Jasmina Arifovic

Bio: Jasmina Arifovic is an academic researcher from Simon Fraser University. The author has contributed to research in topics: Repeated game & Social learning. The author has an hindex of 25, co-authored 73 publications receiving 2310 citations. Previous affiliations of Jasmina Arifovic include McGill University & California Institute of Technology.

The Behavior of the Exchange Rate in the Genetic Algorithm and Experimental Economies

Abstract: This paper studies the behavior of the exchange rate in the Kareken-Wallace overlapping generations economy with two currencies in which decision rules are updated using the genetic algorithm. The analysis shows that a stationary monetary equilibrium of the Kareken-Wallace model is not stable under the genetic algorithm dynamics. The fluctuations in the genetic algorithm exchange rate are driven by fluctuations in the portfolio fractions, which change over time in response to the inequality between the rates of return on two currencies. Further, both the genetic algorithm simulations and the experiments with human subjects were characterized by continuing fluctuations of the exchange rate, with first-period consumption values close to a stationary value.

Using genetic algorithms to select architecture of a feedforward artificial neural network

Abstract: This paper proposes a model selection methodology for feedforward network models based on the genetic algorithms and makes a number of distinct but inter-related contributions to the model selection literature for the feedforward networks. First, we construct a genetic algorithm which can search for the global optimum of an arbitrary function as the output of a feedforward network model. Second, we allow the genetic algorithm to evolve the type of inputs, the number of hidden units and the connection structure between the inputs and the output layers. Third, we study how introduction of a local elitist procedure which we call the election operator affects the algorithm's performance. We conduct a Monte Carlo simulation to study the sensitiveness of the global approximation properties of the studied genetic algorithm. Finally, we apply the proposed methodology to the daily foreign exchange returns.

博弈论 : 矛盾冲突分析 = Game theory : analysis of conflict

Abstract: Preface 1. Decision-Theoretic Foundations 1.1 Game Theory, Rationality, and Intelligence 1.2 Basic Concepts of Decision Theory 1.3 Axioms 1.4 The Expected-Utility Maximization Theorem 1.5 Equivalent Representations 1.6 Bayesian Conditional-Probability Systems 1.7 Limitations of the Bayesian Model 1.8 Domination 1.9 Proofs of the Domination Theorems Exercises 2. Basic Models 2.1 Games in Extensive Form 2.2 Strategic Form and the Normal Representation 2.3 Equivalence of Strategic-Form Games 2.4 Reduced Normal Representations 2.5 Elimination of Dominated Strategies 2.6 Multiagent Representations 2.7 Common Knowledge 2.8 Bayesian Games 2.9 Modeling Games with Incomplete Information Exercises 3. Equilibria of Strategic-Form Games 3.1 Domination and Ratonalizability 3.2 Nash Equilibrium 3.3 Computing Nash Equilibria 3.4 Significance of Nash Equilibria 3.5 The Focal-Point Effect 3.6 The Decision-Analytic Approach to Games 3.7 Evolution. Resistance. and Risk Dominance 3.8 Two-Person Zero-Sum Games 3.9 Bayesian Equilibria 3.10 Purification of Randomized Strategies in Equilibria 3.11 Auctions 3.12 Proof of Existence of Equilibrium 3.13 Infinite Strategy Sets Exercises 4. Sequential Equilibria of Extensive-Form Games 4.1 Mixed Strategies and Behavioral Strategies 4.2 Equilibria in Behavioral Strategies 4.3 Sequential Rationality at Information States with Positive Probability 4.4 Consistent Beliefs and Sequential Rationality at All Information States 4.5 Computing Sequential Equilibria 4.6 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria 4.7 Games with Perfect Information 4.8 Adding Chance Events with Small Probability 4.9 Forward Induction 4.10 Voting and Binary Agendas 4.11 Technical Proofs Exercises 5. Refinements of Equilibrium in Strategic Form 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Perfect Equilibria 5.3 Existence of Perfect and Sequential Equilibria 5.4 Proper Equilibria 5.5 Persistent Equilibria 5.6 Stable Sets 01 Equilibria 5.7 Generic Properties 5.8 Conclusions Exercises 6. Games with Communication 6.1 Contracts and Correlated Strategies 6.2 Correlated Equilibria 6.3 Bayesian Games with Communication 6.4 Bayesian Collective-Choice Problems and Bayesian Bargaining Problems 6.5 Trading Problems with Linear Utility 6.6 General Participation Constraints for Bayesian Games with Contracts 6.7 Sender-Receiver Games 6.8 Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria 6.9 Communication in Extensive-Form and Multistage Games Exercises Bibliographic Note 7. Repeated Games 7.1 The Repeated Prisoners Dilemma 7.2 A General Model of Repeated Garnet 7.3 Stationary Equilibria of Repeated Games with Complete State Information and Discounting 7.4 Repeated Games with Standard Information: Examples 7.5 General Feasibility Theorems for Standard Repeated Games 7.6 Finitely Repeated Games and the Role of Initial Doubt 7.7 Imperfect Observability of Moves 7.8 Repeated Wines in Large Decentralized Groups 7.9 Repeated Games with Incomplete Information 7.10 Continuous Time 7.11 Evolutionary Simulation of Repeated Games Exercises 8. Bargaining and Cooperation in Two-Person Games 8.1 Noncooperative Foundations of Cooperative Game Theory 8.2 Two-Person Bargaining Problems and the Nash Bargaining Solution 8.3 Interpersonal Comparisons of Weighted Utility 8.4 Transferable Utility 8.5 Rational Threats 8.6 Other Bargaining Solutions 8.7 An Alternating-Offer Bargaining Game 8.8 An Alternating-Offer Game with Incomplete Information 8.9 A Discrete Alternating-Offer Game 8.10 Renegotiation Exercises 9. Coalitions in Cooperative Games 9.1 Introduction to Coalitional Analysis 9.2 Characteristic Functions with Transferable Utility 9.3 The Core 9.4 The Shapkey Value 9.5 Values with Cooperation Structures 9.6 Other Solution Concepts 9.7 Colational Games with Nontransferable Utility 9.8 Cores without Transferable Utility 9.9 Values without Transferable Utility Exercises Bibliographic Note 10. Cooperation under Uncertainty 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Concepts of Efficiency 10.3 An Example 10.4 Ex Post Inefficiency and Subsequent Oilers 10.5 Computing Incentive-Efficient Mechanisms 10.6 Inscrutability and Durability 10.7 Mechanism Selection by an Informed Principal 10.8 Neutral Bargaining Solutions 10.9 Dynamic Matching Processes with Incomplete Information Exercises Bibliography Index

The Six Major Puzzles in International Macroeconomics: Is There a Common Cause?

Abstract: The central claim in this paper is that by explicitly introducing costs of international trade (narrowly, transport costs, but more broadly, tariffs, nontariff barriers, and other trade costs), one can go far toward explaining a great number of the main empirical puzzles that international macroeconomists have struggled with over twenty-five years. Our approach elucidates J. McCallum's home-bias-in-trade puzzle, the Feldstein-Horioka saving-investment puzzle, the French-Poterba equity-home-bias puzzle, and the Backus-Kehoe-Kydland consumption-correlations puzzle. That one simple alteration to an otherwise canonical international macroeconomic model can help substantially to explain such a broad range of empirical puzzles, including some that previously seemed intractable, suggests a rich area for future research. We also address a variety of international pricing puzzles, including the purchasing-power-parity puzzle emphasized by Rogoff, and what we term the exchange-rate disconnect puzzle. The latter cat...

Multi-Agent Systems for the Simulation of Land-Use and Land-Cover Change: A Review

Abstract: This paper presents an overview of multi-agent system models of land-use/cover change (MAS/LUCC models). This special class of LUCC models combines a cellular landscape model with agent-based representations of decisionmaking, integrating the two components through specification of interdependencies and feedbacks between agents and their environment. The authors review alternative LUCC modeling techniques and discuss the ways in which MAS/LUCC models may overcome some important limitations of existing techniques. We briefly review ongoing MAS/LUCC modeling efforts in four research areas. We discuss the potential strengths of MAS/LUCC models and suggest that these strengths guide researchers in assessing the appropriate choice of model for their particular research question. We find that MAS/LUCC models are particularly well suited for representing complex spatial interactions under heterogeneous conditions and for modeling decentralized, autonomous decision making. We discuss a range of possible roles for MAS/LUCC models, from abstract models designed to derive stylized hypotheses to empirically detailed simulation models appropriate for scenario and policy analysis. We also discuss the challenge of validation and verification for MAS/LUCC models. Finally, we outline important challenges and open research questions in this new field. We conclude that, while significant challenges exist, these models offer a promising new tool for researchers whose goal is to create fine-scale models of LUCC phenomena that focus on human-environment interactions.