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Jean Piaget

Other affiliations: University of Paris, Sorbonne
Bio: Jean Piaget is an academic researcher from University of Geneva. The author has contributed to research in topic(s): Cognitive development & Cognition. The author has an hindex of 111, co-authored 418 publication(s) receiving 91230 citation(s). Previous affiliations of Jean Piaget include University of Paris & Sorbonne.
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Jean Piaget1, Margaret CookInstitutions (1)
01 Jan 1971

6,159 citations

21 Jan 1954
Abstract: class does not exist either, precisely since the relation between the two shadows compared is not a relation of simple comparison and common appurtenance to the same totality, but of substantial participation. The shadow perceived on the table is therefore no more an isolable object than is, on the sensorimotor plane, the watch which disappears under one cushion and which the child expects to see appear under another. But if there is thus an apparent return to the past it is for an opposite reason to that which obstructs objectification in sensorimotor intelligence; in the latter case the object is difficult to form in proportion as the child has difficulty in intercoordinating perceptual images, whereas on the plane of conceptual thought the object, already elaborated, again loses its identity to the extent that it is coordinated with other objects to construct a class or a relation. In conclusion, in the case of the object as in that of space, from the very beginnings of verbal reflection there is a return of the difficulties already overcome on the plane of action, and there is repetition, with temporal displacements, of the stages and process of adaptation defined by the transition from egocentrism to objectivity. And in both cases the phenomenon is due to the difficulties experienced by the child, after he has reached the social plane, in inserting his sensorimotor acquisitions in a framework of relationships of logical classes and deductive structures admitting of true generalisation, that is, taking into account the point of view of others and all possible points of view as well as his own. § 4. From Sensori-Motor Universe to Representation of the Child’s World II. Causality and Time The development of causality from the first months of life to the eleventh or twelfth year reveals the same graphic curve as that of space or object. The acquisition of causality seems to be completed with the formation of sensorimotor intelligence; in the measure that objectification and spatialisation of relations of cause and effect succeed the magico-phenomenalistic egocentrism of the primitive connections, a whole evolution resumes with the advent of speech and representative thought which seems to reproduce the preceding evolution before really extending it. But among the displacements to which this history of the concept of cause gives rise, distinction must again be made between the simple temporal displacements in extension due to the repetition of primitive processes on the occasion of new problems analogous to old ones, and the temporal displacements in comprehension due to the transition from one plane of activity to another; that is, from the plane of action to that of representation. It seems useless to us to emphasise the former. Nothing is more natural than the fact that belief in the efficacy of personal activity, a belief encouraged by chance comparisons through immediate or phenomenalistic experience, is again found throughout childhood in those moments of anxiety or of desire which characterise infantile magic. The second type of temporal displacements, however, raises questions which it is useful to mention here. During the first months of life the child does not dissociate the external world from his own activity. Perceptual images, not yet consolidated into objects or coordinated in a coherent space, seem to him to be governed by his desires and efforts, though these are not attributed to a self which is separate from the universe. Then gradually, as progress is made in the intelligence which elaborates objects and space by spinning a tight web of relations among these images, the child attributes an autonomous causality to things and persons and conceives of the existence of causal relations independent of himself, his own body becoming a source among other sources of effects integrated in this total system. What will happen when, through speech and representative thought, the subject succeeds not only in foreseeing the development of phenomena and in acting upon them but in evoking them apart from any action in order to try to explain them? It is here that the paradox of displacement in comprehension appears. By virtue of the "why" obsessing the child’s mind, as soon as his representation of the world can be detached without too much risk of error, one perceives that this universe, centred on the self, which seemed abolished because it was eliminated from practical action relating to the immediate environment, reappears on the plane of thought and impresses itself on the little child as the sole understandable conception of totality. Undoubtedly the child no longer behaves, as did the baby, as though he commanded everything and everybody. He knows that adults have their own will, that the rain, wind, clouds, stars, and all things are characterised by movements and effects he undergoes but cannot control. In short, on the practical plane, the objectification and spatialisation of causality remain acquired. But this does not at all prevent the child from representing the universe to himself as a large machine, organised exactly by whom he does not know, but organised with the help of adults and for the sake of the well-being of men and particularly of children. Just as in a house everything is arranged according to a plan, despite imperfections and partial failures, so also the raison d’être for everything in the physical universe is the function of a sort of order in the world, an order both material and moral, of which the child is the center. Adults are there "to take care of us," animals to do us service, the stars to warm us and give us light, plants to nourish us, rain to make the gardens grow, clouds to "make night," mountains to climb on, and lakes for boats, etc. Furthermore, to this more or less explicit and coherent artificialism there corresponds a latent animism which endows everything with the will to play its role and with just the force and awareness needed to act with regularity. Thus the causal egocentrism, which on the sensorimotor plane disappears gradually under the influence of spatialisation and objectification, reappears from the time of the beginnings of thought in almost as radical a form. Doubtless the child no longer attributes personal causality to others or to things, but while endowing objects with specific activities he centers all these activities on man and above all on himself. It seems clear that in this sense we may speak of temporal displacement from one plane to another and that the phenomenon is thus comparable to the phenomena which characterise the evolution of space and object. But it is in a still deeper sense that the primitive schemata of causality are again transposed in the child’s first reflective representations. If it is true that from the second year of life the child attributes causality to others and to objects instead of reserving a monopoly on them for his own activity, we have still to discover how he represents to himself the mechanism of these causal relations. We have just recalled that corresponding to the egocentric artificialism which makes the universe gravitate around man and child is an animism capable of explaining the activity of creatures and things in this sort of world. This example is precisely of a kind to help us understand the second kind of temporal displacement of which we now speak: if the child renounces considering his actions as the cause of every event, he nevertheless is unable to represent to himself the action of bodies except by means of schemata drawn from his own activity. An object animated by a "natural" movement like the wind which pushes clouds, or the moon which advances, thus seems endowed with purposefulness and finality, for the child is unable to conceive of an action without a conscious goal. Through lack of awareness, every process involving a relation of energies, such as the rising of the water level in a glass in which a pebble has been dropped, seems due to forces copied from the model of personal activity; the pebble "weighs" on the bottom of the water, it "forces" the water to rise, and if one held the pebble on a string midway of the column of the water the level would not change. In short, even though there is objectivity on the practical plane, causality may remain egocentric from the representative point of view to the extent that the first causal conceptions are drawn from the completely subjective consciousness of the activity of the self. With regard to spatialisation of the causal connection the same temporal displacement between representation and action is observable. Thus the child can acknowledge in practice the necessity for a spatial contact between cause and effect, but that does not make causality geometric or mechanical. For example, the parts of a bicycle all seem necessary to the child long before he thinks of establishing irreversible causal series among them. However, subsequent to these primitive stages of representation during which one sees reappear on the plane of thought forms of causality relative to those of the first sensorimotor stages and which seem surpassed by the causal structures of the final stages of sensorimotor intelligence, one witnesses a truly reflective objectification and spatialisation, whose progress is parallel to that which we have described on the plane of action. Thus it is that subsequent to the animism and dynamism we have just mentioned, we see a gradual "mechanism" taking form, correlative to the principles of conservation described in § 3 and to the elaboration of a relative space. Causality, like the other categories, therefore evolves on the plane of thought from an initial egocentrism to a combined objectivity and relativity, thus reproducing, in surpassing, its earlier sensorimotor evolution. With regard to time, concerning which we have tried to describe on the purely practical plane of the first two years of life the transformation from

5,686 citations

01 Jan 1951

5,033 citations

01 Jan 1932
Abstract: The Moral Judgment of the Child By Jean Piaget The seminal book by this century's most important developmental psychologist chronicles the evolution of children's moral thinking from preschool to adolescence, tracing their concepts of lying, cheating, adult authority, punishment, and responsibility and offering important insights into how they learn -or fail to learn -the difference between right and wrong.

4,597 citations

01 Jan 1969
Abstract: * Introduction The Sensori-Motor Level * Sensori-motor Intelligence * The Construction of Reality * The Cognitive Aspect of Sensori-motor Reactions * The Affective Aspect of Sensori-motor Reactions The Development of Perception * Perceptual Consistencies and Perceptual Causality * Field Effects * The Perceptual Activities * Perceptions, Concepts, and Operations The Semiotic or Symbolic Function * The Semiotic Function and Imitation * Symbolic Play * Drawing * Mental Images * Memory and the Structure of Image-Memories * Language The Concrete Operations of Thought and Interpersonal Relations * The Three Levels in the Transition from Action to Operation * The Genesis of the Concrete Operations * Representation of the Universe: Causality and Chance * Social and Affective Interactions * Moral Feelings and Judgments * Conclusion The Preadolescent and the Propositional Operations * Formal Thought and the Combinatorial System * The Two Reversibilities * The Formal Operatory Schemes * The Induction of Laws and the Dissociation of Factors * The Affective Transformations * Conclusion: Factors in Mental Development

3,524 citations

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Journal ArticleDOI
Julian B. Rotter1Institutions (1)
Abstract: The effects of reward or reinforcement on preceding behavior depend in part on whether the person perceives the reward as contingent on his own behavior or independent of it. Acquisition and performance differ in situations perceived as determined by skill versus chance. Persons may also differ in generalized expectancies for internal versus external control of reinforcement. This report summarizes several experiments which define group differences in behavior when Ss perceive reinforcement as contingent on their behavior versus chance or experimenter control. The report also describes the development of tests of individual differences in a generalized belief in internal-external control and provides reliability, discriminant validity and normative data for 1 test, along with a description of the results of several studies of construct validity.

20,553 citations

Fritz Heider1Institutions (1)
01 Jan 1958
Abstract: The psychology of interpersonal relations , The psychology of interpersonal relations , کتابخانه دیجیتال و فن آوری اطلاعات دانشگاه امام صادق(ع)

14,774 citations

01 Jan 1999
Abstract: New developments in the science of learning science of learning overview mind and brain how experts differ from novices how children learn learning and transfer the learning environment curriculum, instruction and commnity effective teaching - examples in history, mathematics and science teacher learning technology to support learning conclusions from new developments in the science of learning.

13,579 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
Earl K. Miller1, Jonathan D. Cohen2Institutions (2)
TL;DR: It is proposed that cognitive control stems from the active maintenance of patterns of activity in the prefrontal cortex that represent goals and the means to achieve them, which provide bias signals to other brain structures whose net effect is to guide the flow of activity along neural pathways that establish the proper mappings between inputs, internal states, and outputs needed to perform a given task.
Abstract: ▪ Abstract The prefrontal cortex has long been suspected to play an important role in cognitive control, in the ability to orchestrate thought and action in accordance with internal goals. Its neural basis, however, has remained a mystery. Here, we propose that cognitive control stems from the active maintenance of patterns of activity in the prefrontal cortex that represent goals and the means to achieve them. They provide bias signals to other brain structures whose net effect is to guide the flow of activity along neural pathways that establish the proper mappings between inputs, internal states, and outputs needed to perform a given task. We review neurophysiological, neurobiological, neuroimaging, and computational studies that support this theory and discuss its implications as well as further issues to be addressed

10,033 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
Abstract: Past work has documented and described major patterns of adaptive and maladaptive behavior: the mastery-oriented and the helpless patterns. In this article, we present a research-based model that accounts for these patterns in terms of underlying psychological processes. The model specifies how individuals' implicit theories orient them toward particular goals and how these goals set up the different patterns. Indeed, we show how each feature (cognitive, affective, and behavioral) of the adaptive and maladaptive patterns can be seen to follow directly from different goals. We then examine the generality of the model and use it to illuminate phenomena in a wide variety of domains. Finally, we place the model in its broadest context and examine its implications for our understanding of motivational and personality processes. The task for investigators of motivation and personality is to identify major patterns of behavior and link them to underlying psychological processes. In this article we (a) describe a research-based model that accounts for major patterns of behavior, (b) examine the generality of this model—its utility for understanding domains beyond the ones in which it was originally developed, and (c) explore the broader implications of the model for motivational and personality processes.

8,033 citations

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Author's H-index: 111

No. of papers from the Author in previous years