/pdf/studies-of-interference-in-serial-verbal-reactions-59nk8objh0.pdf

Studies of interference in serial verbal reactions.

The literature on interference in the Stroop Color-Word Task, covering over 50 years and some 400 studies, is organized and reviewed. In so doing, a set of 18 reliable empirical finding is isolated that must be captured by any successful theory of the Stroop effect. Existing theoretical positions are summarized and evaluated in view of this critical evidence and the 2 major candidate theories ―relative speed of processing and automaticity of reading― are found to be wanting. It is concluded that recent theories placing the explanatory weight on parallel processing of the irrelevant and the relevant dimensions are likely to be more sucessful than are earlier theories attempting to locate a single bottleneck in attention

/pdf/half-a-century-of-research-on-the-stroop-effect-an-31uxjoznng.pdf

Half a century of research on the Stroop effect: an integrative review.

In this article we present a standardized set of 260 pictures for use in experiments investigating differences and similarities in the processing of pictures and words. The pictures are black-and-white line drawings executed according to a set of rules that provide consistency of pictorial representation. The pictures have been standardized on four variables of central relevance to memory and cognitive processing: name agreement, image agreement, familiarity, and visual complexity. The intercorrelations among the four measures were low, suggesting that they are indices of different attributes of the pictures. The concepts were selected to provide exemplars from several widely studied semantic categories. Sources of naming variance, and mean familiarity and complexity of the exemplars, differed significantly across the set of categories investigated. The potential significance of each of the normative variables to a number of semantic and episodic memory tasks is discussed.

/pdf/a-standardized-set-of-260-pictures-norms-for-name-agreement-538pmnf0w6.pdf

A standardized set of 260 pictures: Norms for name agreement, image agreement, familiarity, and visual complexity.

https://psycnet.apa.org/journals/rev/88/5/375.pdf

An interactive activation model of context effects in letter perception: I. An account of basic findings.

People often have trouble performing 2 relatively simple tasks concurrently. The causes of this interference and its implications for the nature of attentional limitations have been controversial for 40 years, but recent experimental findings are beginning to provide some answers. Studies of the psychological refractory period effect indicate a stubborn bottleneck encompassing the process of choosing actions and probably memory retrieval generally, together with certain other cognitive operations. Other limitations associated with task preparation, sensory-perceptual processes, and timing can generate additional and distinct forms of interference. These conclusions challenge widely accepted ideas about attentional resources and probe reaction time methodologies. They also suggest new ways of thinking about continuous dual-task performance, effects of extraneous stimulation (e.g., stop signals), and automaticity. Implications for higher mental processes are discussed.

https://psycnet.apa.org/journals/bul/116/2/220.pdf

Dual-task interference in simple tasks: Data and theory.

The time it takes to see and name objects

Mental states correspond to physical changes in the brain. The object of this paper is to inquire into the time needed to bring about changes in the brain, and thus to determine the rapidity of thought. When waves in the luminiferous ether of a particular length strike the retina a red light is seen, but a certain time passes after the waves have struck the retina before the light is seen: (1) It takes time for the light waves to work on the retina, and generate in the cells a nervous impulse corresponding to the nature of the light; (2) it takes time for the nervous impulse to be conveyed along the optic nerve to the brain; (3) it takes time for the nervous impulse to be conveyed through the brain to the visual centre; and (4) it takes time for the nervous impulse to bring about changes in the visual centre corresponding to its own nature, and consequently to the nature of the external stimulus. When these changes are brought about a red light is seen. It does not take any time for a sensation or perception to arise after the proper changes in the brain have been brought about. The sensation of a red light is a state of consciousness corresponding to a certain condition of the brain. The chemical changes in a galvanic battery take time, but after they are brought about, no additional time is needed to produce the electric current. The current is the product of chemical changes in the battery, but at the same time the immediate representative of these changes; and the relation is so far analogous between states of consciousness and changes in the brain. Again, as it takes time to see a light, so it takes time to make a motion. Changes in the brain, the origin and nature of which we do not understand (physiologically they are part of the continuous life of the brain, mentally they are often given in continuous life of the brain, mentally they are often given in consciousness as a will-impulse), excite the centre for the coordination of motions. The impulse there developed is conveyed through the brain (and it may be spinal cord) to a motor nerve, and along the nerve to the muscle, which is contracted in accordance with the will-impulse. We have here in the reverse direction the same four periods as in the case of a stimulus giving rise to a sensation. In each case there is the latent period in the sense-organ or muscle, the centripetal or centrifugal time in the nerve, the centripetal or centrifugal time in the brain, and the time of growing energy in the sensory or motor centre. Besides these [p. 221] two classes of processes, the one centripetal, the other centrifugal, there are centrimanent cerebral operations, some of which are given in consciousness, and make up the mental life of thought and feeling. These cerebral changes all take time, and, as I shall show, the times can in many cases be determined.

James McKeen Cattell

Papers

The time it takes to see and name objects

The time taken up by cerebral operations

Experiments on the Association of Ideas

Mental association investigated by experiment

Ii.—the psychological laboratory at leipsic