Jiming Chen

Bio: Jiming Chen is an academic researcher from Zhejiang University. The author has contributed to research in topics: Wireless sensor network & Key distribution in wireless sensor networks. The author has an hindex of 58, co-authored 329 publications receiving 12220 citations. Previous affiliations of Jiming Chen include Zhejiang Chinese Medical University.

A Survey on Demand Response in Smart Grids: Mathematical Models and Approaches

Abstract: The smart grid is widely considered to be the informationization of the power grid. As an essential characteristic of the smart grid, demand response can reschedule the users’ energy consumption to reduce the operating expense from expensive generators, and further to defer the capacity addition in the long run. This survey comprehensively explores four major aspects: 1) programs; 2) issues; 3) approaches; and 4) future extensions of demand response. Specifically, we first introduce the means/tariffs that the power utility takes to incentivize users to reschedule their energy usage patterns. Then we survey the existing mathematical models and problems in the previous and current literatures, followed by the state-of-the-art approaches and solutions to address these issues. Finally, based on the above overview, we also outline the potential challenges and future research directions in the context of demand response.

Smart community: an internet of things application

Abstract: In this article, we introduce an Internet of Things application, smart community, which refers to a paradigmatic class of cyber-physical systems with cooperating objects (i.e., networked smart homes). We then define the smart community architecture, and describe how to realize secure and robust networking among individual homes. We present two smart community applications, Neighborhood Watch and Pervasive Healthcare, with supporting techniques and associated challenges, and envision a few value-added smart community services.

Optimal DoS Attack Scheduling in Wireless Networked Control System

Abstract: Recently, many literature works have considered the security issues of wireless networked control system (WNCS). However, few works studied how the attacker should optimize its attack schedule in order to maximize the effect on the system performance due to the insufficiency of energy at the attacker side. This paper fills this gap from the aspect of control system performance. We consider the optimal jamming attack that maximizes the Linear Quadratic Gaussian (LQG) control cost function under energy constraint. After analyzing the properties of the cost function under an arbitrary attack schedule, we derive the optimal jamming attack schedule and the corresponding cost function. System stability under this optimal attack schedule is also considered. We further investigate the optimal attack schedule in a WNCS with multiple subsystems. Different examples are provided to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed optimal denial-of-service attack schedule.

Optimal Denial-of-Service Attack Scheduling With Energy Constraint

Abstract: Security of Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) has gained increasing attention in recent years. Most existing works mainly investigate the system performance given some attacking patterns. In this technical note, we investigate how an attacker should schedule its Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks to degrade the system performance. Specifically, we consider the scenario where a sensor sends its data to a remote estimator through a wireless channel, while an energy-constrained attacker decides whether to jam the channel at each sampling time. We construct optimal attack schedules to maximize the expected average estimation error at the remote estimator. We also provide the optimal attack schedules when a special intrusion detection system (IDS) at the estimator is given. We further discuss the optimal attack schedules when the sensor has energy constraint. Numerical examples are presented to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed optimal attack schedules.

Demand Response Management With Multiple Utility Companies: A Two-Level Game Approach

Abstract: Demand Response Management (DRM) is a key component of the future smart grid that helps to reduce power peak load and variation. Different from most existing studies that focus on the scenario with a single utility company, this paper studies DRM with multiple utility companies. First, the interaction between utility companies and residential users is modeled as a two-level game. That is, the competition among the utility companies is formulated as a non-cooperative game, while the interaction among the residential users is formulated as an evolutionary game. Then, we prove that the proposed strategies are able to make both games converge to their own equilibrium. In addtion, the strategies for the utility companies and the residential users are implemented by distributed algorithms. Illustrative examples show that the proposed scheme is able to significantly reduce peak load and demand variation.

博弈论 : 矛盾冲突分析 = Game theory : analysis of conflict

Abstract: Preface 1. Decision-Theoretic Foundations 1.1 Game Theory, Rationality, and Intelligence 1.2 Basic Concepts of Decision Theory 1.3 Axioms 1.4 The Expected-Utility Maximization Theorem 1.5 Equivalent Representations 1.6 Bayesian Conditional-Probability Systems 1.7 Limitations of the Bayesian Model 1.8 Domination 1.9 Proofs of the Domination Theorems Exercises 2. Basic Models 2.1 Games in Extensive Form 2.2 Strategic Form and the Normal Representation 2.3 Equivalence of Strategic-Form Games 2.4 Reduced Normal Representations 2.5 Elimination of Dominated Strategies 2.6 Multiagent Representations 2.7 Common Knowledge 2.8 Bayesian Games 2.9 Modeling Games with Incomplete Information Exercises 3. Equilibria of Strategic-Form Games 3.1 Domination and Ratonalizability 3.2 Nash Equilibrium 3.3 Computing Nash Equilibria 3.4 Significance of Nash Equilibria 3.5 The Focal-Point Effect 3.6 The Decision-Analytic Approach to Games 3.7 Evolution. Resistance. and Risk Dominance 3.8 Two-Person Zero-Sum Games 3.9 Bayesian Equilibria 3.10 Purification of Randomized Strategies in Equilibria 3.11 Auctions 3.12 Proof of Existence of Equilibrium 3.13 Infinite Strategy Sets Exercises 4. Sequential Equilibria of Extensive-Form Games 4.1 Mixed Strategies and Behavioral Strategies 4.2 Equilibria in Behavioral Strategies 4.3 Sequential Rationality at Information States with Positive Probability 4.4 Consistent Beliefs and Sequential Rationality at All Information States 4.5 Computing Sequential Equilibria 4.6 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria 4.7 Games with Perfect Information 4.8 Adding Chance Events with Small Probability 4.9 Forward Induction 4.10 Voting and Binary Agendas 4.11 Technical Proofs Exercises 5. Refinements of Equilibrium in Strategic Form 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Perfect Equilibria 5.3 Existence of Perfect and Sequential Equilibria 5.4 Proper Equilibria 5.5 Persistent Equilibria 5.6 Stable Sets 01 Equilibria 5.7 Generic Properties 5.8 Conclusions Exercises 6. Games with Communication 6.1 Contracts and Correlated Strategies 6.2 Correlated Equilibria 6.3 Bayesian Games with Communication 6.4 Bayesian Collective-Choice Problems and Bayesian Bargaining Problems 6.5 Trading Problems with Linear Utility 6.6 General Participation Constraints for Bayesian Games with Contracts 6.7 Sender-Receiver Games 6.8 Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria 6.9 Communication in Extensive-Form and Multistage Games Exercises Bibliographic Note 7. Repeated Games 7.1 The Repeated Prisoners Dilemma 7.2 A General Model of Repeated Garnet 7.3 Stationary Equilibria of Repeated Games with Complete State Information and Discounting 7.4 Repeated Games with Standard Information: Examples 7.5 General Feasibility Theorems for Standard Repeated Games 7.6 Finitely Repeated Games and the Role of Initial Doubt 7.7 Imperfect Observability of Moves 7.8 Repeated Wines in Large Decentralized Groups 7.9 Repeated Games with Incomplete Information 7.10 Continuous Time 7.11 Evolutionary Simulation of Repeated Games Exercises 8. Bargaining and Cooperation in Two-Person Games 8.1 Noncooperative Foundations of Cooperative Game Theory 8.2 Two-Person Bargaining Problems and the Nash Bargaining Solution 8.3 Interpersonal Comparisons of Weighted Utility 8.4 Transferable Utility 8.5 Rational Threats 8.6 Other Bargaining Solutions 8.7 An Alternating-Offer Bargaining Game 8.8 An Alternating-Offer Game with Incomplete Information 8.9 A Discrete Alternating-Offer Game 8.10 Renegotiation Exercises 9. Coalitions in Cooperative Games 9.1 Introduction to Coalitional Analysis 9.2 Characteristic Functions with Transferable Utility 9.3 The Core 9.4 The Shapkey Value 9.5 Values with Cooperation Structures 9.6 Other Solution Concepts 9.7 Colational Games with Nontransferable Utility 9.8 Cores without Transferable Utility 9.9 Values without Transferable Utility Exercises Bibliographic Note 10. Cooperation under Uncertainty 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Concepts of Efficiency 10.3 An Example 10.4 Ex Post Inefficiency and Subsequent Oilers 10.5 Computing Incentive-Efficient Mechanisms 10.6 Inscrutability and Durability 10.7 Mechanism Selection by an Informed Principal 10.8 Neutral Bargaining Solutions 10.9 Dynamic Matching Processes with Incomplete Information Exercises Bibliography Index

IEEE transactions on pattern analysis and machine intelligence

Abstract: In the real world, a realistic setting for computer vision or multimedia recognition problems is that we have some classes containing lots of training data and many classes contain a small amount of training data. Therefore, how to use frequent classes to help learning rare classes for which it is harder to collect the training data is an open question. Learning with Shared Information is an emerging topic in machine learning, computer vision and multimedia analysis. There are different level of components that can be shared during concept modeling and machine learning stages, such as sharing generic object parts, sharing attributes, sharing transformations, sharing regularization parameters and sharing training examples, etc. Regarding the specific methods, multi-task learning, transfer learning and deep learning can be seen as using different strategies to share information. These learning with shared information methods are very effective in solving real-world large-scale problems. This special issue aims at gathering the recent advances in learning with shared information methods and their applications in computer vision and multimedia analysis. Both state-of-the-art works, as well as literature reviews, are welcome for submission. Papers addressing interesting real-world computer vision and multimedia applications are especially encouraged. Topics of interest include, but are not limited to: • Multi-task learning or transfer learning for large-scale computer vision and multimedia analysis • Deep learning for large-scale computer vision and multimedia analysis • Multi-modal approach for large-scale computer vision and multimedia analysis • Different sharing strategies, e.g., sharing generic object parts, sharing attributes, sharing transformations, sharing regularization parameters and sharing training examples, • Real-world computer vision and multimedia applications based on learning with shared information, e.g., event detection, object recognition, object detection, action recognition, human head pose estimation, object tracking, location-based services, semantic indexing. • New datasets and metrics to evaluate the benefit of the proposed sharing ability for the specific computer vision or multimedia problem. • Survey papers regarding the topic of learning with shared information. Authors who are unsure whether their planned submission is in scope may contact the guest editors prior to the submission deadline with an abstract, in order to receive feedback.