/pdf/the-theory-of-industrial-organization-19bejph0ej.pdf

The Theory of Industrial Organization

The paper provides a road map to the burgeoning literature on two-sided markets and presents new results. It identifies two-sided markets with markets in which the structure, and not only the level of prices charged by platforms matters. The failure of the Coase theorem is necessary but not sufficient for two-sidedness. The paper builds a model integrating usage and membership externalities, that unifies two hitherto disparate strands of the literature emphasizing either form of externality, and obtains new results on the mix of membership and usage charges when price setting or bargaining determine payments between end-users.

/pdf/two-sided-markets-a-progress-report-40yp4ugn2p.pdf

Two-sided markets: a progress report

There are many examples of markets involving two groups of participants who need to interact via intermediaries. Moreover, these intermediaries usually have to compete for business from both groups. Examples include academic publishing (where journals facilitate the interaction between authors and readers), advertising in media markets (where newspapers or TV channels enable adverts from producers to reach consumers), payment systems (where credit cards can be a convenient method of transaction between consumers and retailers), and telecommunications networks (where networks are used to provide links between callers and those who receive calls). The paper surveys recent theoretical work on these two-sided markets. The main questions are (i) what determines which side of the market is subsidized (if either) in order to attract the other side, and (ii) is the resulting outcome socially e¢cient?

https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/42863/1/MPRA_paper_42863.pdf

Competition in Two-Sided Markets ¤

There are many examples of markets involving two groups of agents who need to interact via 'platforms', and where one group's benefit from joining a platform depends on the number of agents from the other group who join the same platform. This paper presents theoretical models for three variants of such markets: a monopoly platform; a model of competing platforms where each agent must choose to join a single platform; and a model of 'competing bottlenecks', where one group wishes to join all platforms. The main determinants of equilibrium prices are (i) the relative sizes of the cross-group externalities, (ii) whether fees are levied on a lump-sum or per-transaction basis, and (iii) whether a group joins just one platform or joins all platforms.

Competition in Two-Sided Markets

Central to the problem of providing adequate foundations for the analysis of monopolistic competition, is the problem of describing market equilibria in which firms choose both the specification of their respective products, and their prices. The present paper is concerned with a-very particular-model of such a market equilibrium. In this equilibrium, exactly two potential entrants will choose to enter the industry; they will choose to produce differentiated products; and both will make positive profits.

/pdf/relaxing-price-competition-through-product-differentiation-2h3val09pm.pdf

Relaxing price competition through product differentiation

The purpose of this note is to show that the so-called Principle of Minimum Differentiation, as based on Hotelling’s 1929 paper “Stability in Competition” is invalid. The purpose of this note is to show that the so-called Principle of Minimum Differentiation, as based on Hotelling’s 1929 celebrated paper (Hotelling [3]), is invalid. Firstly, we assert that, contrary to the statement formulated by Hotelling in his model, nothing can be said about the tendency of both sellers to agglomerate at the center of the market. The reason is that no equilibrium price solution will exist when both sellers are not far enough from each other. Secondly, we consider a slightly modified version of Hotelling’s example, for which there exists a price equilibrium solution everywhere. We show however that, for this version, there is a tendency for both sellers to maximize their differentiation. This example thus constitutes a counterexample to Hotelling’s conclusions. We shall first recall Hotelling’s model and notations. On a line of length `, two sellers A and B of a homogeneous product, with zero production cost, are located at respective distances a and b from the ends of this line (a+ b ≤ `; a ≥ 0, b ≥ 0). Customers are evenly distributed along the line, and each customer consumes exactly a single unit of this commodity per unit of time, irrespective of its price. Since the product is homogeneous, a customer will buy from the seller Econometrica, 47(5), 1145–1150, September 1979. Center for Operations Research and Econometrics

/pdf/on-hotelling-s-stability-in-competition-281rf8iu6x.pdf

On hotelling's "Stability in competition"

Price competition, quality and income disparities

The gains from cartel formation and the stability of a dominant cartel are investigated for the price-leadership model. We show that there is a general interest in the establishment of a cartel with the competitive fringe reaping a disproportionate share of the benefits. In contrast to results involving a continuum of firms, with a finite number of firms (each with the same cost curve) there is always a stable dominant cartel. A propos de la stabilite d'une structure de marche caracterisee par la collusion de firmes dominantes pour etablir un leadership de prix. Le memoire etudie les gains derives de la formation d'un cartel et la stabilite d'un cartel dominant dans le cadre d'un modele de leadership de prix de la firme dominante. On montre qu'il y a un int6ret general a creer un cartel meme si les firmes satellites A la peripherie du cartel ramassent une part plus que proportionnelle des benefices. Contrairement a ce que l'on observe quand on est en presence d'un continuum de firmes, quand leur nombre est fini chacune avec la meme courbe de couts il y a toujours un cartel dominant stable.

/pdf/on-the-stability-of-collusive-price-leadership-3z2krhvy6j.pdf

Jean Jaskold Gabszewicz

Papers

On hotelling's "Stability in competition"

Price competition, quality and income disparities

On the Stability of Collusive Price Leadership

Entry (and exit) in a differentiated industry

Oligopoly "à la Cournot" in a general equilibrium analysis