proportion to the relevant variables which he can influence (e.g., work effort), but not according to those which he cannot reasonably influence (e.g., a physical handicap). The results of telephone interviews and written questionnaires are presented in support of the theory.

277 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors report the results from the first experiment to study fairness views about risk-taking, where the main aim is to examine whether people's fairness considerations mainly focus on ex ante opportunities or ex post outcomes.
Abstract: Choices involving risk significantly affect the distribution of income and wealth in society, but there is probably no more contentious question of justice than how to allocate the gains and losses that inevitably result from risky choices. This paper reports the results from the first experiment, to our knowledge, to study fairness views about risk-taking, where the main aim is to examine whether people's fairness considerations mainly focus on ex ante opportunities or ex post outcomes. The experiment was a two stage dictator game where the distribution phase was preceded by a risk-taking phase. Our analysis provides four main findings. First, we show that even though many participants focus exclusively on ex ante opportunities, the majority favors some redistribution ex post. Second, we find that, among the participants who redistribute ex post, a substantial share make a distinction between ex post inequalities that reflect differences in luck and ex post inequalities that reflect differences in choices. Third, we show that the appeal of the ex ante view is independent of how costly it is to avoid exposure to risk. Fourth, we find that the choices of stakeholders and impartial spectators reflect the same set of fairness considerations.

262 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, a positive theory of distributive justice, in a framework of inequity aversion, that depends on three general justice principles and context, is proposed, and results from telephone interviews and written questionnaires are presented in support of the theory.
Abstract: Recent theoretical progress on inequity has left unresolved the crucial question of what constitutes equity. This paper proposes a positive theory of distributive justice, in a framework of inequity aversion, that depends on three general justice principles and context. The current study challenges the view of many previous inquiries that justice is context-specific and instead advances a theory in which justice is context-dependent: context matters, not because of the lack of general principles of justice, but due to its effect on the interpretation of those principles. Results from telephone interviews and written questionnaires are presented in support of the theory.

252 citations


Cited by
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Book
01 Jan 2009

8,216 citations

Journal Article
TL;DR: Thaler and Sunstein this paper described a general explanation of and advocacy for libertarian paternalism, a term coined by the authors in earlier publications, as a general approach to how leaders, systems, organizations, and governments can nudge people to do the things the nudgers want and need done for the betterment of the nudgees, or of society.
Abstract: NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS by Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein Penguin Books, 2009, 312 pp, ISBN 978-0-14-311526-7This book is best described formally as a general explanation of and advocacy for libertarian paternalism, a term coined by the authors in earlier publications. Informally, it is about how leaders, systems, organizations, and governments can nudge people to do the things the nudgers want and need done for the betterment of the nudgees, or of society. It is paternalism in the sense that "it is legitimate for choice architects to try to influence people's behavior in order to make their lives longer, healthier, and better", (p. 5) It is libertarian in that "people should be free to do what they like - and to opt out of undesirable arrangements if they want to do so", (p. 5) The built-in possibility of opting out or making a different choice preserves freedom of choice even though people's behavior has been influenced by the nature of the presentation of the information or by the structure of the decisionmaking system. I had never heard of libertarian paternalism before reading this book, and I now find it fascinating.Written for a general audience, this book contains mostly social and behavioral science theory and models, but there is considerable discussion of structure and process that has roots in mathematical and quantitative modeling. One of the main applications of this social system is economic choice in investing, selecting and purchasing products and services, systems of taxes, banking (mortgages, borrowing, savings), and retirement systems. Other quantitative social choice systems discussed include environmental effects, health care plans, gambling, and organ donations. Softer issues that are also subject to a nudge-based approach are marriage, education, eating, drinking, smoking, influence, spread of information, and politics. There is something in this book for everyone.The basis for this libertarian paternalism concept is in the social theory called "science of choice", the study of the design and implementation of influence systems on various kinds of people. The terms Econs and Humans, are used to refer to people with either considerable or little rational decision-making talent, respectively. The various libertarian paternalism concepts and systems presented are tested and compared in light of these two types of people. Two foundational issues that this book has in common with another book, Network of Echoes: Imitation, Innovation and Invisible Leaders, that was also reviewed for this issue of the Journal are that 1 ) there are two modes of thinking (or components of the brain) - an automatic (intuitive) process and a reflective (rational) process and 2) the need for conformity and the desire for imitation are powerful forces in human behavior. …

3,435 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
G. W. Smith1

1,991 citations

Book
John E. Roemer1
01 Jan 1998
TL;DR: The modern formulation of equality of opportunity emerges from discussions in political philosophy from the second half of the twentieth century beginning with Rawls (1971) and Dworkin, 1981a, DworkIN, 1981b,.
Abstract: The modern formulation of equality of opportunity emerges from discussions in political philosophy from the second half of the twentieth century beginning with Rawls (1971) and Dworkin, 1981a , Dworkin, 1981b . Equality of opportunity exists when policies compensate individuals with disadvantageous circumstances so that outcomes experienced by a population depend only on factors for which persons can be considered to be responsible. Importantly, inequality of opportunity for income exists when individuals’ incomes are in some important part determined by the educational achievement and income of the families that raised them. We review the philosophical debates referred to, commenting upon them from an economist's viewpoint. We propose several ways of modeling equality (or inequality) of opportunity, pointing out that an equal-opportunity ethic implies a non-welfarist way of ranking social outcomes. We propose that economic development should be conceived of as the equalization of opportunities for income in a country. We consider equalization of opportunity from a dynamic viewpoint, and we review popular attitudes with regard to distributive justice, showing that there is substantial popular support for an equal-opportunity ethic. We discuss the empirical issues that emerge in measuring inequality of opportunity and provide a review of the empirical literature that measures degrees of inequality of opportunity for the achievement of various objectives, in various countries.

1,590 citations

MonographDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors measure social norms and preferences using experimental games and find substantial variation among social groups in Bargaining and Public Goods Behavior in an Egalitarian Society of Hunter-Gatherers.
Abstract: 1. Introduction and Guide to the Volume 2. Overview and Synthesis 3. Measuring Social Norms and Preferences Using Experimental Games: A Guide for Social Sciences 4. Coalitional Effects on Reciprocal Fairness in the Ultimatum Game: A Case from the Ecuadorian Amazon 5. Comparative Experimental Evidence from Machiguenga, Mapuche, Huinca, and American Populations Shows Substantial Variation Among Social Groups in Bargaining and Public Goods Behavior 6. Dictators and Ultimatums in an Egalitarian Society of Hunter-Gatherers - the Hadza of Tanzania 7. Does Market Exposure Affect Economic Game Behavior? The Ultimatum Game and the Public Goods Game Among the Tsimane of Bolivia 8. Market Integration, Reciprocity, and Fairness in Rural Papua New Guinea: Results from a Two-Village Ultimatum Game Experiment 9. Ultimatum Game with an Ethnicity Manipulation: Results from Khovdiin Bulgan Sum, Mongolia 10. Kinship, Familiarity, and Trust: An Experimental Investigation 11. Community Structure, Mobility, and the Strength of Norms in an Africa Society: the Sangu of Tanzania 12. Market Integration and Fairness: Evidence from Ultimatum, Dictator, and Public Goods Experiments in East Africa 13. Economic Experiments to Examine Fairness and Cooperation among the Ache Indians of Paraguay 14. The Ultimatum Game, Fairness, and Cooperation among Big Game Hunters

1,361 citations