Bio: Jan Wind is an academic researcher. The author has contributed to research in topics: Sociobiology & Reciprocal altruism. The author has an hindex of 4, co-authored 6 publications receiving 143 citations.
TL;DR: Cultural selectionism is a Darwinian approach to the understanding of human culture which, in constrast to sociobiology, holds that cultural evolution proceeds solely on the phenotypic level.
Abstract: Cultural selectionism is a Darwinian approach to the understanding of human culture which, in constrast to sociobiology, holds that cultural evolution proceeds solely on the phenotypic level. Unlike structuralism, cultural selectionism predicts that the form taken by any culture will reflect historical processes rather than underlying, genetically induced biases of the human mind. Genetic selection, however, must be invoked to explain both the origin of the human capacity for culture and the maintenance of this genetic capacity in modern humans. Both the origin and the maintenance of the genetic capacity for culture in humans are most realistically modeled if we assume that culture is fundamentally an adaptation to the social, as opposed to the natural, environment.
TL;DR: Hallowell's approach permits the building of a thrid but complementary explanation based on selection for the ability to internalize others and to attend to their representations even in the absence of their prototypes.
Abstract: A. I. Hallowell tried to turn anthropology towards a sociobiology while the former field was still strongly opposed to any consideration of the evolution of human behavior. His work is of more than historical interest, however, because he stressed the evolution of the human ability to internalize social norms and evaluate self and others in terms of them. This ability is the basis of our species's trait of cultural rather than biological adaptation to diverse ecological settings. Sociobiologists have dealt with the evolution of norm acquisition under the rubric of "altruism." Insofar as adherence to norms either directly increases the fitnes of kin (kin selection) or indirectly increases the fitness of all participants (reciprocal altruism), both Hamilton and Trivers have offered explanations for adherence to social norms. Hallowell's approach permits the building of a thrid but complementary explanation based on selection for the ability to internalize others and to attend to their representations even i...
TL;DR: The history of study of the relationships of extant hominoids and many of the morphological and other criteria upon which theories of relatedness have been based are reviewed, thereby eliminating inconsistencies in present interpretations of hominoid evolution.
Abstract: I review here the history of study of the relationships of extant hominoids (humans and apes) and many of the morphological and other (e.g., molecular, biochemical, and chromosomal) criteria upon which theories of relatedness have been based. Few morphological features emerge as uniting humans and one or both of the African apes, and, contrary to popular opinion, the nonmorphological data do not support a human-African-ape theory of relatedness to the exclusion of other hypotheses. Most phylogenetically significant characters are shared by humans and the orangutan. Many of the morphologies uniting a hominid-orangutan clade also subsume the controversial Sivapithecus, thereby eliminating inconsistencies in present interpretations of hominoid evolution.
TL;DR: The psychology of fear, serpent phobia, various expressions of serpent veneration, the innate qualities of serpents which incite these attitudes, and the general question of animals which are ''bons a penser'' fall in a special category as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: communities. Caras (p. 25) states that \"many people who have spent their lifetimes within the range of this powerful predator have never seen one.\" This can hardly be said of venomous reptiles, as the mortality statistics of Mexico and Central and South America amply prove (Swaroop and Grab 1954). Serov raises some interesting points, but they are irrelevant to the main theme and immediate goals of my article. I find his mention of psychological criteria, considered at various levels of abstraction, very agreeable, particularly in dealing with the ophiolatrous attitudes of peoples in geographical regions where the threat posed bv venomous reptiles is rare or nonexistent. The psychology of fear, serpent phobia, various expressions of serpent veneration, the innate qualities of serpents which incite these attitudes, and the general question of animals which are \"bons a penser\" fall in a special category. I have discussed these aspects at length in an article expected to be published elsewhere.
TL;DR: The Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus as mentioned in this paper is a remarkable and strikingly original work which is published in German and English in parallel pages and it is difficult to appreciate the reason for this, seeing that the author is evidently familiar with our language and has himself carefully revised the proofs of the translation.
Abstract: 13 EADERS of Mr. Bertrand Russell's philosophical £v works know that one of his pupils before the outbreak of the war, an Austrian, Mr. Ludwig Wittgenstein, caused him to change his views in some important particulars. Curiosity can now be satisfied. The “Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus “which Mr. Ogden has included in his new library of philosophy is a remarkable and strikingly original work. It is published in German and English in parallel pages. It is difficult to appreciate the reason for this, seeing that the author is evidently familiar with our language and has himself carefully revised the proofs of the translation. Also we should have liked to have the Tractatus without Mr. Russell's Introduction, not, we hasten to add, on account of any fault or shortcoming in that introduction, which is highly appreciative and in part a defence of himself, in part explanatory of the author, but for the reason that good wine needs no bush and that Mr. Russell's bush has the unfortunate effect of dulling the palate instead of whetting the appetite. In his penultimate sentence Mr. Russell says; “To have constructed a theory of logic which is not at any point obviously wrong is to have achieved a work of extraordinary difficulty and importance.” We agree, but how uninspiring when compared with Mr. Wittgenstein's own statement of aim: “What can be said at all can be said clearly, and whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.” Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. By Ludwig Wittgenstein. (International Library of Psychology, Philosophy and Scientific Method.) Pp. 189. (London: Kegan Paul and Co., Ltd.; New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., Inc., 1922.) 10s. 6d. net.
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TL;DR: In this article, the problem of post-processual archaeology has been addressed and an ethnohistoric example: reconsideration of ethnoarchaeology and middle range theory.
Abstract: Preface to the first edition Preface to the second edition 1. The problem 2. The systems approach 3. Structuralist archaeology 4. Marxist archaeology, ideology and practice 5. Archaeology and history 6. An ethnohistoric example: reconsideration of ethnoarchaeology and middle range theory 7. Contextual archaeology 8. Post-processual archaeology 9. Conclusion: archaeology as archaeology Bibliography Index.
TL;DR: The human psyche appears to consist of a large number of mechanisms, many or most of which are special purpose and domain-specific as mentioned in this paper, and the output of these mechanisms taken together constitutes the private culture of each individual, and the interactions of these private cultures lead to the cross-individual patterns of similarity that have led anthropologists to think typologically of social groups as having "a" culture.
TL;DR: A “thought experiment” is employed to demonstrate that neither side of the sociobiology debate is justified in dismissing the arguments of the other.
Abstract: Most social scientists would agree that the capacity for human culture was probably fashioned by natural selection, but they disagree about the implications of this supposition. Some believe that natural selection imposes important constraints on the ways in which culture can vary, while others believe that any such constraints must be negligible. This paper employs a “thought experiment” to demonstrate that neither of these positions can be justified by appeal to general properties of culture or of evolution. Natural selection can produce mechanisms of cultural transmission that are neither adaptive nor consistent with the predictions of acultural evolutionary models (those ignoring cultural evolution). On the other hand, natural selection can also produce mechanisms of cultural transmission that are highly consistent with acultural models. Thus, neither side of the sociobiology debate is justified in dismissing the arguments of the other. Natural selection may impose significant constraints on some human behaviors, but negligible constraints on others. Models of simultaneous genetic/cultural evolution will be useful in identifying domains in which acultural evolutionary models are, and are not, likely to be useful.