Jerold L. Zimmerman

Bio: Jerold L. Zimmerman is an academic researcher from University of Rochester. The author has contributed to research in topics: Organizational architecture & Incentive. The author has an hindex of 41, co-authored 74 publications receiving 18091 citations. Previous affiliations of Jerold L. Zimmerman include Baruch College.

Positive Accounting Theory

Abstract: This book reviews the theory and methodology underlying the economics-based empirical literature in accounting. An accounting theory theory is an explanation for observed accounting and auditing practices. Such an explanation is necessary for interpretation of empirical associations between variables. The book discusses the role of theory in empirical work. It then reviews accounting theories involved in empirical studies of the use of accounting in capital markets, contracting and the political process and the extent to which the theories are consistent with those studies' evidence. Empirical studies in auditing are also reviewed. The book finishes with a discussion of the role of accounting research and a summary and evaluation of the research up until the mid-1980s.

Towards A Positive Theory of the Determination of Accounting Standards

Abstract: This article provides the beginning of a positive theory of accounting by exploring those factors influencing management's attitudes on accounting standards that are likely to affect a firm's cashflows and in turn are affected by accounting standards. These factors are taxes, regulation, management compensation plans, bookkeeping costs and political costs, and they are combined into a model that predicts that large firms that experience reduced earnings due to changed accounting standards favor the change. All other firms oppose the change if the additional bookkeeping costs justify the cost of lobbying. This prediction was tested using the corporate submissions to the FASB's Discussion Memorandum on General Price Level Adjustments. The empirical results are consistent with the theory.

Positive Accounting Theory: A Ten Year Perspective

Abstract: This paper reviews and critiques the positive accounting literature following the publication of Watts and Zimmerman (1978, 1979), The 1978 paper helped generate the positive accounting literature that offers an explanation of accounting practice, suggests the importance of contracting costs, and has led to the discovery of some previously unknown empirical regularities. The 1979 paper produced a methodological debate that has not been very productive. This paper attempts to remove some common misconceptions about methodology that surfaced in that debate. It also suggests ways to improve positive research in accounting choice. The most important of these improvements is tighter links between the theory and the empirical tests. A second suggested improvement is the development of models that recognize the endogeneity among the variables in the regressions. A third improvement is reduction in measurement errors in both the dependent and independent variables in the regressions.

Agency problems, auditing, and the theory of the firm: some evidence*

Abstract: Agency Problems, Auditing, and the Theory of the Firm: Some EvidenceAuthor(s): Ross L. Watts and Jerold L. ZimmermanSource: Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 26, No. 3, (Oct., 1983), pp. 613-633Published by: The University of Chicago PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/725039Accessed: 29/06/2008 23:14

Information Asymmetry, Corporate Disclosure and the Capital Markets: A Review of the Empirical Disclosure Literature

Abstract: Corporate disclosure is critical for the functioning of an efficient capital market. Firms provide disclosure through regulated financial reports, including the financial statements, footnotes, management discussion and analysis, and other regulatory filings. In addition, some firms engage in voluntary communication, such as management forecasts, analysts? presentations and conference calls, press releases, internet sites, and other corporate reports. Finally, there are disclosures about firms by information intermediaries, such as financial analysts, industry experts, and the financial press.

Regression Diagnostics: Identifying Influential Data and Sources of Collinearity

Abstract: 1. Introduction and Overview. 2. Detecting Influential Observations and Outliers. 3. Detecting and Assessing Collinearity. 4. Applications and Remedies. 5. Research Issues and Directions for Extensions. Bibliography. Author Index. Subject Index.

Performance Pay and Top Management Incentives

Abstract: Our estimates of the pay-performance relation (including pay, options, stockholdings, and dismissal) for chief executive officers indicate that CEO wealth changes $3.25 for every $1,000 change in shareholder wealth. Although the incentives generated by stock ownership are large relative to pay and dismissal incentives, most CEOs hold trivial fractions of their firms' stock, and ownership levels have declined over the past 50 years. We hypothesize that public and private political forces impose constraints that reduce the pay-performance sensitivity. Declines in both the pay-performance relation and the level of CEO pay since the 1930s are consistent with this hypothesis.