Jannik Peters

Bio: Jannik Peters is an academic researcher from Hasso Plattner Institute. The author has contributed to research in topics: Computer science & Matching (statistics). The author has an hindex of 1, co-authored 7 publications receiving 1 citations. Previous affiliations of Jannik Peters include Technical University of Berlin & University of Potsdam.

Mixed Integer Programming versus Evolutionary Computation for Optimizing a Hard Real-World Staff Assignment Problem

Abstract: Assigning staff to engagements according to hard constraints while optimizing several objectives is a task encountered by many companies on a regular basis. Simplified versions of such assignment problems are NP-hard. Despite this, a typical approach to solving them consists of formulating them as mixed integer programming (MIP) problems and using a stateof-the-art solver to get solutions that closely approximate the optimum.In this paper, we consider a complex real-world staff assignment problem encountered by the professional service company KPMG, with the goal of finding an algorithm that solves it faster and with a better solution than a commercial MIP solver. We follow the evolutionary algorithm (EA) metaheuristic and design a search heuristic which iteratively improves a solution using domain-specific mutation operators. Furthermore, we use a flow algorithm to optimally solve a subproblem, which tremendously reduces the search space for the EA.For our real-world instance of the assignment problem, given the same total time budget of 100 hours, a parallel EA approach finds a solution that is only 1.7% away from an upper bound for the (unknown) optimum within under five hours, while the MIP solver Gurobi still has a gap of 10.5%.

Proportionality in Approval-Based Participatory Budgeting

Abstract: The ability to measure the satisfaction of (groups of) voters is a crucial prerequisite for formulating proportionality axioms in approval-based participatory budgeting elections. Two common -- but very different -- ways to measure the satisfaction of a voter consider (i) the number of approved projects and (ii) the total cost of approved projects, respectively. In general, it is difficult to decide which measure of satisfaction best reflects the voters' true utilities. In this paper, we study proportionality axioms with respect to large classes of approval-based satisfaction functions. We establish logical implications among our axioms and related notions from the literature, and we ask whether outcomes can be achieved that are proportional with respect to more than one satisfaction function. We show that this is impossible for the two commonly used satisfaction functions when considering proportionality notions based on extended justified representation, but achievable for a notion based on proportional justified representation. For the latter result, we introduce a strengthening of priceability and show that it is satisfied by several polynomial-time computable rules, including the Method of Equal Shares and Phragmén's sequential rule.

Approval-Based Voting with Mixed Goods

Abstract: We consider a voting scenario in which the resource to be voted upon may consist of both indivisible and divisible goods. This generalizes both the well-studied model of multiwinner voting and the recently introduced model of cake sharing. Under approval votes, we propose two variants of the extended justified representation (EJR) notion from multiwinner voting, a stronger one called EJR for mixed goods (EJR-M) and a weaker one called EJR up to 1 (EJR-1). We extend three multiwinner voting rules to our setting—GreedyEJR, the method of equal shares (MES), and proportional approval voting (PAV)—and show that while all three generalizations satisfy EJR-1, only the first one provides EJR-M. In addition, we derive tight bounds on the proportionality degree implied by EJR-M and EJR-1, and investigate the proportionality degree of our proposed rules.

Robust and Verifiable Proportionality Axioms for Multiwinner Voting

Abstract: When selecting a subset of candidates (a so-called committee) based on the preferences of voters, proportional representation is often a major desideratum. When going beyond simplistic models such as party-list or district-based elections, it is surprisingly challenging to capture proportionality formally. As a consequence, the literature has produced numerous competing criteria of when a selected committee qualifies as proportional. Two of the most prominent notions are proportionality for solid coalitions (PSC) [Dummett, 1984] and extended justified representation (EJR) [Aziz et al., 2017]. Both definitions guarantee proportional representation to groups of voters with very similar preferences; such groups are referred to as solid coalitions by Dummett and as cohesive groups by Aziz et al. However, they lose their bite when groups are only almost solid or cohesive.

A Note on Rules Achieving Optimal Metric Distortion

Abstract: In this note, we uncover three connections between the metric distortion problem and voting methods and axioms from the social choice literature.

What's Wrong with Deep Learning in Tree Search for Combinatorial Optimization

Abstract: Combinatorial optimization lies at the core of many real-world problems. Especially since the rise of graph neural networks (GNNs), the deep learning community has been developing solvers that derive solutions to NP-hard problems by learning the problem-specific solution structure. However, reproducing the results of these publications proves to be difficult. We make three contributions. First, we present an open-source benchmark suite for the NP-hard Maximum Independent Set problem, in both its weighted and unweighted variants. The suite offers a unified interface to various state-of-the-art traditional and machine learning-based solvers. Second, using our benchmark suite, we conduct an in-depth analysis of the popular guided tree search algorithm by Li et al. [NeurIPS 2018], testing various configurations on small and large synthetic and real-world graphs. By re-implementing their algorithm with a focus on code quality and extensibility, we show that the graph convolution network used in the tree search does not learn a meaningful representation of the solution structure, and can in fact be replaced by random values. Instead, the tree search relies on algorithmic techniques like graph kernelization to find good solutions. Thus, the results from the original publication are not reproducible. Third, we extend the analysis to compare the tree search implementations to other solvers, showing that the classical algorithmic solvers often are faster, while providing solutions of similar quality. Additionally, we analyze a recent solver based on reinforcement learning and observe that for this solver, the GNN is responsible for the competitive solution quality.

The (Computational) Social Choice Take on Indivisible Participatory Budgeting

Abstract: In this survey, we review the literature investigating participatory budgeting as a social choice problem. Participatory Budgeting (PB) is a democratic process in which citizens are asked to vote on how to allocate a given amount of public money to a set of projects. From a social choice perspective, it corresponds then to the problem of aggregating opinions about which projects should be funded, into a budget allocation satisfying a budget constraint. This problem has received substantial attention in recent years and the literature is growing at a fast pace. In this survey, we present the most important research directions from the literature, each time presenting a large set of representative results. We only focus on the indivisible case, that is, PB problems in which projects can either be fully funded or not at all. The aim of the survey is to present a comprehensive overview of the state of the research on PB. We aim at providing both a general overview of the main research questions that are being investigated, and formal and unified definitions of the most important technical concepts from the literature. Of course a survey is never complete as the state of the research keeps changing. This document is intended to be a living document that gets updated every now and then as the literature grows. If you feel that some papers are not presented correctly, or simply missing, feel free to contact us. We will be more than happy to correct it.

Best of Both Distortion Worlds

Abstract: We study the problem of designing voting rules that take as input the ordinal preferences of n agents over a set of n alternatives and output a single alternative, aiming to optimize the overall happiness of the agents. The input to the voting rule is each agent's ranking of the alternatives from most to least preferred, yet the agents have more refined (cardinal) preferences that capture the intensity with which they prefer one alternative over another. To quantify the extent to which voting rules can optimize over the cardinal preferences given access only to the ordinal ones, prior work has used the distortion measure, i.e., the worst-case approximation ratio between a voting rule's performance and the best performance achievable given the cardinal preferences. The work on the distortion of voting rules has been largely divided into two "worlds": utilitarian distortion and metric distortion. In the former, the cardinal preferences of the agents correspond to general utilities and the goal is to maximize a normalized social welfare. In the latter, the agents' cardinal preferences correspond to costs given by distances in an underlying metric space and the goal is to minimize the (unnormalized) social cost. Several deterministic and randomized voting rules have been proposed and evaluated for each of these worlds separately, gradually improving the achievable distortion bounds, but none of the known voting rules perform well in both worlds simultaneously. In this work, we prove that one can in fact achieve the "best of both worlds" by designing new voting rules, both deterministic and randomized, that simultaneously achieve near-optimal distortion guarantees in both distortion worlds. We also prove that this positive result does not generalize to the case where the voting rule is provided with the rankings of only the top-t alternatives of each agent, for t < m, and study the extent to which such best-of-both-worlds guarantees can be achieved.

Truthful Fair Mechanisms for Allocating Mixed Divisible and Indivisible Goods

Abstract: We study the problem of designing truthful and fair mechanisms when allocating a mixture of divisible and indivisible goods. We first show that there does not exist an EFM (envy-free for mixed goods) and truthful mechanism in general. This impossibility result holds even if there is only one indivisible good and one divisible good and there are only two agents. Thus, we focus on some more restricted settings. Under the setting where agents have binary valuations on indivisible goods and identical valuations on a single divisible good (e.g., money), we design an EFM and truthful mechanism. When agents have binary valuations over both divisible and indivisible goods, we first show there exist EFM and truthful mechanisms when there are only two agents or when there is a single divisible good. On the other hand, we show that the mechanism maximizing Nash welfare cannot ensure EFM and truthfulness simultaneously.

Robust and Verifiable Proportionality Axioms for Multiwinner Voting

Abstract: When selecting a subset of candidates (a so-called committee) based on the preferences of voters, proportional representation is often a major desideratum. When going beyond simplistic models such as party-list or district-based elections, it is surprisingly challenging to capture proportionality formally. As a consequence, the literature has produced numerous competing criteria of when a selected committee qualifies as proportional. Two of the most prominent notions are proportionality for solid coalitions (PSC) [Dummett, 1984] and extended justified representation (EJR) [Aziz et al., 2017]. Both definitions guarantee proportional representation to groups of voters with very similar preferences; such groups are referred to as solid coalitions by Dummett and as cohesive groups by Aziz et al. However, they lose their bite when groups are only almost solid or cohesive.