Jennifer A. Hillman

Bio: Jennifer A. Hillman is an academic researcher from Georgetown University Law Center. The author has contributed to research in topics: Commercial policy & Dumping. The author has an hindex of 3, co-authored 4 publications receiving 24 citations. Previous affiliations of Jennifer A. Hillman include German Marshall Fund.

Slamming the Door on Trade Policy Discretion? The WTO Appellate Body’s Ruling on Market Distortions and Production Costs in EU–Biodiesel (Argentina)

Abstract: This paper presents a legal–economic analysis of the Appellate Body's decision in EU–Biodiesel (Argentina) that the WTO's Anti-Dumping Agreement (ADA) does not permit countries to take into account government-created price distortions of major inputs when calculating anti-dumping duties. In this case, the EU made adjustments to the price of biodiesel's principal input – soybeans – in determining the cost of production of biodiesel in Argentina. The adjustment was made based on the uncontested finding that the price of soybeans in Argentina was distorted by the existence of an export tax scheme that resulted in artificially low soybean prices. The Appellate Body found that the EU was not permitted to take tax policy-induced price distortions into account in calculating dumping margins. We analyze the economic rationale for Argentina's export tax system, distortions in biodiesel markets in Argentina and the EU, and the remaining trade policy options for addressing distorted international prices. We also assess whether existing subsidies disciplines would be more effective in addressing this problem and conclude that they would not.

Trading Places: The New Dynamics of EU Trade Policy Under the Treaty of Lisbon

Abstract: After nearly a decade of fits and starts, the Treaty of Lisbon, providing for a reformed institutional framework for the European Union (EU), entered into force on December 1, 2009. With it came a number of critical but little noticed changes in the area of European trade policy. This policy brief broadly outlines these changes and argues that a good understanding of the new EU trade policy regime will be essential for Europe’s trading partners and their trade experts and policy makers, as EU institutional reform will result in substantial shifts in the process and substance of EU bilateral and multilateral trade and investment regimes. At the heart of the reform lies the empowerment of the European Parliament in the area of trade legislation and trade agreements. In addition, a number of issues that had been left up the individual member states of the EU or which shared governance authority between the individual EU member states and the European Union, most notably investment, services and trade-related intellectual property, will now fall exclusively under the purview of the European Union. Finally, trade policy now falls under the umbrella of European External Action, rendering it subject to a number of broad EU foreign policy goals such as democracy, the rule of law, human rights, sustainable economic and environmental development, and good global governance.

An Emerging International Rule of Law?—The WTO Dispute Settlement System’s Role in its Evolution

Abstract: More than 2,000 years have passed since the idea of the "rule of law" appeared in Western culture. But only recently has it entered common usage-we have become the "rule of law generation." With the growth in the number of international courts and tribunals, the question arises whether the same principles surrounding the rule of law that have been developed in many national legal systems also apply in international arenas. Despite the fact that the international system lacks a centralized legislative authority, and despite the scepticism of many observers, I argue that institutions like the dispute settlement system of the World Trade Organization ("WTO") significantly contribute to moving toward a full-fledged international "rule of law."In the first part of this Comment, I explore what the concept of "rule of law" means in a domestic setting, and address the problems arising from applying this concept in the international arena. In the second part, I analyse the role of the WTO's dispute settlement system, and in particular of the Appellate Body, in the progressive development of an international rule of law. In the third part, I address the question of whether the WTO's dispute settlement system can constitute a valid model for how the rule of law can be applied in other international arenas. In the fourth part, I examine the potential obstacles in the path of establishing a genuine rule of law at the WTO -- namely the absence of a balance between a highly functioning adjudicatory system and a weak legislative arm.

Slamming the door on trade policy discretion? The WTO Appellate Body's ruling on market distortions and production costs in EU-Biodiesel (Argentina)

Abstract: This paper presents a legal-economic analysis of the Appellate Body's decision in EU-Biodiesel (Argentina) that the WTO's Anti-Dumping Agreement (ADA) does not permit countries to take into account government-created price distortions of major inputs when calculating antidumping duties. In this case, the EU made adjustments to the price of biodiesel's principal input - soybeans - in determining the cost of production of biodiesel in Argentina. The adjustment was made based on the uncontested finding that the price of soybeans in Argentina was distorted by the existence of an export tax scheme that resulted in artificially low soybean prices. The Appellate Body found that the EU was not permitted to take tax policy-induced price distortions into account in calculating dumping margins. We analyze the economic rationale for Argentina's export tax system, distortions in biodiesel markets in Argentina and the EU, and the remaining trade policy options for addressing distorted international prices. We also assess whether existing subsidies disciplines would be more effective in addressing this problem and conclude that they would not.

L'intervention des tierces parties dans le règlement des différends à l'OMC / Ngoc Ha Nguyen ; préface de Marie-Pierre Lanfranchi

Abstract: The third party intervention in the WTO dispute settlement has specificities compared to that existing in other international jurisdictions. The first one include very frequent access of third parties in the consultations, in the panel and the Appellate Body proceedings. This frequency results from rather favorable procedural rules and an open judicial policy developed by WTO judge in favor of the third parties presence. Contrary to this, the procedural rights of third parties are still very limited. They are imprecise in the consultation phase and limited in the panel phase. In addition, third parties do not have certain rights (for example, the right to appeal) because of the absence of the binding effects of adopted reports on themselves. On the whole, these specificities allow third parties to play really an important role in this system. Their intervention can meet the judge’s information needs and contribute to the multilateralization and legitimacy of the system at a whole. It can also help to defend interests at various levels and thus becomes a procedural mean to build and strengthen the capacity and skills of developing country Members. Their intervention can sometimes involve risks and limitations on the implementation of the guaranties of due process, on certain developments of the system and on the protection of legitimate rights and interests of the main parties. However, these effects are either minimal or mitigated through certain strategies implemented by the parties to dispute or through the control of the WTO judge. Therefore, the results of the intervention which appear generally positive advocates the strengthening of third party’s rights.

Precedents and Case-Based Reasoning in the European Court of Justice: Unfinished Business

Abstract: 1. Introduction 2. Setting precedents: law made in Luxembourg 3. Determining the essence of ECJ precedents 4. Precedent application by the ECJ 5. Avoiding ECJ precedents I: distinguishing 6. Avoiding ECJ precedents II: departing 7. ECJ precedents in context 8. The normativity of ECJ precedents 9. Conclusions and suggestions.

Parliamentary Assertion and Deep Integration: The European Parliament in the CETA and TTIP Negotiations

Abstract: Scholars have long viewed parliamentarians as parochial actors having little interest, or incentive to engage, in international diplomacy. Yet, parliaments have recently taken on a very active role in various international negotiations. This article explores the role of the European Parliament (EP) in the European Union (EU)–Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) and the EU–United States Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations. Drawing on classic institutionalist insights, it develops the concept of parliamentary assertion and explores its usefulness through a combination of comparative and process-tracing analyses. The conclusions are threefold: (1) the EP has asserted its power in international trade matters beyond the simple power of consent; (2) the EP’s search for legitimacy in the EU polity is driving this phenomenon; and (3) this phenomenon is significant beyond the current CETA and TTIP negotiations.