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Jay Pil Choi

Other affiliations: Harvard University, Tilburg University, Hitotsubashi University  ...read more
Bio: Jay Pil Choi is an academic researcher from Michigan State University. The author has contributed to research in topics: Competition (economics) & Tying. The author has an hindex of 40, co-authored 136 publications receiving 5326 citations. Previous affiliations of Jay Pil Choi include Harvard University & Tilburg University.


Papers
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TL;DR: In this paper, a dynamic version of the old leverage doctrine is proposed, and it is shown that when an incumbent monopolist faces the threat of entry in all complementary components, tying may make the prospects of successful entry less certain, discouraging rivals from investing and innovating.
Abstract: The idea that an incumbent supplier may tie two complementary products to fend off potential entrants is popular among practitioners yet is not fully understood in formal economic theory. This article makes sense of the argument by formally deriving a dynamic version of the old leverage doctrine. We show that when an incumbent monopolist faces the threat of entry in all complementary components, tying may make the prospects of successful entry less certain, discouraging rivals from investing and innovating. Tie-in sales may reduce consumer and total economic welfare. Copyright 2001 by the RAND Corporation.

285 citations

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TL;DR: In this article, the authors analyzed the effects of net neutrality regulation on investment incentives for Internet service providers (ISPs) and content providers (CPs), and their implications for social welfare.
Abstract: This article analyzes the effects of net neutrality regulation on investment incentives for Internet service providers (ISPs) and content providers (CPs), and their implications for social welfare. Concerning the ISPs’ investment incentives, we find that capacity expansion decreases the sale price of the priority right under the discriminatory regime. Thus, contrary to ISPs’ claims that net neutrality regulations would have a chilling effect on their incentive to invest, we cannot dismiss the possibility of the opposite. A discriminatory regime can also weaken CPs’ investment incentives because of CPs’ concern that the ISP would expropriate some of the investment benefits.

269 citations

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TL;DR: The authors analyzes the effects of tying on market competition and social welfare in two-sided markets when economic agents can engage in multi-homing by participating in multiple platforms to reap maximal network benefits, showing that tying induces more consumers to multi-home and makes platform-specific exclusive content available to more consumers, which is beneficial to content providers.
Abstract: This paper analyzes the effects of tying on market competition and social welfare in two-sided markets when economic agents can engage in multi-homing by participating in multiple platforms to reap maximal network benefits. The model shows that tying induces more consumers to multi-home and makes platform-specific exclusive content available to more consumers, which is beneficial to content providers. As a result, tying can be welfare-enhancing if multi-homing is allowed, even in cases where its welfare impacts are negative in the absence of multi-homing. The analysis thus can have important implications for recent antitrust cases in industries where multi-homing is prevalent.

258 citations

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TL;DR: In this article, the authors provide a formal theory of planned obsolescence based on incompatible technologies in the presence of network externalities, and explore how a monopolist's ability to make the new product incompatible with the old version of a product constrains the optimal dynamic behavior of the monopolist.
Abstract: This paper attempts to provide a formal theory of planned obsolescence based on incompatible technologies in the presence of network externalities. The author explores how a monopolist's ability to make the new product incompatible with the old version of a product constrains the optimal dynamic behavior of the monopolist. The social optimum and the market equilibrium are compared. Finally, the possibility of quality distortion is considered as a commitment mechanism to the future compatibility choice. Copyright 1994 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

227 citations

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TL;DR: In this article, the authors develop a simple framework for analyzing the links between corruption and the unofficial economy and their implications for the official economy and show that the entrepreneurs' option to flee to the underground economy constrains a corrupt official's ability to introduce distortions to the economy for private gains.
Abstract: This article develops a simple framework for analyzing the links between corruption and the unofficial economy and their implications for the official economy. In a model of self-selection with heterogeneous entrepreneurs, we show that the entrepreneurs' option to flee to the underground economy constrains a corrupt official's ability to introduce distortions to the economy for private gains. The unofficial economy thus mitigates government-induced distortions and, as a result, leads to enhanced economic activities in the official sector. In this sense, the presence of the unofficial sector acts as a complement to the official economy instead of as a substitute.

215 citations


Cited by
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01 May 1975
TL;DR: The Fundamentals of Queueing Theory, Fourth Edition as discussed by the authors provides a comprehensive overview of simple and more advanced queuing models, with a self-contained presentation of key concepts and formulae.
Abstract: Praise for the Third Edition: "This is one of the best books available. Its excellent organizational structure allows quick reference to specific models and its clear presentation . . . solidifies the understanding of the concepts being presented."IIE Transactions on Operations EngineeringThoroughly revised and expanded to reflect the latest developments in the field, Fundamentals of Queueing Theory, Fourth Edition continues to present the basic statistical principles that are necessary to analyze the probabilistic nature of queues. Rather than presenting a narrow focus on the subject, this update illustrates the wide-reaching, fundamental concepts in queueing theory and its applications to diverse areas such as computer science, engineering, business, and operations research.This update takes a numerical approach to understanding and making probable estimations relating to queues, with a comprehensive outline of simple and more advanced queueing models. Newly featured topics of the Fourth Edition include:Retrial queuesApproximations for queueing networksNumerical inversion of transformsDetermining the appropriate number of servers to balance quality and cost of serviceEach chapter provides a self-contained presentation of key concepts and formulae, allowing readers to work with each section independently, while a summary table at the end of the book outlines the types of queues that have been discussed and their results. In addition, two new appendices have been added, discussing transforms and generating functions as well as the fundamentals of differential and difference equations. New examples are now included along with problems that incorporate QtsPlus software, which is freely available via the book's related Web site.With its accessible style and wealth of real-world examples, Fundamentals of Queueing Theory, Fourth Edition is an ideal book for courses on queueing theory at the upper-undergraduate and graduate levels. It is also a valuable resource for researchers and practitioners who analyze congestion in the fields of telecommunications, transportation, aviation, and management science.

2,562 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The authors argue that the theory of observational learning, and particularly of informational cascades, has much to offer economics, business strategy, political science, and the study of criminal behavior, which can help explain some otherwise puzzling phenomena about human behavior.
Abstract: Learning by observing the past decisions of others can help explain some otherwise puzzling phenomena about human behavior. For example, why do people tend to converge on similar behavior? Why is mass behavior prone to error and fads? The authors argue that the theory of observational learning, and particularly of informational cascades, has much to offer economics, business strategy, political science, and the study of criminal behavior.

1,833 citations

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TL;DR: The literature on new technology diffusion is vast, and it spills over many conventional disciplinary boundaries as discussed by the authors, and the most commonly found model which is used to account for this model is the so-called epidemic model, which builds on the premise that what limits the speed of usage is the lack of information available about the new technology, how to use it and what it does.

1,450 citations