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Author

Jean-Pierre Seifert

Other affiliations: University of Paderborn, Intel, Deutsche Telekom  ...read more
Bio: Jean-Pierre Seifert is an academic researcher from Technical University of Berlin. The author has contributed to research in topics: Side channel attack & Cryptography. The author has an hindex of 45, co-authored 298 publications receiving 7516 citations. Previous affiliations of Jean-Pierre Seifert include University of Paderborn & Intel.


Papers
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Book ChapterDOI
27 Jan 2003
TL;DR: An implemen- tation independent fault attack on AES is presented, able to deter- mine the complete 128-bit secret key of a sealed tamper-proof smart- card by generating 128 faulty cipher texts.
Abstract: In this paper we describe several fault attacks on the Ad- vanced Encryption Standard (AES). First, using optical/eddy current fault induction attacks as recently publicly presented by Skorobogatov, Anderson and Quisquater, Samyde (SA,QS), we present an implemen- tation independent fault attack on AES. This attack is able to deter- mine the complete 128-bit secret key of a sealed tamper-proof smart- card by generating 128 faulty cipher texts. Second, we present several implementation-dependent fault attacks on AES. These attacks rely on the observation that due to the AES's known timing analysis vulnera- bility (as pointed out by Koeune and Quisquater (KQ)), any implemen- tation of the AES must ensure a data independent timing behavior for the so called AES's xtime operation. We present fault attacks on AES based on various timing analysis resistant implementations of the xtime- operation. Our strongest attack in this direction uses a very liberal fault model and requires only 256 faulty encryptions to determine a 128-bit key.

334 citations

Patent
Liang Xie1, Xinwen Zhang1, Jean-Pierre Seifert1, Onur Aciicmez1, Afshin Latifi1 
04 Feb 2008
TL;DR: In this paper, an acceptable behavioral pattern data can be generated for a computing system by monitoring the use of a support system (e.g., an operating system, a virtual environment) operating on the computing system.
Abstract: Techniques for detecting unauthorized use (e.g., malicious attacks) of the computing systems (e.g., computing devices) are disclosed. Unauthorized use can be detected based on patterns of use (e.g., behavioral patterns of use typically associated with a human being) of the computing systems. Acceptable behavioral pattern data can be generated for a computing system by monitoring the use of a support system (e.g., an operating system, a virtual environment) operating on the computing system. For example, a plurality of system support provider components of a support system (e.g., system calls, device drivers) can be monitored in order to generate the acceptable behavioral pattern data in a form which effectively defines an acceptable pattern of use (usage pattern) for the monitored system support provider components, thereby allowing detection of unauthorized use of a computing system by detecting any deviation from the acceptable pattern of use of the monitored system support provider components.

317 citations

Book ChapterDOI
05 Feb 2007
TL;DR: A new software side-channel attack enabled by the branch prediction capability common to all modern high-performance CPUs, which allows an unprivileged process to attack other processes running in parallel on the same processor, despite sophisticated partitioning methods such as memory protection, sandboxing or even virtualization.
Abstract: This paper announces a new software side-channel attack — enabled by the branch prediction capability common to all modern high-performance CPUs. The penalty paid (extra clock cycles) for a mispredicted branch can be used for cryptanalysis of cryptographic primitives that employ a data-dependent program flow. Analogous to the recently described cache-based side-channel attacks our attacks also allow an unprivileged process to attack other processes running in parallel on the same processor, despite sophisticated partitioning methods such as memory protection, sandboxing or even virtualization. In this paper, we will discuss several such attacks for the example of RSA, and experimentally show their applicability to real systems, such as OpenSSL and Linux. Moreover, we will also demonstrate the strength of the branch prediction side-channel attack by rendering the obvious countermeasure in this context (Montgomery Multiplication with dummy-reduction) as useless. Although the deeper consequences of the latter result make the task of writing an efficient and secure modular exponentiation (or scalar multiplication on an elliptic curve) a challenging task, we will eventually suggest some countermeasures to mitigate branch prediction side-channel attacks.

307 citations

Proceedings ArticleDOI
02 Jun 2013
TL;DR: This work demonstrates that SRAM PUFs are not well suited as PUFs, as they do not meet several requirements that constitute an ideal PUF and produces the first physical clone of a Physically Unclonable Function was produced.
Abstract: As system security demands continue to evolve, Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) are a promising solution for secure storage on Integrated Circuits (ICs). SRAM PUFs are among the most popular types of PUFs, since they require no additional circuitry and can be implemented with on-die memories such as caches and data memory that are readily available on both ASICs and FPGAs. This work demonstrates that SRAM PUFs are not well suited as PUFs, as they do not meet several requirements that constitute an ideal PUF. The compact nature of SRAM, standard interconnects and resiliency to environmental effects make SRAM PUFs particularly easy to clone. We consider several ways in which SRAM PUFs can be characterized and demonstrate a Focused Ion Beam circuit edit with which we were able to produce a physical clone of our Proof-of-Concept SRAM PUF implementation. As a result of the circuit edit, when challenged, the physical clone produced an identical physical response to the original device. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work in which a physical clone of a Physically Unclonable Function was produced.

287 citations

Posted Content
TL;DR: The Simple Branch Prediction Analysis (SBPA) attack as mentioned in this paper is a sidechannel side-channel attack against RSA implementations, where a carefully written spy-process running simultaneously with an RSA-process is able to collect during one single RSA signing execution almost all of the secret key bits.
Abstract: Very recently, a new software side-channel attack, called Branch Prediction Analysis (BPA) attack, has been discovered and also demonstrated to be practically feasible on popular commodity PC platforms. While the above recent attack still had the flavor of a classical timing attack against RSA, where one uses many execution-time measurements under the same key in order to statistically amplify some small but key-dependent timing differences, we dramatically improve upon the former result. We prove that a carefully written spy-process running simultaneously with an RSA-process, is able to collect during one single RSA signing execution almost all of the secret key bits. We call such an attack, analyzing the CPU’s Branch Predictor states through spying on a single quasi-parallel computation process, a Simple Branch Prediction Analysis (SBPA) attack — sharply differentiating it from those one relying on statistical methods and requiring many computation measurements under the same key. The successful extraction of almost all secret key bits by our SBPA attack against an OpenSSL RSA implementation proves that the often recommended blinding or so called randomization techniques to protect RSA against side-channel attacks are, in the context of SBPA attacks, totally useless. Additional to that very crucial security implication, targeted at such implementations which are assumed to be at least statistically secure, our successful SBPA attack also bears another equally critical security implication. Namely, in the context of simple side-channel attacks, it is widely believed that equally balancing the operations after branches is a secure countermeasure against such simple attacks. Unfortunately, this is not true, as even such “balanced branch” implementations can be completely broken by our SBPA attacks. Moreover, despite sophisticated hardware-assisted partitioning methods such as memory protection, sandboxing or even virtualization, SBPA attacks empower an unprivileged process to successfully attack other processes running in parallel on the same processor. Thus, we conclude that SBPA attacks are much more dangerous than previously anticipated, as they obviously do not belong to the same category as pure timing attacks.

222 citations


Cited by
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Book
01 Jan 2004
TL;DR: This guide explains the basic mathematics, describes state-of-the-art implementation methods, and presents standardized protocols for public-key encryption, digital signatures, and key establishment, as well as side-channel attacks and countermeasures.
Abstract: After two decades of research and development, elliptic curve cryptography now has widespread exposure and acceptance. Industry, banking, and government standards are in place to facilitate extensive deployment of this efficient public-key mechanism. Anchored by a comprehensive treatment of the practical aspects of elliptic curve cryptography (ECC), this guide explains the basic mathematics, describes state-of-the-art implementation methods, and presents standardized protocols for public-key encryption, digital signatures, and key establishment. In addition, the book addresses some issues that arise in software and hardware implementation, as well as side-channel attacks and countermeasures. Readers receive the theoretical fundamentals as an underpinning for a wealth of practical and accessible knowledge about efficient application. Features & Benefits: * Breadth of coverage and unified, integrated approach to elliptic curve cryptosystems * Describes important industry and government protocols, such as the FIPS 186-2 standard from the U.S. National Institute for Standards and Technology * Provides full exposition on techniques for efficiently implementing finite-field and elliptic curve arithmetic* Distills complex mathematics and algorithms for easy understanding* Includes useful literature references, a list of algorithms, and appendices on sample parameters, ECC standards, and software toolsThis comprehensive, highly focused reference is a useful and indispensable resource for practitioners, professionals, or researchers in computer science, computer engineering, network design, and network data security.

2,893 citations

Proceedings ArticleDOI
Oded Regev1
22 May 2005
TL;DR: A public-key cryptosystem whose hardness is based on the worst-case quantum hardness of SVP and SIVP, and an efficient solution to the learning problem implies a quantum, which can be made classical.
Abstract: Our main result is a reduction from worst-case lattice problems such as SVP and SIVP to a certain learning problem. This learning problem is a natural extension of the 'learning from parity with error' problem to higher moduli. It can also be viewed as the problem of decoding from a random linear code. This, we believe, gives a strong indication that these problems are hard. Our reduction, however, is quantum. Hence, an efficient solution to the learning problem implies a quantum algorithm for SVP and SIVP. A main open question is whether this reduction can be made classical.Using the main result, we obtain a public-key cryptosystem whose hardness is based on the worst-case quantum hardness of SVP and SIVP. Previous lattice-based public-key cryptosystems such as the one by Ajtai and Dwork were only based on unique-SVP, a special case of SVP. The new cryptosystem is much more efficient than previous cryptosystems: the public key is of size O(n2) and encrypting a message increases its size by O(n)(in previous cryptosystems these values are O(n4) and O(n2), respectively). In fact, under the assumption that all parties share a random bit string of length O(n2), the size of the public key can be reduced to O(n).

2,620 citations

Proceedings ArticleDOI
09 Nov 2009
TL;DR: It is shown that it is possible to map the internal cloud infrastructure, identify where a particular target VM is likely to reside, and then instantiate new VMs until one is placed co-resident with the target, and how such placement can then be used to mount cross-VM side-channel attacks to extract information from a target VM on the same machine.
Abstract: Third-party cloud computing represents the promise of outsourcing as applied to computation. Services, such as Microsoft's Azure and Amazon's EC2, allow users to instantiate virtual machines (VMs) on demand and thus purchase precisely the capacity they require when they require it. In turn, the use of virtualization allows third-party cloud providers to maximize the utilization of their sunk capital costs by multiplexing many customer VMs across a shared physical infrastructure. However, in this paper, we show that this approach can also introduce new vulnerabilities. Using the Amazon EC2 service as a case study, we show that it is possible to map the internal cloud infrastructure, identify where a particular target VM is likely to reside, and then instantiate new VMs until one is placed co-resident with the target. We explore how such placement can then be used to mount cross-VM side-channel attacks to extract information from a target VM on the same machine.

2,230 citations

01 Jan 1979
TL;DR: This special issue aims at gathering the recent advances in learning with shared information methods and their applications in computer vision and multimedia analysis and addressing interesting real-world computer Vision and multimedia applications.
Abstract: In the real world, a realistic setting for computer vision or multimedia recognition problems is that we have some classes containing lots of training data and many classes contain a small amount of training data. Therefore, how to use frequent classes to help learning rare classes for which it is harder to collect the training data is an open question. Learning with Shared Information is an emerging topic in machine learning, computer vision and multimedia analysis. There are different level of components that can be shared during concept modeling and machine learning stages, such as sharing generic object parts, sharing attributes, sharing transformations, sharing regularization parameters and sharing training examples, etc. Regarding the specific methods, multi-task learning, transfer learning and deep learning can be seen as using different strategies to share information. These learning with shared information methods are very effective in solving real-world large-scale problems. This special issue aims at gathering the recent advances in learning with shared information methods and their applications in computer vision and multimedia analysis. Both state-of-the-art works, as well as literature reviews, are welcome for submission. Papers addressing interesting real-world computer vision and multimedia applications are especially encouraged. Topics of interest include, but are not limited to: • Multi-task learning or transfer learning for large-scale computer vision and multimedia analysis • Deep learning for large-scale computer vision and multimedia analysis • Multi-modal approach for large-scale computer vision and multimedia analysis • Different sharing strategies, e.g., sharing generic object parts, sharing attributes, sharing transformations, sharing regularization parameters and sharing training examples, • Real-world computer vision and multimedia applications based on learning with shared information, e.g., event detection, object recognition, object detection, action recognition, human head pose estimation, object tracking, location-based services, semantic indexing. • New datasets and metrics to evaluate the benefit of the proposed sharing ability for the specific computer vision or multimedia problem. • Survey papers regarding the topic of learning with shared information. Authors who are unsure whether their planned submission is in scope may contact the guest editors prior to the submission deadline with an abstract, in order to receive feedback.

1,758 citations