Joan Farre-Mensa

Bio: Joan Farre-Mensa is an academic researcher from University of Illinois at Chicago. The author has contributed to research in topics: Initial public offering & Stock market. The author has an hindex of 13, co-authored 23 publications receiving 1812 citations. Previous affiliations of Joan Farre-Mensa include Harvard University.

Corporate Investment and Stock Market Listing: A Puzzle?

Abstract: We investigate whether short-termism distorts the investment decisions of stock market listed firms. To do so, we compare the investment behavior of observably similar public and private firms using a new data source on private U.S. firms, assuming for identification that closely held private firms are subject to fewer short-termist pressures. Our results show that compared to private firms, public firms invest substantially less and are less responsive to changes in investment opportunities, especially in industries in which stock prices are most sensitive to earnings news. These findings are consistent with the notion that short-termist pressures distort their investment decisions.

Do Measures of Financial Constraints Measure Financial Constraints

Abstract: Financial constraints are fundamental to empirical research in finance and economics. We propose two novel tests to evaluate how well measures of financial constraints actually capture constraints. We find that firms classified as constrained according to five popular measures do not in fact behave as if they were constrained: they have no trouble raising debt when their demand for debt increases exogenously and they use the proceeds of equity issues to increase payouts to shareholders. We propose an alternative proxy for financial constraints, based on Merton’s (1974) distance-to-default measure, which successfully identifies firms whose behavior is consistent with being constrained.

Corporate Investment and Stock Market Listing: A Puzzle?

Abstract: We investigate whether short-termism distorts the investment decisions of stock market-listed firms. To do so, we compare the investment behavior of observably similar public and private firms, using a new data source on private U.S. firms and assuming for identification that closely held private firms are subject to fewer short-termist pressures. Our results show that compared with private firms, public firms invest substantially less and are less responsive to changes in investment opportunities, especially in industries in which stock prices are most sensitive to earnings news. These findings are consistent with the notion that short-termist pressures distort investment decisions.

Do Measures of Financial Constraints Measure Financial Constraints

Abstract: Financial constraints are fundamental to empirical research in finance and economics. We propose two tests to evaluate how well measures of financial constraints actually capture constraints. We find that firms typically classified as constrained do not actually behave as if they were constrained: they have no trouble raising debt when their demand for debt increases exogenously and use the proceeds of equity issues to increase payouts to shareholders. Our evidence suggests that extant findings that have been attributed to constraints may instead reflect differences in the growth and financing policies of firms at different stages of their life cycles.

Do Measures of Financial Constraints Measure Financial Constraints

Abstract: Financial constraints are fundamental to empirical research in finance and economics. We propose two tests to evaluate how well measures of financial constraints actually capture constraints. We find that firms typically classified as constrained do not in fact behave as if they were constrained: they have no trouble raising debt when their demand for debt increases exogenously and they use the proceeds of equity issues to increase payouts to shareholders. Our evidence suggests that extant findings that have been attributed to constraints may instead reflect differences in the growth and financing policies of firms at different stages of their lifecycles.

The Dark Side of Analyst Coverage: The Case of Innovation

Abstract: We examine the effects of financial analysts on the real economy in the case of innovation. Our baseline results show that firms covered by a larger number of analysts generate fewer patents and patents with lower impact. To establish causality, we use a difference-in-differences approach that relies on the variation generated by multiple exogenous shocks to analyst coverage, as well as an instrumental variable approach. Our identification strategies suggest a negative causal effect of analyst coverage on firm innovation. The evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that analysts exert too much pressure on managers to meet short-term goals, impeding firms’ investment in long-term innovative projects. We further discuss possible underlying mechanisms through which analysts impede innovation and show that there is a residual effect of analysts on innovation even after controlling for these mechanisms. Our paper offers novel evidence on a previously under-explored adverse consequence of analyst coverage — its hindrance to firm innovation.

Does Stock Liquidity Enhance or Impede Firm Innovation

Abstract: We aim to tackle the longstanding debate on whether stock liquidity enhances or impedes firm innovation This topic is of interest because innovation is crucial for firm- and national-level competitiveness and stock liquidity can be altered by financial market regulations Using a difference-in-differences approach that relies on the exogenous variation in liquidity generated by regulatory changes, we find that an increase in liquidity causes a reduction in future innovation We identify two possible mechanisms through which liquidity impedes innovation: increased exposure to hostile takeovers and higher presence of institutional investors who do not actively gather information or monitor

Corporate Investment and Stock Market Listing: A Puzzle?

Abstract: We investigate whether short-termism distorts the investment decisions of stock market listed firms. To do so, we compare the investment behavior of observably similar public and private firms using a new data source on private U.S. firms, assuming for identification that closely held private firms are subject to fewer short-termist pressures. Our results show that compared to private firms, public firms invest substantially less and are less responsive to changes in investment opportunities, especially in industries in which stock prices are most sensitive to earnings news. These findings are consistent with the notion that short-termist pressures distort their investment decisions.