Joanne Gowa

Bio: Joanne Gowa is an academic researcher from Princeton University. The author has contributed to research in topics: International relations & Free trade. The author has an hindex of 25, co-authored 37 publications receiving 3300 citations. Previous affiliations of Joanne Gowa include University of Pennsylvania & University of Pittsburgh.

Allies, Adversaries, and International Trade

Abstract: FiguresTablesAcknowledgmentsCh. 1Introduction3Ch. 2Hegemonic Stability Theory: A Critical Review11Ch. 3Allies, Adversaries, and Free Trade31Ch. 4Alliances and Trade: An Empirical Analysis54Ch. 5The Anglo-French Entente79Ch. 6Extensions and Qualifications108Ch. 7Conclusion120Appendix A: List of Alliances123Appendix B: British Import Duties, 1910-11125Bibliography129Index143

Power politics and international trade

Abstract: Recent literature attributes the relative scarcity of open international markets to the prisoner's dilemma structure of state preferences with respect to trade. We argue that the prisoner's dilemma representation does not reflect the most critical aspect of free trade agreements in an anarchic international system, namely, their security externalities. We consider these external effects explicitly. Doing so leads us to two conclusions: (1) free trade is more likely within, rather than across, political-military alliances; and (2) alliances are more likely to evolve into free-trade coalitions if they are embedded in bipolar systems than in multipolar systems. Using data drawn from an 80-year period beginning in 1905, we test these hypotheses. The results of the analysis make it clear that alliances do have a direct, statistically significant, and large impact on bilateral trade flows and that this relationship is stronger in bipolar, rather than in multipolar, systems.

Power politics and international trade

Abstract: Recent literature attributes the relative scarcity of open international markets to the prisoner's dilemma structure of state preferences with respect to trade. We argue that the prisoner's dilemma representation does not reflect the most critical aspect of free trade agreements in an anarchic international system, namely, their security externalities. We consider these external effects explicitly. Doing so leads us to two conclusions: (1) free trade is more likely within, rather than across, political-military alliances; and (2) alliances are more likely to evolve into free-trade coalitions if they are embedded in bipolar systems than in multipolar systems. Using data drawn from an SO-year period beginning in 1905, we test these hypotheses. The results of the analysis make it clear that alliances do have a direct, statistically significant, and large impact on bilateral trade flows and that this relationship is stronger in bipolar, rather than in multipolar, systems…

Polities and Peace

Abstract: In recent months, the Clinton administration has begun to advocate a replacement for the doctrine of containment that drove U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War. According to Anthony Lake, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the leading candidate to succeed containment is "a strategy of enlargementenlargement of the world's ... community of market democracies."' President Clinton concurs, noting that a strategy of enlargement serves U.S. interests because "democracies rarely wage war on one another."2 Several empirical analyses suggest that the Clinton administration's advocacy of enlargement is well-grounded. They conclude that democratic states do pursue distinctive foreign policies. Perhaps the most intriguing among their findings is that democratic states rarely, if ever, wage war against other democratic states. Indeed, some observers consider this finding to be "as close as anything we have to an empirical law in international relations."3 Yet doubts remain about whether the observed association reflects a causal relationship.4 In this paper, we attempt to resolve these doubts. In order to do so, we reexamine both the logic and the empirical basis of the claim central to

Ballots and Bullets: The Elusive Democratic Peace

Abstract: This text disputes the belief that "democracies don't fight each other". The author argues that those who belive a democratic peace exists, typically examine the 1815-1980 period as a whole, conflating the pre-World War I and post-World War II years. Examining these periods separately, the book contends that a democratic peace prevailed only during the latter period. It calls into question the conclusions of previous researchers and the wisdom of present US foreign policy initiatives.

International Norm Dynamics and Political Change

Abstract: Norms have never been absent from the study of international politics, but the sweeping “ideational turn” in the 1980s and 1990s brought them back as a central theoretical concern in the field. Much theorizing about norms has focused on how they create social structure, standards of appropriateness, and stability in international politics. Recent empirical research on norms, in contrast, has examined their role in creating political change, but change processes have been less well-theorized. We induce from this research a variety of theoretical arguments and testable hypotheses about the role of norms in political change. We argue that norms evolve in a three-stage “life cycle” of emergence, “norm cascades,” and internalization, and that each stage is governed by different motives, mechanisms, and behavioral logics. We also highlight the rational and strategic nature of many social construction processes and argue that theoretical progress will only be made by placing attention on the connections between norms and rationality rather than by opposing the two.

Handbook of Economic Sociology

Abstract: During recent years social scientists have come to reaffirm that understanding almost any facet of social life requires a simultaneous understanding of how economic institutions work and how they are influenced by values and norms. Sociology, and especially economic sociology, is well equipped to be of assistance in this endeavor. Neil Smelser and Richard Swedberg bring together leading sociologists, economists, and political scientists in The Handbook of Economic Sociology, the first comprehensive view of this vital and growing field. "This excellent volume is a compilation of some of the best writing in this field over the past decade, including basic works like Oliver Williamson's transaction cost theory of the firm, and [is] a helpful comparison of economic sociology to mainstream economics." —Francis Fukuyama, Foreign Affairs "This is the first comprehensive theoretical and empirical account of the burgeoning field of economic sociology. The scholarship is consistently strong. . .. The book will be greeted warmly and read by serious scholars throughout the social sciences." —Robert K. Merton "This is a bold, ambitious, almost daunting project. ... It will surely become the standard reference book for the field—the sort of text every scholar will have to know-, consult, and cite." —Viviana Zelizer

Taking Time Seriously: Time-Series-Cross-Section Analysis with a Binary Dependent Variable

Abstract: Researchers typically analyze time-series-cross-section data with a binary dependent variable (BTSCS) using ordinary logit or probit. However, BTSCS observations are likely to violate the independence assumption of the ordinary logit or probit statistical model. It is well known that if the observations are temporally related that the results of an ordinary logit or probit analysis may be misleading. In this paper, we provide a simple diagnostic for temporal dependence and a simple remedy. Our remedy is based on the idea that BTSCS data are identical to grouped duration data. This remedy does not require the BTSCS analyst to acquire any further methodological skills, and it can be easily implemented in any standard statistical software package. While our approach is suitable for any type of BTSCS data, we provide examples and applications from the field of International Relations, where BTSCS data are frequently used. We use our methodology to reassess Oneal and Russett's (1997) findings regarding the relationship between economic interdependence, democracy, and peace. Our analyses show that (1) their finding that economic interdependence is associated with peace is an artifact of their failure to account for temporal dependence yet (2) their finding that democracy inhibits conflict is upheld even taking duration dependence into account.