In this article, we attempt to distinguish between the properties of moderator and mediator variables at a number of levels. First, we seek to make theorists and researchers aware of the importance of not using the terms moderator and mediator interchangeably by carefully elaborating, both conceptually and strategically, the many ways in which moderators and mediators differ. We then go beyond this largely pedagogical function and delineate the conceptual and strategic implications of making use of such distinctions with regard to a wide range of phenomena, including control and stress, attitudes, and personality traits. We also provide a specific compendium of analytic procedures appropriate for making the most effective use of the moderator and mediator distinction, both separately and in terms of a broader causal system that includes both moderators and mediators.

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The moderator–mediator variable distinction in social psychological research: Conceptual, strategic, and statistical considerations.

People in different cultures have strikingly different construals of the self, of others, and of the interdependence of the 2. These construals can influence, and in many cases determine, the very nature of individual experience, including cognition, emotion, and motivation. Many Asian cultures have distinct conceptions of individuality that insist on the fundamental relatedness of individuals to each other. The emphasis is on attending to others, fitting in, and harmonious interdependence with them. American culture neither assumes nor values such an overt connectedness among individuals. In contrast, individuals seek to maintain their independence from others by attending to the self and by discovering and expressing their unique inner attributes. As proposed herein, these construals are even more powerful than previously imagined. Theories of the self from both psychology and anthropology are integrated to define in detail the difference between a construal of the self as independent and a construal of the self as interdependent. Each of these divergent construals should have a set of specific consequences for cognition, emotion, and motivation; these consequences are proposed and relevant empirical literature is reviewed. Focusing on differences in self-construals enables apparently inconsistent empirical findings to be reconciled, and raises questions about what have been thought to be culture-free aspects of cognition, emotion, and motivation.

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Culture and the self: Implications for cognition, emotion, and motivation.

Scholars of the theory of the firm have begun to emphasize the sources and conditions of what has been described as “the organizational advantage,” rather than focus on the causes and consequences of market failure. Typically, researchers see such organizational advantage as accruing from the particular capabilities organizations have for creating and sharing knowledge. In this article we seek to contribute to this body of work by developing the following arguments: (1) social capital facilitates the creation of new intellectual capital; (2) organizations, as institutional settings, are conducive to the development of high levels of social capital; and (3) it is because of their more dense social capital that firms, within certain limits, have an advantage over markets in creating and sharing intellectual capital. We present a model that incorporates this overall argument in the form of a series of hypothesized relationships between different dimensions of social capital and the main mechanisms and proces...

https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/259373.pdf

Social Capital, Intellectual Capital, and the Organizational Advantage

The psychology of interpersonal relations , The psychology of interpersonal relations , کتابخانه دیجیتال و فن آوری اطلاعات دانشگاه امام صادق(ع)

The psychology of interpersonal relations

Attention and Effort

Jerome Bruner argues that the cognitive revolution, with its current fixation on mind as "information processor;" has led psychology away from the deeper objective of understanding mind as a creator of meanings. Only by breaking out of the limitations imposed by a computational model of mind can we grasp the special interaction through which mind both constitutes and is constituted by culture. (http://books.google.fr/books?id=YHt_M41uIuUC&pg=PA157&dq=Bruner,+J.+%281990%29.+Acts+of+meaning&hl=fr&ei=EwOXTrqpCsPWsgaGgO2YBA&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CDMQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q&f=false)

Acts of meaning

Actual Minds, Possible Worlds.

THIS PAPER is concerned with the nature of the tutorial process; the means whereby an adult or \"expert\" helps somebody who is less adult or less expert. Though its aim is general, it is expressed in terms of a particular task: a tutor seeks to teach children aged 3, 4 and 5 yr to build a particular three-dimensional structure that requires a degree of skill that is initially beyond them. It is the usual type of tutoring situation in which one member \"knows the answer\" and the other does not, rather like a \"practical\" in which only the instructor \"knows how\". The changing interaction of tutor and children provide our data. A great deal of early problem solving by the developing child is of this order. Although from the earliest months of life he is a \"natural\" problem solver in his own right (e.g. Bruner, 1973) it is often the ease that his efforts are assisted and fostered by others who are more skilful than he is (Kaye, 1970). Whether he is learning the procedures that constitute the skills of attending, communicating, manipulating objects, locomoting, or, indeed, a more effective problem solving procedure itself, there are usually others in attendance who help him on his way. Tutorial interactions are, in short, a crucial feature of infancy and childhood. Our species, moreover, appears to be the only one in which any \"intentional\" tutoring goes on (Bruner, 1972; Hinde, 1971). For although it is true that many of the higher primate species learn by observation of their elders (Hamburg, 1968; van Lawick-Goodall, 1968), there is no evidence that those elders do anything to instruct their charges in the performance of the skill in question. What distinguishes man as a species is not only his capacity for learning, but for teaching as well. It is the main aim of this paper to examine some of the major implications of this interactive, instructional relationship between the developing child and his elders for the study of skill acquisition and problem solving. The acquisition of skill in the human child can be fruitfully conceived as a hierarchical program in which component skills are combined into \"higher skills\" by appropriate orchestration to meet new, more complex task requirements (Bruner, 1973). The process is analogous to problem solving in which mastery of \"lower order\" or constituent problems in a sine qua non for success with a larger jjroblcm, each level influencing the other—as with reading where the deciphering of words makes possible the deciphering of sentences, and sentences then aid in the deciphering of particular words (F. Smith, 1971). Given persistent intention in the young learner, given a \"lexicon\" of constituent skills, the crucial task is often one of com-

The role of tutoring in problem solving

The Process of Education

Preface Culture, Mind, and Education Folk Pedagogy The Complexity of Educational Aims Teaching the Present, Past, and Possible Understanding and Explaining Other Minds Narratives of Science The Narrative Construal of Reality Knowing as Doing Psychology's Next Chapter Notes Credits Index

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Jerome S. Bruner

Papers

Acts of meaning

Actual Minds, Possible Worlds.

The role of tutoring in problem solving

The Process of Education

The culture of education