/pdf/convex-analysisnoer-san-nojin-zhan-nituite-5dl2rbmoyr.pdf

Convex Analysisの二,三の進展について

This paper develops a new theoretical model with which to examine the interaction between technology and organizations. Early research studies assumed technology to be an objective, external force that would have deterministic impacts on organizational properties such as structure. Later researchers focused on the human aspect of technology, seeing it as the outcome of strategic choice and social action. This paper suggests that either view is incomplete, and proposes a reconceptualization of technology that takes both perspectives into account. A theoretical model—the structurational model of technology—is built on the basis of this new conceptualization, and its workings explored through discussion of a field study of information technology. The paper suggests that the reformulation of the technology concept and the structurational model of technology allow a deeper and more dialectical understanding of the interaction between technology and organizations. This understanding provides insight into the li...

The duality of technology: rethinking the concept of technology in organizations

Preface 1. Decision-Theoretic Foundations 1.1 Game Theory, Rationality, and Intelligence 1.2 Basic Concepts of Decision Theory 1.3 Axioms 1.4 The Expected-Utility Maximization Theorem 1.5 Equivalent Representations 1.6 Bayesian Conditional-Probability Systems 1.7 Limitations of the Bayesian Model 1.8 Domination 1.9 Proofs of the Domination Theorems Exercises 2. Basic Models 2.1 Games in Extensive Form 2.2 Strategic Form and the Normal Representation 2.3 Equivalence of Strategic-Form Games 2.4 Reduced Normal Representations 2.5 Elimination of Dominated Strategies 2.6 Multiagent Representations 2.7 Common Knowledge 2.8 Bayesian Games 2.9 Modeling Games with Incomplete Information Exercises 3. Equilibria of Strategic-Form Games 3.1 Domination and Ratonalizability 3.2 Nash Equilibrium 3.3 Computing Nash Equilibria 3.4 Significance of Nash Equilibria 3.5 The Focal-Point Effect 3.6 The Decision-Analytic Approach to Games 3.7 Evolution. Resistance. and Risk Dominance 3.8 Two-Person Zero-Sum Games 3.9 Bayesian Equilibria 3.10 Purification of Randomized Strategies in Equilibria 3.11 Auctions 3.12 Proof of Existence of Equilibrium 3.13 Infinite Strategy Sets Exercises 4. Sequential Equilibria of Extensive-Form Games 4.1 Mixed Strategies and Behavioral Strategies 4.2 Equilibria in Behavioral Strategies 4.3 Sequential Rationality at Information States with Positive Probability 4.4 Consistent Beliefs and Sequential Rationality at All Information States 4.5 Computing Sequential Equilibria 4.6 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria 4.7 Games with Perfect Information 4.8 Adding Chance Events with Small Probability 4.9 Forward Induction 4.10 Voting and Binary Agendas 4.11 Technical Proofs Exercises 5. Refinements of Equilibrium in Strategic Form 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Perfect Equilibria 5.3 Existence of Perfect and Sequential Equilibria 5.4 Proper Equilibria 5.5 Persistent Equilibria 5.6 Stable Sets 01 Equilibria 5.7 Generic Properties 5.8 Conclusions Exercises 6. Games with Communication 6.1 Contracts and Correlated Strategies 6.2 Correlated Equilibria 6.3 Bayesian Games with Communication 6.4 Bayesian Collective-Choice Problems and Bayesian Bargaining Problems 6.5 Trading Problems with Linear Utility 6.6 General Participation Constraints for Bayesian Games with Contracts 6.7 Sender-Receiver Games 6.8 Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria 6.9 Communication in Extensive-Form and Multistage Games Exercises Bibliographic Note 7. Repeated Games 7.1 The Repeated Prisoners Dilemma 7.2 A General Model of Repeated Garnet 7.3 Stationary Equilibria of Repeated Games with Complete State Information and Discounting 7.4 Repeated Games with Standard Information: Examples 7.5 General Feasibility Theorems for Standard Repeated Games 7.6 Finitely Repeated Games and the Role of Initial Doubt 7.7 Imperfect Observability of Moves 7.8 Repeated Wines in Large Decentralized Groups 7.9 Repeated Games with Incomplete Information 7.10 Continuous Time 7.11 Evolutionary Simulation of Repeated Games Exercises 8. Bargaining and Cooperation in Two-Person Games 8.1 Noncooperative Foundations of Cooperative Game Theory 8.2 Two-Person Bargaining Problems and the Nash Bargaining Solution 8.3 Interpersonal Comparisons of Weighted Utility 8.4 Transferable Utility 8.5 Rational Threats 8.6 Other Bargaining Solutions 8.7 An Alternating-Offer Bargaining Game 8.8 An Alternating-Offer Game with Incomplete Information 8.9 A Discrete Alternating-Offer Game 8.10 Renegotiation Exercises 9. Coalitions in Cooperative Games 9.1 Introduction to Coalitional Analysis 9.2 Characteristic Functions with Transferable Utility 9.3 The Core 9.4 The Shapkey Value 9.5 Values with Cooperation Structures 9.6 Other Solution Concepts 9.7 Colational Games with Nontransferable Utility 9.8 Cores without Transferable Utility 9.9 Values without Transferable Utility Exercises Bibliographic Note 10. Cooperation under Uncertainty 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Concepts of Efficiency 10.3 An Example 10.4 Ex Post Inefficiency and Subsequent Oilers 10.5 Computing Incentive-Efficient Mechanisms 10.6 Inscrutability and Durability 10.7 Mechanism Selection by an Informed Principal 10.8 Neutral Bargaining Solutions 10.9 Dynamic Matching Processes with Incomplete Information Exercises Bibliography Index

博弈论 : 矛盾冲突分析 = Game theory : analysis of conflict

It is increasingly recognized that what makes a theory interesting and influential is that it challenges our assumptions in some significant way. However, established ways for arriving at research questions mean spotting or constructing gaps in existing theories rather than challenging their assumptions. We propose problematization as a methodology for identifying and challenging assumptions underlying existing literature and, based on that, formulating research questions that are likely to lead to more influential theories.

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Generating Research Questions Through Problematization

We study learning in a setting where agents receive independent noisy signals about the true value of a variable and then communi cate in a network. They naively update beliefs by repeatedly taking weighted averages of neighbors' opinions. We show that all opinions in a large society converge to the truth if and only if the influence of the most influential agent vanishes as the society grows. We also identify obstructions to this, including prominent groups, and pro vide structural conditions on the network ensuring efficient learn ing. Whether agents converge to the truth is unrelated to how quickly consensus is approached. (JEL D83, D85, Z13)

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Naïve Learning in Social Networks and the Wisdom of Crowds

A scheme for consensus formation is considered wherein the value of a certain variable associated with the nodes of a network is fixed a priori for a prescribed set of K nodes, and allowed to propagate throughout the network through an averaging process that mimics a gossip algorithm. The objective is to find the best choice of these K nodes that will achieve the fastest convergence to consensus. This objective is captured by the Perron-Frobenius eigenvalue of the resultant sub-stochastic matrix, which then is the quantity one seeks to minimize. We propose an algorithm for this optimization problem, as well as a greedy scheme with some performance guarantees for a variant of the problem that seeks to minimize a simpler objective. Some other related formulations are also considered.

http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/iel5/5701578/5706874/05707097.pdf

Manufacturing consent

Heavy-tails are a continual source of excitement and confusion across disciplines as they are repeatedly "discovered" in new contexts. This is especially true within computer systems, where heavy-tails seemingly pop up everywhere -- from degree distributions in the internet and social networks to file sizes and interarrival times of workloads. However, despite nearly a decade of work on heavy-tails they are still treated as mysterious, surprising, and even controversial.The goal of this tutorial is to show that heavy-tailed distributions need not be mysterious and should not be surprising or controversial. In particular, we will demystify heavy-tailed distributions by showing how to reason formally about their counter-intuitive properties; we will highlight that their emergence should be expected (not surprising) by showing that a wide variety of general processes lead to heavy-tailed distributions; and we will highlight that most of the controversy surrounding heavy-tails is the result of bad statistics, and can be avoided by using the proper tools.

The fundamentals of heavy-tails: properties, emergence, and identification

The increasing penetration of intermittent, unpredictable renewable energy sources such as wind energy, poses significant challenges for utility companies trying to incorporate renewable energy in their portfolio. In this work, we study the problem of conventional energy procurement in the presence of intermittent renewable resources. We model the problem as a variant of the newsvendor problem, in which the presence of renewable resources induces supply side uncertainty, and in which conventional energy may be procured in three stages to balance supply and demand. We compute closed-form expressions for the optimal energy procurement strategy and study the impact of increasing renewable penetration, and of proposed changes to the structure of electricity markets. We explicitly characterize the impact of a growing renewable penetration on the procurement policy by considering a scaling regime that models the aggregation of unpredictable renewable sources. A key insight from our results is that there is a separation between the impact of the stochastic nature of this aggregation, and the impact of market structure and forecast accuracy. Additionally, we study the impact on procurement of two proposed changes to the market structure: the addition and the placement of an intermediate market. We show that addition of an intermediate market does not necessarily increase the efficiency of utilization of renewable sources. Further, we show that the optimal placement of the intermediate market is insensitive to the level of renewable penetration.

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Energy procurement strategies in the presence of intermittent sources

Tail-robust scheduling via limited processor sharing

Classical multi-armed bandit problems use the expected value of an arm as a metric to evaluate its goodness. However, the expected value is a risk-neutral metric. In many applications like finance, one is interested in balancing the expected return of an arm (or portfolio) with the risk associated with that return. In this paper, we consider the problem of selecting the arm that optimizes a linear combination of the expected reward and the associated Conditional Value at Risk (CVaR) in a fixed budget best-arm identification framework. We allow the reward distributions to be unbounded or even heavy-tailed. For this problem, our goal is to devise algorithms that are entirely distribution oblivious, i.e., the algorithm is not aware of any information on the reward distributions, including bounds on the moments/tails, or the suboptimality gaps across arms. In this paper, we provide a class of such algorithms with provable upper bounds on the probability of incorrect identification. In the process, we develop a novel estimator for the CVaR of unbounded (including heavy-tailed) random variables and prove a concentration inequality for the same, which could be of independent interest. We also compare the error bounds for our distribution oblivious algorithms with those corresponding to standard non-oblivious algorithms. Finally, numerical experiments reveal that our algorithms perform competitively when compared with non-oblivious algorithms, suggesting that distribution obliviousness can be realised in practice without incurring a significant loss of performance.

Jayakrishnan Nair

Papers

Manufacturing consent

The fundamentals of heavy-tails: properties, emergence, and identification

Energy procurement strategies in the presence of intermittent sources

Tail-robust scheduling via limited processor sharing

Distribution oblivious, risk-aware algorithms for multi-armed bandits with unbounded rewards