Financial systems are crucial to the allocation of resources in a modern economy. They channel household savings to the corporate sector and allocate investment funds among firms; they allow intertemporal smoothing of consumption by households and expenditures by firms; and they enable households and firms to share risks. These functions are common to the financial systems of most developed economies. Yet the form of these financial systems varies widely. In the United States and the United Kingdom competitive markets dominate the financial landscape, whereas in France, Germany, and Japan banks have traditionally played the most important role. Why do different countries have such different financial systems? Is one system better than all the others? Do different systems merely represent alternative ways of satisfying similar needs? Is the current trend toward market-based systems desirable? Franklin Allen and Douglas Gale argue that the view that market-based systems are best is simplistic. A more nuanced approach is necessary. For example, financial markets may be bad for risk sharing; competition in banking may be inefficient; financial crises can be good as well as bad; and separation of ownership and control can be optimal. Financial institutions are not simply veils, disguising the allocation mechanism without affecting it, but are crucial to overcoming market imperfections. An optimal financial system relies on both financial markets and financial intermediaries.

比较金融系统 = Comparing financial systems

Comparing financial systems.

This paper examines preferences toward particular classes of lottery pairs. We show how such concepts as prudence and temperance can be fully characterized by a preference relation over these lotteries. If preferences are defined in an expected-utility framework with differentiable utility, the direction of preference for a particular class of lottery pairs is equivalent to signing the nth derivative of the utility function. What makes our characterization appealing is its simplicity, which seems particularly amenable to experimentation.

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Putting Risk in Its Proper Place

Both textbook economics and common sense teach us that the value of household wealth should be related to consumer spending At the same time, movements in asset values often seem disassociated with important movements in consumer spending, as episodes such as the 1987 stock market crash and the contraction in equity values that occurred in the fall of 1998 suggest An important first step in understanding the consumption-wealth linkage is determining how closely the two variables are actually correlated, and whether there exist important movements in asset values that are not associated with changes in consumption This paper provides evidence that a surprisingly small fraction of the variation in household net worth is related to variation in aggregate consumer spending We use empirical techniques that allow us to quantify the relative importance of permanent and transitory innovations in the variation of consumer spending and wealth and find that transitory shocks dominate post-war variation in wealth, while permanent shocks dominate variation in aggregate consumption Although transitory innovations are found to have little influence on consumer spending, they have long-lasting effects on wealth , exhibiting a half-life of a little over two years The findings suggest that most macro models which make no allowance for transitory variation in wealth that is orthogonal to consumption are likely to misstate both the timing and magnitude of the consumption-wealth linkage(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item)

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Understanding Trend and Cycle in Asset Values: Reevaluating the Wealth Effect on Consumption

This paper presents a simple new method for measuring 'wealth effects' on aggregate consumption. The method exploits the stickiness of consumption growth (sometimes interpreted as reflecting consumption 'habits') to distinguish between immediate and eventual wealth effects. In U.S. data, we estimate that the immediate (next-quarter) marginal propensity to consume from a $1 change in housing wealth is about 2 cents, with a final eventual effect around 9 cents, substantially larger than the effect of shocks to financial wealth. We argue that our method is preferable to cointegration-based approaches, because neither theory nor evidence supports faith in the existence of a stable cointegrating vector.

How Large are Housing and Financial Wealth Effects? A New Approach

This paper studies the long-run relationship between consumption, asset wealth and income in Germany, based on data from 1980 to 2003. While earlier studies - mostly for the Anglo-Saxon economies - have generally documented that departures of these three variables from their common trend signal changes in asset prices, we find that for Germany they predict changes in income. Asset price changes are found to have virtually no effect on consumption - both in the short as well as in the long-run. We offer an explanation of this finding that emphasizes differences between the bank-based German financial system and the rather market-based Anglo-American system: stock ownership by private households is much less widespread in Germany than in the Anglo-Saxon economies and the share of publicly traded equity in household wealth is much smaller in Germany than in the U.S., the UK or Australia.

Consumption, Wealth and Business Cycles in Germany

This paper studies the long-run relationship between consumption, asset wealth and income—the consumption–wealth ratio—based on German data from 1980 to 2003. We find that departures from this long-run relationship mainly predict adjustments in income. The German consumption–wealth ratio also contains considerable forecasting power for a range of business cycle indicators, including the unemployment rate. This finding is in contrast to earlier studies for some of the Anglo-Saxon economies that have shown that the consumption–wealth ratio reverts to its long-run mean mainly through subsequent adjustments in asset prices. While the German consumption wealth ratio contains little information about future changes in German asset prices, we report that the U.S. consumption–wealth ratio has considerable forecasting power for the German stock market. One explanation of these findings is that in Germany—due to structural differences in the financial and pension systems—the share of publicly traded equity in aggregate household wealth is much smaller than in the Anglo-Saxon countries. We discuss the implications of our results for the measurement of a potential wealth effect on consumption.

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Consumption, wealth and business cycles in Germany

This paper studies the long-run relationship between consumption, asset wealth and income — the consumption-wealth ratio — in Germany, based on data from 1980 to 2003. Earlier papers for the Anglo-Saxon economies have documented that departures of these three variables from their common trend signal future changes in asset prices. We find that for Germany they predict changes in income — the consumption wealth ratio predicts business cycles, not stock market cycles. Asset price changes are found to have virtually no effect on German consumption, both in the short as well as in the long-run. Conversely, German asset prices are predictable from the U.S. consumption-wealth ratio. We offer an explanation of these findings that emphasizes structural differences between the bank-based German financial system and the rather market-based Anglo-American system: stock ownership by private households is much less widespread in Germany than in the Anglo-Saxon economies and the share of publicly traded equity in household wealth is much smaller in Germany than in the U.S., the UK or Australia. JEL-classification: E21, E32, E44, G12, G20

https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/19524/1/200516dkp.pdf

Consumption, wealth and business cycles: why is Germany different?

This paper is a case study that focuses on possible incentive problems in the management of Collateralized Loan Obligations (CLOs). CLOs are the most important type of special purpose vehicles in the leveraged loan market, and their managers appear to have a considerable impact on performance. Specifically, this article identifies the potential incentive, or agency, problems facing CLO managers, and the mechanisms that have been put in place to mitigate these problems. These mechanisms, including structural provisions, financial incentives and reputational concerns, should work fairly effectively. However, the analysis reveals some gaps which may allow managers to engage in certain adverse strategies. Specifically, the article raises concerns about the reliability of constraints on overall portfolio risk, the so-called portfolio tests, and about the effectiveness of reputation as a disciplining device. Both concerns are related to the benign market conditions until the summer of 2007 which - at least until now - prevented, any "stress-testing" of CLOs and differentiation between managers. This paper analyzes also evidence on CLO transactions in which managers buy/hold a portion of the equity tranche. Although retention of the equity tranche is only one of several incentive aligning mechanisms and not a general requirement, the analysis reveals that factors related to the agency problems can explain why in certain cases managers buy/hold a portion of the equity tranche. Specifically, first time managers and managers of a risky transaction buy/hold more frequently a portion of the equity tranche. Furthermore, buy/hold patterns change over time, which suggest that competitive effects and market trends play a role in the question whether to retain a portion of the equity tranche.

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Agency problems in structured finance - a case study of European CLOs

In dieser Arbeit werden "risikoneutrale" Dichtefunktionen uber kunftige DAX-Indexstande aus taglich beobachteten Preisen europaischer Kauf- und Verkaufsoptionen mit verschiedenen Restlaufzeiten abgeleitet. Das hierbei verwendete Berechnungsverfahren beruht auf der Mischung von zwei Log-Normalverteilung, bei dem funf Parameter (der Mischungsparameter, zwei Mittelwerte und zwei Standardabweichungen) so bestimmt werden, dass der quadratische Abstand zwischen beobachteten und impliziten Optionspreisen minimal ist. Die Preisnotierungen fur die Derivative werden der Eurex entnommen und der Untersuchungszeitraum erstreckt sich von Dezember 1995 bis Mai 2002, also sowohl uber die Boom- als auch uber die Niedergangsphase des DAX. Die Vorhersagehorizonte der Dichten sind auf Grund der Datenlage auf sechs bis acht Wochen begrenzt. Die Vorhersagegute dieser Dichten wird uber verschiedene neuartige statistische Evaluierungsverfahren abgeschatzt. Im Ergebnis stellt sich folgendes heraus: Erstens: Die Dichten weisen im Durchschnitt eine negative Schiefe (negatives drittes Moment) auf, so dass das linke Ende der Dichte "dicker" ist als das rechte und die Marktteilnehmer somit einen bestimmten prozentualen Kursverlust als wahrscheinlicher einschatzten als einen Kursgewinn. Zweitens: Die Evaluierungstests fur die Dichten machen deutlich, dass die tatsachlichen Dichten im Mittel deutlich von den risikoneutralen Dichten abweichen. Dabei kann ausgeschlossen werden, dass es sich lediglich um einen "Mittelwert"fehler handelt. Vielmehr scheinen die Markteilnehmer sowohl in der Aufschwung- als auch in der Abschwungphase von den Kursbewegungen des DAX uberrascht worden zu.

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Joachim Keller

Papers

Consumption, Wealth and Business Cycles in Germany

Consumption, wealth and business cycles in Germany

Consumption, wealth and business cycles: why is Germany different?

Agency problems in structured finance - a case study of European CLOs

The Forecasting Performance of German Stock Option Densities